Caputo: Chapter Three—Letting Truth Be: Augustine, Derrida and the Postmodern Turn—Part Two

As noted before, Caputo gets to Derrida’s use of the word “event” and its importance for understanding what Caputo means by truth.
“So before I go further, I want to comment on the word ‘event’ that Derrida uses.  It is the most important concept in his work and one that I have found singularly useful in my own.  An event (evenement) is something ‘coming’ (venir), something ‘to come’ (a-venir).  As something futural (l’avenir), an event is something we cannot see coming that takes us by surprise, like a letter that arrives unexpectedly in the mail with news that changes your life for ever, for better or for worse.  Events cut either way; they may be the source of great jubilation or great consternation.  Derrida’s eye is fixed on keeping the future open lest the weight of the present close down and prevent the event of the future.  His thinking springs from a hope that the future is always better, but since there is no guarantee of this, it simultaneously exposes itself to the threat that the future may be worse.  So events are risky, and if we try too hard to minimize the risk, we will prevent the event.”
A key idea here is that the “event” is something completely out of our control.  It is not something one grasps fully, or is understood initially, it is something that “happens” to us.  It is not a system, a definition, an abstract concept, or theory.  In hindsight, as we reflect, we may try and communicate the event in those terms and concepts, but it can never be reduced to those terms or concepts.  Clearly, for the modernist, the analytic philosopher, this is very frustrating.  Of course, it is frustrating because it refuses the language, form, and process he is use to “hearing” and reading when we speak of epistemology or what “is” or “can” be “true.”  In the modernist’s mind, if we can’t define it, box it, contain it, or somehow build a fence around it, how can we know if it’s really speaking of something that is “true?”  Of course, notice the inherent question-begging, as this mind-set clearly has an idea already in mind of how something can be “true” and that “how” is the very issue disputed.  After all, Caputo has spent the whole first part of the book disabusing us of that very mindset.  He is not going to now throw that away and write and speak has if we can reduce the “event” and conceptualize it in modernist terms and grounds.  Caputo continues:
“Daily life is full of unexpected events, sometimes very subtle, like an aside by a teacher that changes the course of a student’s life.  The teacher does not know this has happened and at the time neither does the student.  That is the event.”
We’ve probably all experienced something like this.  A comment, a word, an encounter, a book, a movie, a song, a concert, an art show, a short exchange with a stranger at a bar or church…these moments can be, and have been, life changing for many.  There is a “truth” that happened to us.  Another key idea here though is that it is not really the circumstances which are the event.  Caputo continues:
“When I say, as I sometimes do, that an event is not what happens but what is going on in what happens, I am not trying to torment you.  I am simply highlighting the fact that the event is what is simmering in the present, but is still to-come, which links us up with our guiding motif of the journey, or life as a trip whose destination is radically concealed, a venture or adventure in which we cannot see what is coming.  The event is a promise/threat: the ‘promise’ that the present holds, which cannot be kept absolutely safe from a ‘threat’, since we do not know and cannot control what the future holds.”
Again, this can be pictured in how we think about justice.  Justice doesn’t happen or come about simply because a country passes laws and then adjudicates and administers those laws (the Nazis did that).  It is not in the mechanics or circumstances (administration/machinery) that justice occurs.  Justice may be present, it may not be.  And even when it is present, it is never perfectly present.  It is always on its way, it is coming.  The entire machinery of law, the courts, the theories, the history, use of force, and every other aspect is in place to try and capture this thing called justice.  It is the thing we hope happens in the “event” and we hope is coming.  And as we think about the “event” or what is going on in the event, here is what we must not do:
“The worst violence for Derrida would be to deprive a thing of its future, to close it down, to lock it inside a body of rigid rules, fixed limits and powerful dogmas—iron clad ‘truths’, where truth is allowed to assume a fixed and definitive form.  So Derrida advises us to hang loose, to stay open.”
Or, we might say, we simply need to be humble.  We need to admit we are finite, limited beings.  Where we start is not where we usually end up.  There are truths we couldn’t see at age 16—truths we can only see after living a while.  What Derrida is suggesting is, of course, almost incomprehensible to the fundamentalist (secular or religious—same thing).  The entire mindset is to close down, lock up, and enclose (entomb) their worldview inside a body of rigid rules (usually a series of dichotomies like faith v. reason and so on) and iron clad “truths”.  This mindset is like living in a castle with a moat around it and the drawbridge pulled up.  And if the drawbridge is permanently drawn, we are never open to the surprise visitor—we can never be visited.
“For Derrida the real truth of a thing—of a person, a book, an institution, a tradition or an unfamiliar city—lies in the surprise it is capable of visiting upon us, which he conceptualizes as a philosopher in the language of the ‘to-come’.  To say that something is true is to say that it has a future, and for us to be in the truth is to be exposed to that future.  Truth for him—say the truth of ‘democracy’—lies in its to-come, its promise.  Democracy is always promised and under threat, always becoming true, and we are always calling for it to come true.  So we can never this is democracy, or this is true, but only that this gives promise of becoming true.  Truth is an event which may visit us like a thief in the night…”
As we can see, he gives the example of democracy and uses it in the same way I’ve been speaking of justice.  Truth surprises.  Truth doesn’t simply confirm what we already thought or believed.  In fact, our certainty and rock solid “convictions” can often be obstacles to truth happening and taking place.  Truth unsettles.  It often makes us feel awkward and unsure, because it unseats something we thought was true only to now be aware we were probably (or could be) wrong.  Truth confronts us.  There is a great example of this in the first Testament of the Bible, where we find a story about King David.  As many might remember, King David has an affair with Bathsheba.  He also has Bathsheba’s husband killed.  David is afterwards visited by the prophet Nathan.  Nathan tells David a story.  He says there was a poor man and a rich man.  The rich man had many sheep.  The poor man had only one, and he and his family loved this one sheep.  The rich man has visitors and he decided to take the poor man’s one sheep to kill and provide food for his guests.  After telling the story, King David becomes very angry at this injustice.  He demands to know who this rich man is so he can be punished.  Nathan points his finger at David and responds, “You are the man.”  David is undone, because he knows it is true.  It hits him in the gut like a fist.  It shatters his sense of his own goodness and fairness.  It topples him and brings him low.
That is what truth does and that is when we know we’ve encountered truth, the thing happening within the event.  Conversely, truth can also bring us great joy.  We could be on the edge of despair only for something we never saw coming or anticipated breaking in and lifting our spirits.  Whether bringing us up short or bringing us great peace or joy, the key is that it surprises us and turns our world upside down (for better or worse).  A key question is, does the narrative I inhabit allow for this type of openness to the event?  Because it is possible to miss the event or what is going on in the event.  Imagine if David would have completely missed Nathan’s point.  Imagine if he could not identify with the rich man in the story.  A sign of fundamentalism is this blindness or refusal to see or be aware of the event or what is going on in the event.  Therefore, we can only see those things that confirm what we already believe or assure us we were right and everyone else wrong.  Caputo then says something very important regarding the term “deconstruction”.
“His [Derrida’s] famous word ‘deconstruction’ (which sounds like a demolition derby) means finding a way to keep the future of a thing open, not to demolish it.  So do not weep if something you love is deconstructed.  Be grateful.  Deconstruction is a love of the future.”
I found this refreshing just because there are such negative understandings out there regarding deconstruction and what it does.  The other interesting connection Caputo’s draws is between grace and the event or as he puts it:
“…how much difference is there, then, between an event of grace (religion) and the grace of an event (deconstruction)?”
Caputo then draws from the life experiences of both Augustine and Derrida (as noted in Augustine’s “Confessions” and Derrida’s “Circumfession”) to show how both seemed to be speaking often of the same sort of idea, even though the language and terms are different.  They often seem to be trying to capture the same truth.  It is in this sense that Derrida called himself “religious”.
“Among the many surprises that ‘Circumfession’ provides, none is more surprising than Derrida’s confession that he, a well-known secularist and atheist, is in truth a religious man, a confession causing his secular admirers some confusion and consternation (both of them marks of an event) while giving his religious critics little comfort (events do not give comfort).”
Caputo notes that Derrida’s “Circumfession” is also a prayer like Augustine’s but Derrida’s prayer is to an unknown god.  For Derrida knowing what is “true” is very much related to not knowing but desiring to know.  I know I desire this thing I do not know.  In my unbelief, in my doubt, in my uncertainty, the only thing left for me is prayer.

“He [Derrida] prays in a night of unknowing for the coming of something, I know not what, praying for truth to come true.  Prayer for Derrida is too precious a thing to surrender to theology for its exclusive use…Derrida is something of an Augustine without God, affirming a desire for God without God, or perhaps we should say, a desire for ‘God’ without God…the important thing to observe, and this goes to the heart of ‘repetition’, is that although Derrida rightly passes for an atheist, he does not dismiss the name of God, the name ‘God’, in which he thinks is concentrated a great deal of what we desire with a ‘desire beyond desire’.  He thinks the name of God is the name not of a being in the sky, but of an event.”
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20 Responses to Caputo: Chapter Three—Letting Truth Be: Augustine, Derrida and the Postmodern Turn—Part Two

  1. Hi Darrell

    To ask the obvious question, is this view of truth entirely relativistic? That is, if the event is transformative for me, hits me in the guts, opens up the possibility of the future etc, is that therefore true (in Caputo's sense) for me? And as such, under this view, can a thing be both true and false simultaneously (so true for me, false for you)?

    Or, is the view such that no one thing can be both true and false, in which case how do I, or David, or any participant in life, tell whether my own event is authentic?

    Bernard

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  2. Burk says:

    Darrell-

    I don't think anyone is trying to forestall the future, or prevent events from happening. That seems to be some absurd rhetorical red herring. All we are doing is trying to understand events, past, future, and in between. We understand them by building models of them and their context which are true rather than false, so that we can run mental simulations that are accurate and useful.

    Does that seem nafarious? Sorry about that. If we successfully understand the world and thus can predict some event, (say, the rising of the sun tomorrow), does that diminish us or the sun? Only to the besotted mystic of ignorance.

    The David story is very nice. So truth is … metaphorical? If we are oblique enough, it is not understood by the dense and plebian? Well, perhaps the solution to that is to be clear and forthright, and not get yourself into ever deeper abstrusities.

    If the intention and point of truth in your view is to alter someone's view or emotional state, then it probably needs to be called something else, like rhetoric, art, pursuasive speech, etc. Perhaps that is what you and Caputo are driving at.. an affective theory of truth rather than a philosophical and logical one. In any case, the object / criterion of this so-called truth is clear enough: the ideals and self-image of the listener, not the objective conditions of the outside world.

    “For Derrida knowing what is “true” is very much related to not knowing but desiring to know.”

    Another classic, to be sure!

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  3. Darrell says:

    Hi Bernard,

    I think Caputo already addressed this in his introduction:

    “In what follows I hope to dodge both of these bullets, each of which I regard as dead ends. I will argue that absolutism is a kind of intellectual blackmail, while relativism, which is widely mistaken to be the postmodern theory of truth, in in fact a failure to come up with a theory. Relativism renders us unable to say that anything is wrong, but absolutism confuses us with God…I will defend the plurivocity, ambiguity and non-programmability of truth while also defending the right to say that some things are not just different, they’re wrong.”

    As to the authenticity of an event, I think when it happens we know it. That is the whole point. It is course-correcting or life changing (if we let it happen–if we let it come). In the example of King David, it was recognized as true both by David (subjective) and by Nathan (objective).

    Could another observe King David's reaction and see it as false or the wrong way to respond? Could they say to themselves, “Why should he even care–he's the king–he can do whatever he wants and that's what I would do as king.” Of course. They could completely miss the event. It happens all the time. That doesn't make truth relative. It makes truth open to perspective.

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  4. Darrell says:

    Burk,

    “I don't think anyone is trying to forestall the future, or prevent events from happening. That seems to be some absurd rhetorical red herring. All we are doing is trying to understand events, past, future, and in between. We understand them by building models of them and their context which are true rather than false, so that we can run mental simulations that are accurate and useful.”

    I don’t think you understand what is meant by “event”. As noted, events are not just the thing happening or the circumstances. It is the thing going on in the event. That thing that is going on is always still on its way however. And your idea of building models and running simulations are the very ideas being pushed against—because they are indicative of modernity’s need to define, map, model, and simulate—to try and capture and control ‘truth’ or the ‘event’. The event or truth will always evade these attempts, the evasion is one way we know something to be true or and event.

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  5. Burk says:

    Darrell-

    As I got to at the end of my last comment, I can tell that you see this “event” as an emotional experience, not as an objective … event. Its “truth” is of an emotional nature. If David is told he has hair on his head, that is true, but not “true” in your terms, because it carries no emotional, affective impact. One can use this as one of many definitions of truth, but that doesn't make god true. It makes god emotionally affecting for those who have been trained in the appreciation of such imaginary principles. Anna Karennina is also true in that sense, as is Kermit the Frog.

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  6. Darrell says:

    Burk,

    “As I got to at the end of my last comment, I can tell that you see this “event” as an emotional experience, not as an objective … event.”

    No, it clearly is both subjective and objective—see my response to Bernard. Again, it is more than emotion. There is something going on in the emotions (or lack thereof). The emotions (subjective) are responses to something (objective).

    “Its “truth” is of an emotional nature. If David is told he has hair on his head, that is true, but not “true” in your terms, because it carries no emotional, affective impact.”

    No, both types of truth (hair on the head/the event experienced) are valid and true—just true in different ways. You are trying to resort to binary thinking again, a fact/value distinction. These are the very things Caputo is pushing against.

    “One can use this as one of many definitions of truth, but that doesn't make god true.”

    What in the world are you talking about? Caputo isn't making an argument for God’s existence.

    You are looking for things that simply aren't there.

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  7. Hi Darrell

    If I have you right, you're saying truth is not relativistic. But rather, our experience of the event gives us access to an objective truth. The question becomes, what if two people's experiences lead them to contradictory conclusions about the nature of a such a truth (so two people, through the living out of their life, reach contradictory conclusions regarding the moral status of abortion, and both feel compelled or transformed by the experience).

    We must say, by your response, that one of them is simply mistaken, and has missed the essence of the experience. But which of them is wrong? It appears that this method can not tell us, and hence we have no reason to trust our own transformative experience, as the living out is apparently prone to such error, and we have nothing to check it against.

    How do we escape this bind, do you think?

    Bernard

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  8. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “We must say, by your response, that one of them is simply mistaken, and has missed the essence of the experience. But which of them is wrong? It appears that this method can not tell us, and hence we have no reason to trust our own transformative experience, as the living out is apparently prone to such error, and we have nothing to check it against.”

    Well, ask yourself, is David’s response the correct one or the response I suggest an onlooker (perhaps a guard or second-in-command) may have taken?

    It is not a matter of the “method” telling us anything. This isn't a “method”. And, my guess is, you do in fact trust the trans-formative periods and experiences in your life. You trust that your wife loves you and will spend the rest of her life with you (but this is a risk—there is no “method” that can confirm it or prove it); you trust the experience you had when your children were born; you trust the experience you had when you saw a student who “got it” and was grateful. I could go on and on.

    And the need to “check it” against something is to simply fall back into the correspondence/empirical “method” Caputo is refusing as the only way we can know something to be true.

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  9. Hi Darrell

    Given there is no method, as you say, and nothing to check against, then how are we to deal with the observation that apparently this 'event' approach to truth very often generates contradictory answers (so, some are hit by the rightness of avoiding meat, while others are hit by the rightness of consuming it)? You say that two contradictory things can not both be true, and yet this method of intuiting truth seems to yield contradictions very easily.

    What's the way around this?

    Bernard

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  10. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    David’s response to this ‘event’ is different from possibly another’s (the onlooker). So what? It’s not that the two responses contradict—it is that they are different.

    There doesn't need to be a way ‘around’ this. And what we are talking about has nothing really to do with the ‘rightness’ or ‘wrongness’ of something like choosing to eat meat or not. That hardly captures the story of David and Bathsheba or Caputo’s point regarding the ‘event’.

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  11. Hi Darrell

    You're quite right, if the issue is purely one of personal perspective, of each perceiving truth in a certain way, then we relativism and there is no problem with contradiction. However, Caputo explicitly rejects relativism, and you speak of these events having an objective quality too, and under these cases contradictions appear possible. How then, are we to make the term truth meaningful, without some means of resolving such contradictions?

    In the material world we have a method for testing contradictory statements, by way of prediction and measurement. Without an equivalent, the attempt to broaden our understanding of truth appears to lead to the conclusion that al things are potentially true. Just interested if you can see a way around this.

    Bernard

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  12. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “You're quite right, if the issue is purely one of personal perspective, of each perceiving truth in a certain way, then we relativism and there is no problem with contradiction.”

    But it’s not just “purely” personal perspective. And it’s not relativism in the way you are assuming. Because people perceive truth differently doesn’t mean truth is relative. And if people disagree it doesn’t mean there are contradictions.

    There is nothing to see a way ‘around’. It appears because you can’t see a way we can adjudicate disagreements in these areas the same way we can questions regarding the material world, you see a problem. This only means you are still struggling with the ideas Caputo is laying out. This “problem” you see just begs the question regarding the very issues Caputo has been calling into question. They are disputed. Disagreements in these areas are not meant to be, nor could they ever be, resolved the way we can disagreements regarding the material world. So what?

    This need to know who is “right” in these areas in a way that “proves” that rightness or wrongness, just like we can regarding disagreements in the material world, is a non-problem because it assumes the very ideas (that correspondence/empiricism are the only way we can “know” or adjudicate truth) Caputo has spent the entire first part of his book calling into question. You would be much better off simply disputing Caputo’s main points, which would then address all these other derivative issues.

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  13. Hi Darrell

    My question is simply this. How does the Caputo's definition of the truth avoid encompassing everything, such that anything now counts as true?

    Maybe a simpler way of putting this, is to ask, what does an untruth, under Caputo's definition of truth, look like? Earlier you offered an example of a judge passing an unjust judgement. But, if the judge was moved by this judgement, if it felt right to them, if it opened up the possibility of living for them, was an event, or however you might wish to term it, would this not count as a truth for them, by Caputo, even though to you it is unjust?

    I don't see how you get to exclude anything from the truth category.

    Bernard

    Bernard

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  14. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    I think you would need to go back to Caputo’s initial points regarding wisdom. We cannot know with certainty and there is always a risk involved but as a community we can ask if this action, event, or decision is good, true, and beautiful. In other words, there is no pure calculation or dispassionate use of some abstract concept called ‘reason’ we can default to in questions of this nature. So can a lynching mob convince the community that their actions were good, true, and beautiful—thus wise? I doubt they will convince those who had a connection or relationship with the person lynched. I doubt, in their private moments and over time, they will even convince themselves.

    Just as in my series on narratives, we cannot ‘prove’ in any sort of empirical or scientific way which one is true (so to keep looking and asking for a way to do that is pointless). But we can look at the ‘performative’ aspects and see what they result in over time and we can ask if they are good, true, and beautiful. I think the same pertains to the truths Caputo is speaking of as represented in the ‘event’. Is there risk involved? Of course. But that is what makes it real—true to our experience. How do I know my wife will love me a year from now? I don’t. Maybe I’ve been wrong about her true feelings. How do I know? I can only know in the performative aspects and over time. If there is a futural aspect to the ‘event’ and truth, then we can’t always know for certain in the present. But that doesn’t mean everything is true or that we have no way of knowing.

    “Maybe a simpler way of putting this, is to ask, what does an untruth, under Caputo's definition of truth, look like? Earlier you offered an example of a judge passing an unjust judgement. But, if the judge was moved by this judgement, if it felt right to them, if it opened up the possibility of living for them, was an event, or however you might wish to term it, would this not count as a truth for them, by Caputo, even though to you it is unjust?”

    This misses what an ‘event’ does or is. It isn’t about “feeling right” to us. In fact, it is that haunting that won’t let us feel right. King David felt fine until what? Until he was confronted by the truth. That truth, whatever that was, was in the event of Nathan coming, telling the story, and then telling David he was the man. An ‘event’ makes us uncomfortable and challenges us.

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  15. Hi Darrell

    Yes, I understand this. My difficulty is understanding how this prevents all things from being true, in the sense that you describe. If the true test is whether we find it beautiful/good, then what is there to prevent somebody finding the opposite 'truth' beautiful/good? The criteria you suggest appear to make all things true (just so long as somebody,somewhere, finds beauty in them).

    I don't think you mean to say this, but how can it be avoided under this system? How are some stances to be excluded as untrue?

    Bernard

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  16. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “If the true test is whether we find it beautiful/good, then what is there to prevent somebody finding the opposite 'truth' beautiful/good?”

    What is there to prevent it? You. Me. Love. Life. Experience. Growing up. Education. Doing the opposite. Showing (the performative) a better way. Again, you seem to be looking for something certain, something where there is no risk involved or something we can know in the moment—without the patience needed for the long haul. There is no such thing. Do people choose to close off the event, choose selfishly, choose evil, and choose death? Yes. So what? All that means is that we are free. It doesn’t mean truth is relative, or that it contradicts, or that we cannot know what truth is.

    You seem to be saying, “Yes, I get all this, but I still want to know how what your saying can tell us something is true in the same way as we can know things are true empirically and in a correspondence way.” I can’t really see that going anywhere, can you? That seems to be a circle to me.

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  17. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    Perhaps this might help. Why don’t you tell us what you would accept as true, that could not be proved or demonstrated empirically/scientifically/correspondently- and then tell us why you would accept it as true.

    If you can do that, then you may answer your own questions here. If you cannot, then we could explore the reasons you cannot, which also might address why you are struggling with what Caputo (or my interpretation of Caputo) is laying out here. In other words, it could be that you disagree with much of the introduction and first chapter but never addressed it and it’s just showing up now.

    It would also save a lot of time. If you believe (if only on a personal level) that you cannot say something is true unless it meets the empirical/correspondence criteria, then we are sort of wasting our time here. You are asking me to provide something, one, I’ve made clear cannot be proven that way and, two, since it can’t, you are then prevented from accepting it based upon your current views.

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  18. Hi Darrell

    There are two separate issues here. First, what sort of thing counts as truth, and second, how we know if any particular belief/attitude is true.

    I'm only interested in the first at this stage. This has nothing to do with what we should or should not accept as true, but rather Caputo's notion that we should broaden what we think of truth referring to.

    You point out that we can not be certain in our response to an event, and this is fine. All knowledge, empirical included, is tentative.

    It seems to me, that if we think of truth referring to actions, or events, or becomings, then all things are true under this definition. Yet both you and Caputo insist this is not the case. Some things are true, and some not, even under this definition. You appear to hint that the difference between the true and untrue in this case is that the true refers to some true state (the true beauty, goodness) but this narrows the definition of truth back that which is or is not (the standard model to which Caputo objects), and the entire project seems to have added nothing.

    So, I'm assuming there is some way of distinguishing conceptually between the true and untrue under this model, but can't see what it is.

    Bernard

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  19. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “There are two separate issues here. First, what sort of thing counts as truth…I'm only interested in the first at this stage.”

    Right, and Caputo has spent the introduction and first part of his book, up to my most recent post, telling us what he thinks counts as true. And I’m asking you to do the same. That might help us.

    “This has nothing to do with what we should or should not accept as true, but rather Caputo's notion that we should broaden what we think of truth referring to.”

    That statement makes no sense to me. If we broaden what truth can refer to then we logically are saying at the same time we should accept such as true. I have no idea what you are getting at there.

    We are repeating ourselves here. So, I will ask again:

    “…Why don’t you tell us what you would accept as true, that could not be proved or demonstrated empirically/scientifically/correspondently- and then tell us why you would accept it as true.

    If you can do that, then you may answer your own questions here. If you cannot, then we could explore the reasons you cannot, which also might address why you are struggling with what Caputo (or my interpretation of Caputo) is laying out here. In other words, it could be that you disagree with much of the introduction and first chapter but never addressed it and it’s just showing up now.

    It would also save a lot of time. If you believe (if only on a personal level) that we cannot say something is true unless it meets the empirical/correspondence criteria, then we are sort of wasting our time here. You are asking me to provide something, one, I’ve made clear cannot be proven that way and, two, since it can’t, you are then prevented from accepting it based upon your current views.”

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  20. Hi Darrell

    We are talking at cross purposes. I'm trying only to see whether Caputo's notion of truth excludes any thing as untrue, and on what grounds.

    I'm open to considering any definition of truth. So, as we've been through before, I think the pragmatic definition is useful both interesting and provocative.

    What seems to me to be unhelpful is any notion of truth that calls all things true, as at this point the word truth is doing no work. And, although Caputo explicitly rejects relativism, I don't see how this would practically work for his idea of Derrida's 'event'.

    There is always the possibility, in this sorts of cases, that the theorist is saying nothing at all, albeit in a rather complex manner. I think, if we could nail down what would constitute an untruth under Caputo's system (as one can for correspondence, pragmatism, or pure relativism) we'd be closer to getting him.

    Bernard

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