Narratives have Consequences

One of the perennial questions on this blog when it is asserted that worldviews/narratives cannot be founded empirically/scientifically (which isn’t  however, to say that both those aspects don’t play a part) is, “Well, then how do we know which narrative is true?”  Leaving aside the huge presupposition contained in the question (which is that we can only know what’s true empirically/scientifically—so aren’t you really saying that every narrative could be true or conversely all false?), there are ways to evaluate differing narratives that don’t reduce to simply saying something like, “all the evidence and science are on the side of…”.  Such a statement merely begs the question.
One of the ways to reflect upon differing narratives is to ask these questions: What is this narrative’s cultural footprint?  How has it made the world a better or worse place?  Of course, remember, anyone using the terms “better” and “worse” already presuppose what such should mean and one is already using those terms within a narrative that gives those terms meaning.  But assuming those terms mean what is commonly meant in modern Western democracies, how does a narrative stack up, so to speak, as far as its impact on a culture/civilization?
Allow me to take a quick detour here before going further.  Even if we could point to the many good things a narrative has produced, this is never to say that we are not aware that any given narrative has also had negative impacts on a culture.  It is always a mixed bag.  When pointing out a good, it should never be without an awareness of the narrative’s dark side.  So please, I am well aware of the Crusades, Inquisition, and various other dark moments in Christian history.  I’m not interested in a comparison sheet of which narrative has the darker history.  That road goes nowhere.  I say upfront, every narrative has failed at points, is failing now, and will fail in the future.
There is one key feature of this duality (positive/dark side) that we must keep in mind however.  I would argue that the dark side of the Christian narrative has always come about because of those claiming the title (Christian) but divorcing themselves from the very core teachings and tradition of the narrative, or “reading” that core and tradition in a literal/wooden manner.  They read in a way that stresses “law” over “spirit” and cares more about purity and power than it does people.  In doing so, they are rebels and traitors in a way.  The very narrative they claim their own actually condemns them.  I would suggest that all fundamentalism (whether secular or religious) falls into this category. 
It follows then that this is an additional way of evaluating a narrative.  Does its dark side actually flow directly from its core and tradition or is it a betrayal of that very core and tradition?  I will give an example:  Christians are prohibited from committing murder.  Even if a law were passed and majority rule established that one could legally kill, let’s just say, any person from the islands of Fiji, it would still be morally wrong for a Christian.  If he were to kill a person from those islands, he would know he had acted outside and contrary to the narrative of the Gospel.  Even if he feigned ignorance, the greater Christian community would condemn the action as a betrayal.
Conversely, consider the narrative of scientific materialism.  It is neutral as to ethics or morality.  There is no “ought” there is only the “is.”  This is not to say that one could then say, “Well, even though there is no “ought” let’s create a way to live in community so that we don’t “eat” each other.  Here is the difference though.  That element, the “ought” is something that has to be added.  It is not something inherent to the narrative.  The narrative itself is silent.  In principle, there is no reason to ask why one couldn’t logically make the claim then, that, since there is no “ought” one “ought” to be able to do whatever his will and power enable him to do, even if that means dominating others, and name it “good.”  It is consistent and flows from the premises (there is no “ought”) of the narrative.  Agree or disagree, the logic is there.  It is not an inherent contradiction to the core of the narrative.
So I think there is a difference when we talk about the dark side of narratives, even when we admit all narratives have them.  Sometimes the dark side flows from a betrayal of that very narrative at its core.  In other cases, the dark side could be logically attributed to flowing from the very core of the narrative.  Another example is with a narrative like Nazism.  We should not be shocked that the Holocaust could happen under such a narrative.  It logically flows from the core of that narrative—or the space that is created by the narrative for that very thing to possibly happen and be seen, by those believing that narrative to be true, as “normal” or the “right” thing to do.  By the same token, we would be shocked if the Holocaust had happened if people like Dietrich Bonheoffer (or even just more moderate German leaders) had been as powerful politically as Hitler.  Why?  Because it would be such a complete and utter betrayal of the very narrative Bonheoffer believed.  
Getting back to the main point however, the other way of evaluating a narrative that differs from one’s own, is this idea of cultural footprint and whether the good accomplished appears to outweigh the bad.  Again, nothing like this “proves” that Christianity is true in any empirical or scientific sense, but that is not the point anyway.  As noted, no narrative (including philosophical naturalism/empiricism) is “proved” that way.  But we can ask, “Have these ideas, more often than not, proved to have good consequence over bad ones?”  Any narrative has to be able to move from the abstract to the concrete in the sense of the “rubber-meeting-the-road” culturally, politically, legally, and educationally at some point.  Regardless of any abstract arguments we might muster, we should be able to point to something concrete and say, “Yes that over there, such is a result of interpreting (seeing) the world a certain way— and that result, in people’s lives, is and has been a good thing.”
I think the “good” things pointed out in this essayare such things.  These are the things that make a narrative “true.”  If these elements were missing, regardless of any other empirical or scientific support a narrative may have, it would still be a false narrative.
To be clear, I’m not saying that only the Christian narrative has produced good things.  Many narratives I would ultimately disagree with have also produced good things—they’ve left a positive cultural footprint in many areas.  For instance, the narratives derived from the Greek tradition as shown in the works of Aristotle, Socrates, and Plato.  I’m simply saying that at some point we need to be able to observe what a narrative actually produces in the lives of a culture over time.  It is one “empirical” way of evaluating narratives.  This doesn’t remove it from the realm of interpretation.  One person may see a church providing free education and medical care to orphans, but only see “indoctrination” and control—thus interpreting such to be a negative impact.  None of this is “objective” or neutral “evidence” to be offered as “proof.”  Putting that aside, I think a reasonable person will see my point that, on the whole, we can observe what a narrative has produced culturally over time and make a general assessment of whether or not it has had a more positive effect than negative or visa-versa.

Narratives have consequences.  What are some of the positive consequences of your narrative–such that they can be linked directly to that narrative? 
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39 Responses to Narratives have Consequences

  1. Hi Darrell

    I agree there's much to be gained from seeking to unpick the pragmatic effects of embracing particular narratives. I imagine this is particularly fruitful if one looks not so much for the best narrative, as the best in each narrative. The potential for making use of the best bits, and disregarding the junk, strikes me as interesting.

    But while such analysis, fraught as it is with the dangers of confirmation bias, might tell us something about the impact of narratives, they don't get us any closer to working out which, if any, best represent the truth. Is there any way of working through that, do you think, or are you more of the mind that when it comes to describing how the world really is, there's no way of assessing the relative merits of particular world views? Or perhaps you're more of the pragmatic mindset, that the impact of a model is all we can meaningfully refer to, when speaking of truth?

    Interested in your perspective on this.

    Bernard

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  2. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    It depends on what you mean by “truth.” When you say “how the world really works” my sense is that you are speaking of the physical. And this is where methodological naturalism comes in. While there are many mysteries and much we still do not know, we know to a great degree “how the world really works” and what is “true” about the physical world.

    The issue becomes reflecting upon the “ought” from the “is.” The Christian conception of truth is that it’s personal. Jesus said he was the “truth.” There is a difference between a fact, a piece of information, and the “truth.” One is helpful and important, especially if we are planning a trip to the moon. The other though is even more important because it tells us how the world “ought” to be and touches upon so much more.

    That was my point about accessing the “truth” of a narrative. No matter how scientific and empirical a narrative might be, if the culture or civilization produced by that narrative is cruel, unjust, indifferent to the poor and marginal, war like, and completely obsessed with its own power, then such a narrative is false. The Christian narrative would hold that saying something like, “The Holocaust was evil” is truer and more important than saying something like, “The earth is round.” And to recognize that difference is to say something about “how the world really works.”

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  3. Hi Darrell

    Yes, I'm initially interested in the 'is' truths, in part because my own world view isn't particularly big on oughts.

    Your world view appears to include some 'is' statements regarding existence, for example you hold God exists. My question is, can the 'is' statements or various world views be assessed, when they refer to something more than the physical realm? If we can't assess them in any way (assuming that the pragmatic outcomes do not speak to their truth, and I think I've read in previous comments that you're not such a type of pragmatist) on what grounds do we hold that one 'is' statement is a better representation of the truth than another?

    I can see how we would reach the conclusion 'this statement is more truthful for me' by referring to its fit within an individual's holisitic world view, but how to go from there to 'this is the best representation of the truth' which I think, in the case of God's existence, you hold to.

    Bernard

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  4. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    You seem to be speaking of “is” statements in a different context than that which I reference in the post. Normally when philosophers are speaking of the “ought” from the “is” problem it is in reference to ethics and morality. Nature, the physical world, simply “is” as a brute fact. But it is silent as to whether the “law of the jungle” should or “ought” to be different as to human relations. Historically, we know at certain times the practice of slavery was the state-of-affairs, it was thought to be the “natural” state of nature; it simply “was” or “is.” Someone had to say, “It ought not to be this way.”

    And you are quite right that empiricists (of whatever stripe) are not big on “ought to’s” because a strictly empirical view doesn’t make any room for them. But even if only personal, we all have some. We might say one “ought” to restrict their beliefs to only those things that can be proved empirically. Or that one “ought” to be tolerant of others.

    As to what I can gather from the gist of your question and thoughts, I think I gestured toward the answers in my post. Narratives (even the narratives of scientific materialism/naturalism/empiricism) cannot be founded, initially, empirically or scientifically. They are first believed—a choice is made to view the world that way, thus my constant assertion we all live by faith. We can observe however the results of narratives. This isn't an argument for pragmatism as there is no attempt here to say that a narrative’s pragmatic results “prove” that narrative to be conclusively “true” or that we should adopt a narrative simply because it seems to “work.” When we think of a narrative’s “oughts” we can see that often they are not the most practical or efficient course. If an economy is entirely based upon slave labor and someone comes along as says “We ought not to own people” it may not be a practical thing at all to completely dissolve such an economy and move to something else. We see this environmentally as well. For some corporations it may not be the most practical thing to do because being environmentally sensitive may cost more and be more inefficient. My point is a rather simple one. If one narrative seems to result in hospitals and orphanages while another seems to result in concentration camps and gas chambers, we have every right as reasonable people to judge and comment on the differences. It is one way we can say if one narrative is “truer” than another.

    I would also caution that when we are speaking of narratives, we are not, as you suggest, speaking of something that is an “individual’s holistic” worldview in the sense of just a personal private preference. We are speaking of those grand narratives (Christianity, Buddhism, Scientific Materialism) that are larger than any one individual, have a tradition, and are recognized in a public way.

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  5. Hi Darrell

    Yes, I think this is the key difference between us. On matters of faith, you simply choose to believe others are wrong, for no reason other than this is were your faith takes you.

    On those matters that can not be resolved by means of shared observation and reasoning, I prefer to give alternative world views the benefit of the doubt.

    Bernard

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  6. Darrell says:

    What? Where are you getting that?

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  7. Hi Darrell

    As you say 'a choice is made to view the world that way.' When one chooses to view the world in such a way that it holds as true certain facts of existence (e.g God exists) then one is choosing, as a matter of faith, to simply believe anybody who doesn't see it that way has got it wrong. Fair enough. I don't think it's a bad way of doing things, for having such beliefs offers many advantages. But it is the intellectual price we pay for them, and a great many non-theists reject theism precisely because this feels too high a cost for them.

    The alternative is to ground one's world view in those faith-based statements that do not entail dismissing contradictory viewpoints, what we ended up referring to as propositional beliefs (of the form, person A believes that statement B is true ). That we reached agreement last time around that the agnostic need not hold any such beliefs leaves room for the distinction I highlighted, and I think may serve to explain to many theists what it is that motivates non-theists to choose an alternative world view.

    Bernard

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  8. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    But it is also a choice for you to view the world the way you do, which is empirically. And in so doing, you also are prevented from believing that other narratives are true as well.

    I have a feeling when you write that I think others wrong for “no reason” you mean empirical reasons, true? Because I gave some reasons for how we could evaluate differing narratives. Further, I've already pointed out that narratives cannot be “proved” strictly empirically, including yours. But we can certainly evaluate the empirical results of differing faiths, including yours or atheists. Do you disagree? Or perhaps you think philosophies/narratives/faiths/worldviews have no empirical consequences?

    Further, noting something like “The earth is round” is not a faith based assertion. It is an empirical one. And the fact there is agreement about such an assertion is trivial to say the least. Do you suppose that if the British and Americans had just sat down with the Nazis and gone over all the empirical facts they agreed upon war could have been averted?

    How is it you think you give other narratives the benefit of the doubt when you erect an arbitrary faith-based restriction whose only purpose is to create a barrier another narrative could never pass to begin with (because they are not established that way anyway)? It would be like a person who built a moat around their castle (their narrative), pulled up the drawbridge, and then claimed they were completely open to strangers dropping by to talk. “They may be right; I give them the benefit of the doubt.” “Oh, that’s nice,” we reply. “How do they get across the moat?” “Oh,” you reply, “They can’t unless I lower the drawbridge (the restriction).” “Wow,” we respond, “Do you ever lower it?” “Nope; of course, if they hold to my restriction and my type of empiricism, I might.” “But, you know, I’m open and will continue to give them the benefit of the doubt.”

    That is very big of you Bernard. 🙂

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  9. Darrell says:

    Oh, and just so you have it again, here was my last response regarding your “I believe A to be true” challenge and it is still irrelevant:

    Bernard,

    Yes, I agree that they do not take that strict propositional form. And, such is irrelevant to this discussion even though it may bring you some sort of personal comfort. At the end of the day, as even Burk noted, you are an empiricist. Yes, I know, a very qualified empiricist. Duly noted.

    And, as you know, one chooses to be an empiricist. One isn't forced by pure logic or deduction to be one. It is a faith choice to view the world that way. And to view the world that way clearly does lead to a contested view of the world, thus this discussion.

    So tell me again, what was it that you accomplished?

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  10. Hi Darrell

    What is achieved, I suppose, is this. If one does not hold contested beliefs of the propositional form, then one does not deny the alternative belief. If I hold 'A is true' then I by definition hold that those who believe 'Not A is true' are wrong.

    Not so for the agnostic, we avoid this dismissal.

    Now, you have given methods for evaluating the usefulness of narratives, their pragmatic implications, but no method for evaluating their truthfulness. In this sense, your dismissal of alternative potential truths is a dismissal without reason.

    Bernard

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  11. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    I have also shown that your distinction is without a difference. One doesn't need to “dismiss” anything if he has rig the test such that a differing narrative can never pass it.

    I addressed the pragmatic issue too. As far as evaluation truthfulness, again, are you speaking of being truthful empirically? Because I've addressed that as well. I’m suggesting that “truthfulness” may be bound up in whether or not a narrative results in more hospitals than gas chambers. Those are also “reasons.”

    So, I’m not sure your point. Plus, I noticed you addressed very little of my response.

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  12. Hi Darrell

    I'm a little unclear on your approach to pragmatism. Are you saying that the outcome of a narrative (say hospitals) can be used as a guide to the match between that narrative and reality? So, for example if believing in God leads to desirable outcomes, is that an indicator that God exists, or rather is it simply an indicator that believing God exists leads to desirable outcomes? If only the second, then do you mean something other than 'match with reality' when speaking of the truthfulness of a narrative.

    With regard to dismissal, there is a difference between saying 'I have no opinion on this' (e.g I have no opinion on whether or not some form of God exists) and saying 'I believe God exists, and those who believe otherwise are, in my opinion, wrong.'

    To fail to embrace a belief is not to dismiss that belief as wrong. I don't know if there is a God or not. I don't dismiss those with beliefs either way as wrong. Indeed, so long as the terms themselves are meaningful, then we can reasonably hold that one or other group is certainly right. I just don't know which group.

    You back your instincts on matters of faith in ways that agnostics choose not to do, and this backing leads to a dismissal of other faith positions. Hence the distinction does contain a crucial difference. Your stance logically implies certain faith-based beliefs are wrong, despite containing no error of fact or reasoning. Agnosticism doesn't, and this for many is its great appeal.

    Bernard

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  13. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    What do you mean a match with “reality”? When we speak of the “ought” and the “is” we are inherently saying that things “ought” to be a certain way rather than another way. The “reality” is that people get sick, injured, grow old, and die. The question becomes “ought” we not make sure that there is a space available where healing, comfort, and, if necessary, the provisions are in place for a peaceful passing. We could, if we wanted to, simply take all the sick, old, injured, and those close to death out to the edge of town and toss them in a dump. So which course of action matches with “reality”?

    Clearly, from history (see the linked essay again) we see that some narratives give rise to the idea of hospitals and certain attitudes toward the poor, the sick and weaker members of society. Does that “prove” that God exists? Of course not. I said that already. My point was to the question, “If we cannot prove a narrative scientifically/empirically, how can we know which narrative is true?” I think this is one way, the cultural footprint, acting as a clue, a nod, and sign pointing to one narrative as perhaps being “truer” than another. But that is all it could be. However, since no narrative, including your own, can be “proved” empirically, then it is a way forward for every narrative.

    I’m afraid I completely disagree with you regarding any supposed distinction you are trying to make. It melts away upon the slightest scrutiny. I think I made that clear with the castle and drawbridge analogy. It is very easy to say one doesn't have an opinion when he has rigged the game such that he isn't allowed one because he’s restricted what he can believe to the empirical. I’m sorry, but that just doesn't fly at all. You seem to think that casting your view in the negative, as a restriction, rather than in some overt, positive, “I believe X to be true…” somehow absolves you. It doesn't. It is an implicit privileging of empiricism, which by default means that you can only see differing narratives as private subjective opinions. That alone is a dismissal of other narratives.

    I have no idea what you mean by “backing my instincts” on matters of faith. You are an empiricist by faith as much as I’m a Christian by faith. I thought we had settled that. What I find very interesting Bernard is you seem to be at pains here to make sure we know that you are tolerant of differing views, while at the same time making it clear that you “believe” or come to your position in some way that is superior to Christians or theists. Rather ironic.

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  14. Hi Darrell

    There are two distinct issues here, so perhaps we can think about them one at a time. First, the issue of truthfulness in a narrative.

    It seems to me that evidence regarding a narrative's impact can be seen as entirely consistent with competing truth hypotheses. So, for example, we might find a particular type of religious relief provides comfort or social cohesion. A theist would then argue this reflects the underlying reality of the universe. Because God is real, knowing HIm brings these types of rewards. The atheist argues that evolutionary pressures rewarded self awareness (perhaps for the purpose of knowing other minds, and anticipating action within a social context) which brought with it the cost of existential despair, thus rewarding the cultural evolution of certain solace devices.

    Because both stories can be made to fit the evidence rather neatly, we can't use the pragmatic outcomes of a narrative stance as an indicator of the truthfulness of one or other of the narratives.

    If we redefine truthfulness as helpfulness, this is another matter.

    Bernard

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  15. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    “It seems to me that evidence regarding a narrative's impact can be seen as entirely consistent with competing truth hypotheses.”

    Competing truth hypotheses though often lead to different impacts, right? The Nazi narrative led to different impacts, as opposed, let’s say, the narrative believed by Mother Theresa. I know, I’m going over the top here, but you see the point. Further, this is why I keep saying that empirical results don’t mean, without a doubt, with complete certainty, that one narrative is true over another. Differing narratives, but ones that have very similar understandings of ethics and morality can often lead to the same good things.

    In the post, for instance, see the difference I outline as far as Christianity and Scientific Materialism.

    I’m not making an argument from pragmatism. The argument from pragmatism is that since there is no objective moral truth or a true narrative, let’s just figure out what “works” or is practical. This isn't to say however that narratives don’t have cultural impacts or results that can seem practical, or not. That often depends upon how those ideas are defined within the narrative itself and the greater community.

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  16. Hi Darrell

    Yes, I'd agree that differing narratives have differing impacts upon society. And that's an important issue to grapple with, particularly when we consider what to tell our children about their world.

    I don't see the link between impact and truthfulness, however. Perhaps I'm being dim. Imagine a group of children on a camp. Their teacher tells them they must stay in their tents at night, because there are dangerous animals in the woods. Some children embrace the narrative, others are sceptical.

    The sceptics creep out at night to explore, fall off a cliff and perish. Thus the animal narrative had a positive impact, in this case. This impact does not, however, tell us anything about whether or not there were indeed dangerous animals in the woods. There is no obvious coupling between narrative impact and truthfulness.

    Bernard

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  17. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    Well, at least we agree that narratives have consequences, right? That is a start. And we can evaluate those consequences, right? My main point was that this is a real, concrete, and very “empirical” way of reflecting upon narratives. In other words, if one’s narrative enslaves me, is unjust, cruel, and destructive of my humanity, do you suppose at the end of the day I might say something like, “But you know, on the other hand, it is a very scientific and empirically sound narrative—so at least it’s true.” Right, I don’t think so.

    And that touches upon the relation between impact and truth, which was my secondary point. What is true? As with your story, first of all, there actually might be dangerous animals in the woods. But that isn't the point is it? What is “true” is the love and concern the teachers have for their children. What is “true” is protecting them from harm.

    Again, you seem to equate “truth” only with empirical truth (were the dangerous animals actually present?) This is not only reductionist it is such a truncated and shallow/surface understanding.

    Allow me another example. Suppose the natural biological mother of Betty was very cruel to her growing up, beat her, barely fed her, and one day abandoned her. Betty is adopted. She is raised from there on in a loving home by loving parents. She grows up a very happy girl and graduates High School. One day Betty’s biological mother sees Betty on the street and runs up to her. She says, “Betty, it’s me, your mother.” Betty just stares at her. She says, “I’m a little light on money right now, could you spare a little, you know for your mother?” Betty reaches into her purse, pulls out some money, hands it to her, and says, “You are not my mother—my mother is at my house,” and she walks away.

    Now which statement is “true”? Empirically and scientifically, this woman is Betty’s biological mother. She gave birth to Betty. They carry the same DNA. But Betty says she is not her mother—that her true mother is somewhere else. Who is telling the truth here?

    I think any serious reflection here will answer your question about the relation between impact and truth.

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  18. Hi Darrell

    I think, however that you are making a claim that God actually exists, above and beyond the social construction of the notion God (as in the social construction of mother you are referring to). Perhaps, however, you do not mean God exists in this sense. What do you mean, when you say God exists?

    Bernard

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  19. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    God cannot be “proved” empirically/scientifically. Whether the narrative is Christianity or Scientific-Materialism neither can prove nor disprove God’s existence in that manner—and neither arrives at that position in that manner. Whether they believe God exists or doesn't exist, they do so by faith. If you disagree with this, then there is no point in talking about other ways to evaluate narratives. So we might want to get pass this little barrier right now, although I thought we had. If you disagree, then you are right there with Burk.

    Moving on, so, do I believe God is a social construction? Absolutely not. But see the above. What I’m trying to point out is other ways (rather than empirically/scientifically) we might see clues however to that existence.

    Here is the advantage I think my take on this has. Not only do I have a robust appreciation for methodological naturalism, and thus can appreciate the fact there were probably no dangerous animals in the woods or the fact that empirically, and in that sense, this woman is truly Betty’s biological mother, there is a deeper meaning to being a mother than simple empirical biology. And there is a greater truth than whether or not there were really dangerous animals in the woods.

    The Christian narrative creates a wider and deeper space for understanding what is “true.” It allows for both to have their place. I don’t think empiricism does. It can only allow for one small area of reality to be true and, in these types of examples, the smallest and most insignificant area.

    Imagine the parents of the children who had fallen off the cliff. They are grieving, destroyed. The empiricist comes up and says, “You know the worst of it?” “There weren’t even really any dangerous animals out there.” I hope you can grasp the complete bankruptcy of such a response. You seem to be worried about “truth” in this manner and yet, can you tell us why it could possibly matter in these types of situations?

    So which is the better understanding? And, is it possible such is a clue pointing toward the truer narrative?

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  20. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    Just to follow up: I keep hearing you say, “Yes, but how does this prove God exists empirically?” Do I have that right?

    My answer is- it doesn't and can’t- no narrative can. Nor can any narrative prove empirically God doesn't exist. Unless one thinks such is the only way we can “prove” something or for something to be true, what is the problem?

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  21. Hi Darrell

    Yes, I readily understand that in a great many situations, the facts of the matter are the least important consideration.

    Nevertheless, you believe that God exists, that this is a fact of the situation. And the impact of the God narrative appears to have nothing to say about this particular matter.

    You suggest that impact of narrative might be a clue to that narrative's truth, and in the case of God's existence, I'm saying I see no logical link between impact and existence. Do you see a link, or do you mean something different form me by 'God exists'?

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  22. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    See my last follow-up response and the very first paragraph of the post.

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  23. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    To clarify: You have said you do see a link between narratives and their possible consequences, but you don’t see a link between the impact of narratives and the “existence” of God or whatever.

    What I hear you saying is: I don’t see a link between the impact of narratives and the “empirical” proof of God’s existence. Do I have that right?

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  24. Hi Darrell

    No, not empirical proof. Any non-empirical reason for believing in God's existence would be interesting. This is why I ask you precisely what you mean by 'God exists.' I await your answer.

    Bernard

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  25. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    Non-empirical reasons were the whole point of the post. What am I missing?

    Do you mean “exists” like a rock exists or like gravity? Because those would be empirical ways of noting purely physical forms of “existence.” And you of course know that God is not like that, right?

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  26. Hi Darrell

    Yes, not exists in the sense of having a physical presence. Clearly. But existing in some sense, I would have thought, or else there is no distinction between the atheist and the theist.

    Now, I am arguing that your non-empirical reasons for belief do not make clear any line of reasoning. Why should one expect pragmatic value of a belief implies the existence of the subject of that belief? I don't see your line of reasoning. So, I'm not looking for an empirical justification, just a reasonable one. And I think that one can demonstrate, via examples like the animals in the woods, that pragmatic value is not sufficient reason for belief.

    Bernard

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  27. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    But I’m not arguing that any pragmatic value makes something true. As you note yourself, narratives have consequences. Why can’t we evaluate those consequences? We might say something like, “Wow, this narrative seems to create the space for a hospitality toward the weak and strangers that other narratives have never produced or produced in such a deep and profound way.” When we say something like this, we are not saying “This is efficient and practical—this works—therefore the narrative must be true.” We are saying something about charity, about mercy, about love. We are saying something about a different way of “seeing” people. Why isn’t it then reasonable to presume that the source of a narrative, the event, reasoning, beliefs, or kernel of what creates a narrative is the founding cause of this new way of thinking about hospitality (or whatever the consequence may be)?

    I think such is an entirely reasonable line of thought and, in fact, I think it is the way that many people evaluate differing narratives. There is a reason there isn’t a great influx of emigrants, those comprising the weak and poor, heading to the promised land of Somalia. People indeed vote with their feet.

    Again, as I’ve said over and over, this does not “prove” that God exists. However, in a cumulative way, I do think it can be one way of investigating and reflecting upon differing narratives. And it does demand a change in the way we think about what “true” means. This suggests thinking of a narratives’ “truthfulness” as being partly established by their “fruit” if you will. This seems, to me anyway, to be a very common-sense way of interrogating most aspects of life.

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  28. JP says:

    Hi Darrell,

    If I may offer an observation here…

    On occasion, you have been very critical of the way others use certain words (“taste” comes to mind). Rightly so: agreeing on the meanings of words is a prerequisite to meaningful communication. However, you also have been quite creative in the use of language. Recall that it took weeks to figure out that you use the word “belief” even when no underlying proposition is held to be true (which is contrary to common definitions, e.g. Wikipedia: Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a proposition or premise to be true.).

    Now, you want to redefine what “truth” means. You want to say a narrative is “true” when it produces nice results, or whatever. Why not simply say what you mean instead of redefining common words?

    You know, I am interested in understanding what you have to say. Your outlook on things is very different form mine and this is part of what makes this interesting. But understanding is made much more difficult if your use of words leads others in the wrong direction.

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  29. Hi Darrell

    If this is what you mean by a narrative being true, then we have a very interesting situation. For it seems that one can both hold that a religious narrative is true, and be an atheist. For there is no problem simultaneously holding that acting as if certain things are true will yield positive results, while holding those things are not actually true (as in the creatures in the wood).

    In which case your belief is not contradicted by the atheist claim that there is no God. Both might hold. Is this what you intend?

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  30. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    Again, I’m not arguing that the results of a narrative make it true. And while an atheist may agree that he likes the idea of hospitals and treating the poor and stranger with hospitality, he would never attribute such to God actually existing so there still wouldn’t be agreement. I’m sure he would find other reasons for why hospitals and such existed. Christians believe the narrative only exists because God exists—if one changes the core of the narrative, if it becomes a different narrative, then we often don’t see the same consequences. An atheist may believe that we can get the same results without belief in God, but unfortunately, he can’t show where his narrative or another created the same results he now thinks are a “good” thing (after 2000 years of enculturation mind you). So the issue just isn’t about narratives having consequences, but the content of the narrative itself. They are intrinsic to each other.

    However, if an atheist wants to believe and support Christianity because he sees the good consequences of that narrative, as opposed to his own, then more power to him. Many live with some cognitive dissonance all the time.

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  31. Hi Darrell

    I'm confused. You say here you are “not arguing that the results of a narrative make it true”, but you also say we can think of “narratives' truthfulness being part established by their fruits.”

    Can you explain the difference?

    Bernard

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  32. Darrell says:

    Hi JP,

    Very good point. I am talking about thinking of “truth” in a more accurate and robust way— a way that takes many more factors into consideration. As I already noted, the advantage I think this has is it not only takes into consideration the empirical/scientific facts (or “truth”) of a matter, for instance the fact that the woman is Betty’s biological mother; but also allows for the greater “truth” that this woman isn’t really her mother.

    I also think most people know exactly what I’m talking about as to both aspects of truth. It is not a novel or just my own personal way of talking about truth. It is truth as explicated in literature and many art forms. We might say it’s the difference between justice and law. But I think most people would understand and agree with me (because it’s certainly not original to me) regarding the greater “truth” aspect to the story about Betty.

    Sorry if I was unclear.

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  33. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    I’m saying one cannot assert, unequivocally, beyond a shadow of a doubt, conclusively, empirically/scientifically that this line of reasoning “proves” a narrative is “True” capital T.

    What I’m suggesting is that existence is almost like the scene of a crime. We are all trying to figure out what happened. All we have are clues. I think this area of the story a narrative tells and what consequences can be shown to be a result could be one of those clues. It is possible that the “fruit” of a narrative is a gesturing, a sign, a clue, that the story is possibly true in a capital T sort of way.

    We can say something is a clue that seems to be pointing in a certain direction; a direction we think may be the truth, capital T. Such is not the same as saying we have arrived yet however.

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  34. My previous comment may have dropped off, apologies if this becomes a repeat.

    I agree with you on both your major points. Accumulating knowledge is a lot like a crime scene, lots of speculating, following hints and hunches, looking for plausible lines.

    And I agree that we can validly speak of truths that are not grounded in facts, things that speak truly to us, and our human condition. Were this not the case, we wouldn't have the Arts, and I agree too that we mustn't fall for the trap of believing one type of truth is more important, or even more basic, than the other.

    My contention is that using the putative pragmatic value of a religious narrative as a hint as to the truth of its existential claims (e.g God exists) involves a logical misstep. In terms of the crime scene analogy, here you have a piece of evidence that doesn't appear to favour one hypotheses over its contradictory alternative. Therefore, to use it as evidence in favour of one hypothesis over the other is unreasonable.

    Bernard

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  35. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    It is good to see we agree on some very key points. However, again, and I think I’ve pointed this out several times now, I am not making any sort argument from pragmatism.

    And I disagree. I think it entirely reasonable to suggest a causal link between the content of a narrative, it’s empirical consequences, and the possibility that such is an indicator of that narrative’s being true, capital T.

    Your assertion of a logical misstep, I think, fails as well. The piece(s) of evidence (the things noted in the linked essay) did not arise from some other narrative. They point back to one narrative, not two, or a multiple number of alternatives. Such is not to say that someone can’t suggest an alternative narrative that could try to explain the same consequences, it just means that a preponderance of the evidence points to one narrative as being the cause. Thus, it is entirely reasonable to favor that hypothesis over an alternative.

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  36. Hi Darrell

    There is a difference between claiming that a narrative causes a particular outcome, and claiming that the outcome speaks to the truth of claims within that narrative (e.g that God exists).

    It is in this second case that there is no preponderance of evidence, so even if we could establish that religious narratives were beneficial, this would not of itself constitute evidence in favour of the proposition that God exists.

    The reason is that the proposition God does not exist can equally well accommodate the possibility that the God narratives have favourable outcomes (indeed some naturalistic models require it, as this supports for them the means by which the cultural transmission of religion occurs).

    Bernard

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  37. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    As I've already noted many times, I am not asserting that this line of reasoning “proves” or sets up an unequivocal logical, linear, sequential relationship that must “equal” X. If that had been what I was suggesting, then you would have every right to claim a logical misstep.

    My claim was much more limited, but, I also think more significant. I think it entirely reasonable when people see a “good” somewhere (good, regardless of its practical or pragmatic value), to wonder how it arose and where it came from. In doing so, if they find it linked directly to a story, a narrative, most people see such as actually saying something important about the very content of that narrative. They see a link. In a common-sense fashion, almost unconsciously, they note that such a good (hospitality for instance or hospitals) could possibly mean there is something true and significant about that narrative.

    This is a modest claim but I think a very reasonable and significant one.

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  38. Hi Darrell

    If we limit ourselves to 'could possibly mean there is something true and significant about that narrative' we're on safe ground, particularly if we acknowledge it could also possibly mean the narrative is a construction.

    It's when we conclude it hints in one direction, rather than the other, that we make the error of reasoning. In other words, if we use the narrative's impact to support the belief that the narrative is true, we make a mistake.

    Bernard

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  39. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    Yes, agreed. Scientific/materialism could be a construction. Atheism could be a construction. Or, they could be true. What we are saying applies to any narrative.

    Each person still has to decide, make a choice, as to what they think the consequences of any narrative then ultimately means. The consequences can only act as clues or signs.

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