Whence the Agnosticism Now?

So, we’ve learned a lot through the comment threads from the last several posts.   We now know there were things “heard” and quite a bit of “reading into” things no one was asserting or saying; in fact, things I have never heard anyone say.  Apparently, Bernard has thought that all this time when Christians (at least) would assert they believed (knew) morality to be objective and universally true (which is simply to say they had the prior belief God existed) that they were, at the very same time, telling us they “knew” this by divine intervention in their brains.

Just let that sit there for a moment.  Let that sink in.  There is not one Christian philosopher or theologian, ancient, or otherwise, of any recognized credibility, that I am aware of that has ever asserted such a thing.  Ever.  I certainly have never asserted such a thing.  But this is what Bernard has been “hearing”.  I have no idea though where this came from.  His objection then, all this time, was to something no one was asserting and, as far as I know, no one believes.  A complete straw-man then.  One can go back several posts and see this.  It was what he meant by the question asked repeatedly in a previous post regarding “how” the knowledge “got in” our brains.  This was a mind boggling question at the time, but now I see what he meant.  Of course, no one was even asserting such a thing.

Even if no one was asserting such a thing, and Bernard was thinking this is what would have to be meant by “knowing”, regardless of anyone’s claim—why would it have anything to do with brain states?  Why in this one instance (an assertion of moral realism or God’s existence) would “knowing” this, when all one means is “believes” or has “concluded” such mean a divine intervention in brain states, as opposed to every other philosophical conclusion?  Putting that all aside, one should address the argument a person is making, not the one he thinks they are making, especially after one knows the true argument being made. 

We “know” what we know philosophically/theologically the same way anyone “knows” what they know (believes) about such matters, through holistic reasoning that takes in and reflects upon a wide and varied survey of information, including science, our experiences, and so on.  As is very clear from the Stanford link and just about every credible source anyone would care to consult, the way (“mechanism”—what a poor choice of words) anyone “knows” any philosophical truth is holistically—which is reasoning by taking into consideration a plethora of information and experiences, in community.  What this means is that neither our philosophical presuppositions, nor our conclusions can be founded or proved empirically/scientifically, but regardless could reflect “true” statements about existence.

As an aside, if what Bernard and JP wanted to know was how and why we choose the philosophical narratives we do, why we think them true, or the narrative that best describes, not just the physical world, but existence comprehensively, all they needed do is ask themselves how they chose theirs (we all have them).  They reasoned to it.  As far as contrasting philosophical narratives and reflecting upon one’s own, why we might consider one narrative false and another true, I have posted on that before and both were involved in that conversation.  They are welcome to peruse those posts and conversations again.  Perhaps now those posts will make better sense and Bernard and JP may better understand why their objections were, considering what we now know, off the mark then as well.

So, Bernard has tried to bracket out Christians, and, I guess all those who hold the belief that morality is objective and universal as “doing” something different than what he thinks he is doing.  Well, hopefully we all see now that no one is doing something different.  We claim nothing different than the same process he (or any rational person) uses to reach the conclusions they do of a religious or philosophical nature, even if those conclusions are that the other guy’s views clash with science.  That assertion is a philosophical claim, not a scientific one.  It is reached through the same holistic process of reasoning we all use and it has nothing to do with brain states or divine intervention.

Where much of this was given away was in Bernard’s admission he did not mean by “know” and “true” in an empirical/scientific sense.  As even Burk knew, Bernard’s argument melted away right there, putting aside the fact it was a straw-man to begin with.  If someone is not claiming they mean to “know” something is “true” in an empirical/scientific sense, then brain states and a claim of a clash with science logically go out the window.  And even Burk thought the “brain states” idea a side “adventure”, something he clearly thought wasn’t even worth addressing as he refused to even address any of the questions regarding “brain states” I gave Bernard.

To make matters worse, in addition to all this time arguing against a straw-man, we learn that Bernard (and JP) was also confusing the two senses of something being relative.  Bernard told us that because philosophical conclusions are true relative to their presuppositions, this meant truth was relative and not objective and that I was a relativist.  Here are just a couple of his statements:

“…We all reason our way from presuppositions to conclusions, and hence our conclusions can only be thought of as true relative to these suppositions…”

False.  The fact our conclusions are relative to our presuppositions DOES NOT mean our conclusions can only be thought true in the sense they logically follow our presuppositions.  Everyone knows this.  Everyone knows that one can have conclusions that logically follow (are relative to) their presuppositions but are possibly false conclusions or true ones.  The truthfulness or falsity of our conclusions have nothing to do with our conclusions following (being relative to) our presuppositions.

This is the difference between a valid argument and one that has true conclusions.  Here is an example:

All toasters are items made of gold

All items made of gold are time-travel devices.

Therefore, all toasters are time-travel devices.

The argument above has a conclusion that is “relative” to its premise, or presupposition, so it is a valid argument.  However, it’s conclusion is false.  All valid arguments are “relative” in this way, but that doesn’t mean their conclusions are relative in the sense of confirming a conclusion that morality is relative (or objective for that matter).  One of those conclusions is false, while both conclusions are relative to their premises.

“Yes indeed. You are a relativist. You think you come to beliefs that are relative to your starting assumptions, and we have no way of adjudicating between opposing moral beliefs…”

False.  I am a moral realist.  And let’s just be honest, when Bernard claims here that I am a relativist, he wasn’t just pointing out the trivially true, the obvious fact we all reason to conclusions that “follow” (are relative to) our presuppositions.  If that had been his point, I would have thanked him for the compliment—it would be like exclaiming: “Yes, indeed, you are logical—you make valid arguments!”  He clearly meant this in a “gotcha” sense however- that I was “really” a relativist, which means he indeed was completely confusing the two senses of “relative”.

I think when he realized this he tried to sweep it away by claiming it was only a word game or semantics.  It is in no way just a word game or semantics—it is critical we understand the difference in the two senses of “relative” in a conversation like this one.

JP made the same mistake:

“Moral knowledge refers to what we know of these truths. Under your approach, this knowledge is relative to world views.”

Wrong for the same reasons.  “Relative” to world-view simply means one makes a valid argument, one that follows—it is everyone’s approach we hope!  It has nothing to do with whether morality is “relative” or objective.  Everyone’s knowledge, what they think they know “of these truths”, even the knowledge we can’t know anything about them is “relative” to their world-view.  One is only pointing out the obvious here (as Ron noted—it is trivially true) while mistakenly thinking they are commenting upon the question of knowing if our conclusions are “really” true or not.  Two different things entirely.

And I do (we all do) have a way of adjudicating between opposing ethical assertions or the narratives from which they arise.  When a Christian or moral realist claims that morality is universal and objective, how do they “know” this?  And there is no need to break it down any further, for instance to ask: “How do you know torture is wrong?”  The question as to any specific ethical stance is still based upon the same type of knowing and the greater question still goes to whether morality is objective and universal or relative and subjective, as any specific claim is still understood from one of those perspectives.  This would be true even if it were two moral realists who disagree regarding a specific moral assertion.  Since the disagreement cannot be adjudicated empirically/scientifically, it can only be adjudicated by reasoned argument, by contrasting and discussing the differing reasons, and in what believing such has actually produced historically (this is not an argument from pragmatism-but a normal part of the reasoning process-one of the factors any rational person considers).  As we all know, this certainly hasn’t settled these issues or disagreements to everyone’s satisfaction, but cultures and entire civilizations do tend, by consensus, to affirm certain ethical stances over others and believed them to be “true” and not just in relation to them.  Unfortunately, many times the adjudication happens violently as world wars and the need for police forces attest.  For the most part however, the adjudication is peaceful and through reasoned debate and the passing of laws.

Are these types of disputes settled or adjudicated like a dispute over an empirical matter would be?  Of course not, how silly.  What would that even mean?  Would they weigh, measure, run tests on, the two different answers?  But that doesn’t mean there can’t be a consensus that develops, wherein a person or culture can assert that the other person or culture is “wrong” and in fact this is what we have done since recorded time and do now.  As noted above, the assertion of their being “wrong” would not be simply relative to us or relative to our presuppositions, but an assertion of the violation of an objective and universal ethical assertion (taking an innocent life is wrong/evil), which may indeed be a true conclusion (or a false one).

This always leads to the next question (which has been covered in past posts): If two people disagree as to whether something is morally right or wrong, or even if morality is relative as opposed to being objective, doesn’t this fact alone mean morality is relative?  No, it doesn’t.  It just means there is disagreement.  It just means someone is wrong.  This always leads to the follow-up question: How do we know who is wrong then—how do we adjudicate this?  Well, since we all agree (except Burk) that by “know” we do not mean empirically/scientifically then how else would we proceed, how else could we “know” who is wrong?  Any ideas?

If one accepts the presupposition that not all knowledge is founded empirically/scientifically, then he must be open to other justifications for “knowing” or claiming the other person is “wrong” or holds a false belief.  Let’s pause right there.  If throughout the last comment section, unless one was being disingenuous, when we were told by “know” and “true” one did not mean in the sense of empirically/scientifically, he was, at the same time, accepting the presupposition that there are other ways to “know” what is “true”.  At the end of this post, I will ask for clarification however.

If he was truly accepting that presupposition, he will then also accept the fact that one is never going to prove the other person wrong in an empirical fashion, unless the other person is making some sort of empirical/scientific claim to begin with.  If a person tells us he believes torture is wrong based upon some empirical and scientific finding, he is then open to being disproved by those same methods.  However, if a person claims torture is wrong based upon metaphysical and philosophical grounds, he is not then open to being disproved upon empirical/scientific grounds.  He is open however to being shown his argument contains logical fallacies, or that the philosophical narrative he inhabits, that leads to his assertions, isn’t compelling or doesn’t align with the good, the true, and beautiful.  Anticipating the next question (How do we know what is good, true, and beautiful?), see the many previous posts wherein this was discussed (and in which Bernard, JP, and Burk participated).

Now, they could take the path Burk takes which is one of scientism/empiricism.  They could assert by “know” that they do mean empirically/scientifically because such is the only way we can “know” if something is “true” or exists.  I think this would be the most logical argument to make to end up where they seem to want to, which is to make it so that if one does claim morality is objective, there is a “problem” with science.  It still wouldn’t be a clash with science, but a clash with scientism/empiricism, but it would logically follow (I at least will give that to Burk).

So, given what we now know, let’s consider again Bernard’s peculiar way of being “agnostic”.  Here, as far as I can tell, was Bernard’s initial claim:

1. Let’s stipulate God may exist, and therefore morality may exist derivative to God existing.
2. However, we can’t claim any knowledge of either; or, if we do, any such claim would be     problematic from a scientific understanding.
3. Therefore, we should remain agnostic regarding God and morality existing objectively/universally.

Well, since we know Bernard agreed he didn’t mean “knowledge” in the sense of empirical/scientific knowledge and since we know no one is claiming they know by divine changes in their brains, but mean “know” in the sense of reasoning to, coming to conclude such, coming to that belief, then we can all see now the problems with the above.  Bernard’s assertion in number 2 was based upon an erroneous belief that knowledge was obtained by divine intervention in people’s brains.

We would now have to put it this way:

1. Let’s stipulate God may exist, and therefore morality may exist derivative to God existing.  

2. If God does exist, we could claim knowledge of such in the same way we claim knowledge of any metaphysical assertion or conclusion (even the opposite assertion of atheism), which is outside the purview of empiricism or science.  

3. Therefore, our agnosticism shouldn’t be based upon a claim of knowledge being impossible or being problematic from a scientific understanding, but upon the reasoned (or not) arguments made by both the theist and atheist and our evaluation of those arguments.

Neither of the above are meant to be syllogisms; the first example is meant to show the general path of Bernard’s reasoning, how it was based upon a misconception and how the second example is the much more reasonable path of thought.  I think Bernard was trying to place himself in a position where he thought he could commit to nothing, and then stand back and claim the assertions of the moral realist and anti-realist, if they asserted they “knew” morality was either relative or objective, clashed with science.  Unfortunately, to do that one does have to commit to something and what he was committed to was a misunderstanding as to number 2 (thinking it would involve divine intervention as to brain states) in his initial claim and once he gave up meaning by “knowledge”, empirical knowledge, there was no way to then claim a clash with science.

As an aside, if he were to claim that all this time he did mean empirical knowledge (as I think he originally did) he would know it meant a philosophical commitment to empiricism, scientism, which would have been question-begging (the very question of how we can “know” and what it means for something to be “true” or exist is disputed) and confirmed my suspicions he is a naturalist and he clearly didn’t want to go down that road.

I will take Bernard’s claim he is not a naturalist and that we can “know” something to be “true” in ways other than empirically/scientifically (although we will seek clarification of that point here shortly) in good faith, but he has never explained how he is always able, at the same time, to come down on the same side as Burk on any significant point.  I’m not sure how that is possible.  If I claimed repeatedly that I was not a fundamentalist Christian (as I do claim), but at every turn, where it was significant, I came down on the same side as they, I think anyone would have every right to call me on it. Of course, the way he could claim he wasn’t a naturalist, but, at the very same time, basically posit an atheistic universe/existence (because even if they did exist, we couldn’t “know” anything about them) has now been shown to be based upon several misunderstandings and errors on his part.

As alluded to above, while both Bernard and JP were willing to say they didn’t mean “know” “true” and similar terms in the sense of empirically/scientifically, I have a sense they only assented to such because they wanted the conversation to move forward and knew I had to know what they meant by those words before we could do so.  However, such doesn’t mean they actually believe, like Burk, that the only way we can “know” if something is “true” or exists, is empirically/scientifically.  They may have just meant, for the sake of conversation, I will agree by “knowing” and “true” we are talking about other ways of knowing, that you Darrell, believe we can know something to be true or exist.  So, let’s just get clear here: Do you (Bernard and JP) believe the only way we can “know” if something is “true” or “exists” is through empirical and scientific means?

This is important because if the answer is “No”, then they accept there are other ways to adjudicate disagreements over philosophical issues and questions.  I would then assume they had some in mind, such as those noted by me, their own ways, or others.  Thus, what is the problem?  If the answer is “Yes” then it is an admission of being a naturalist/empiricist, which is scientism.  This certainly wouldn’t be shocking as I think most assume this already.  Regardless, please address this question.

Finally, whence the agnosticism now?  In addition to the question above, here are a few more for both Bernard and JP (if JP feels his agnosticism rests upon the same reasoning; I’m never quite sure): Would you still explain your agnosticism as being based upon your prior reasons (even if they exist, we could “know” nothing about them), after they have now been shown to be based upon several misunderstandings?  If not, if you no longer hold to the first example (above) I gave of your reasoning, what now would your reasons be for being agnostic, if you indeed still are?