Amanda Marcotte has written here regarding what she considers ‘egregious’ myths perpetuated by the ‘religious’ against atheists. When you look at the fundamentalists on both sides here, both the secular and religious variety, there are myths perpetuated by each against the other in abundance. Neither side has clean hands here. I don’t think either side ‘hears’ the other and both are blind to their own complicity in the on-going circus of misunderstanding and believing the worst of the ‘other’.
So, I thought I would take a look at these ‘myths’ and try to formulate a response to, one, if this is something I believe is true and, two, how I might respond. This is really just an off the top-of-my-head and cursory take on her essay, so I’m not doing a deep in-depth response here. These are just my initial thoughts and reflections.
1. There are no atheists in foxholes.
I have heard Christians say this, but I’m not sure it rises in their minds to saying anything much greater than ‘we all behave and think differently sometimes under great stress or when in great fear’. Regardless, should Christians say something like this? I don’t think so. It could be there are no Christians in foxholes. What might we do when confronted with our impending death or if we were in great fear for our lives? Some have renounced their faith. Some might have felt abandoned by God in such situations, perhaps even to the point of then abandoning God. Fear clouds the mind and we all, atheist and theist alike, might do and say things we never would otherwise.
2. Atheists are just angry with God.
It’s interesting- she brings up the problem of evil (and whether or not the belief she notes is a logical inconsistency is question-begging) as the impetus for the accusation but doesn’t really address the link but simply devolves into further question-begging statements. And I don’t think Christians are ‘dismissing’ the arguments because of perceived anger on the part of the atheist. Rather they are interested in why someone would get angry over the idea (evil) to begin with, when we are often told by these same atheists that the idea of ‘evil’ is a purely cultural, psychological, and emotional response to an event or action (or omission) and if there was a different culture and psychology involved, or time-frame, our emotional response toward the same action or event could be that it was ‘good’. So the question is does ‘evil’ really exist beyond our time-bound, cultural, psychological and emotional response? If it doesn’t, then why the anger over something called ‘evil’ in relation to God’s supposed goodness or even in God’s absence? Is one admitting then that there is some objective standard one is using to determine that God’s supposed goodness isn’t a ‘true’ goodness and that there is something called ‘evil’? If so, what is that standard and why is it one we should care about? But yes, if what is really going on here is that atheists are angry with Christians and their actions, then of course, we should admit that and not accuse them of being angry with God, which I’m sure I have probably done. Again though, whence the anger when ‘evil’ doesn’t really exist (according to the atheist) beyond our purely time-bound, cultural and emotional psychology? There is a great disconnect here that most atheists do not get. The writer misses all this.
3. Atheists are aggressive and rude.
I’ve interacted with some who are and some who are not. There are Christians who are aggressive and rude too. I do think the ‘new’ atheists and people like Bill Maher and Jeffrey Taylor are at the root of this current perception, since they have the largest microphones. Unfortunately people then begin to think all atheists are like them. I don’t believe that to be true.
4. Atheism is a white dude thing.
I notice that other than some anecdotal evidence, there is nothing of substance offered to refute this so-called ‘myth’. I’m not sure what it means to be a ‘white dude thing’ but the credible evidence is that the great majority of atheists are male and white. Draw whatever conclusions you might from that fact, but it is indeed a fact.
“Surveys suggest most atheists are white men. A recent survey of 4,000 members of the Freedom from Religion Foundation found that 95 percent were white, and men comprised a majority. Among U.S. nonbelievers, 72 percent are white and 60 percent are men, according to the 2008 American Religious Identification Survey; the U.S. Religious Landscape Survey by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life found that Hispanics make up 11 percent, and African-Americans just 8 percent, of “unaffiliated” Americans.”
5. Atheism is just a faith like any other.
Her response here just made me shake my head. First, 90% of her response is just question-begging nonsense. No argument is even offered. Then, she assumes that those who make this claim have the same low opinion (or false opinion) she does of what faith even means to begin with, and she embarrassingly mistakes this observation as some sort of rhetorical cleverness. Seriously? She clearly has no idea what people even mean when they make this claim—she is clueless. Did she miss the last 50 years of philosophy and the modern/postmodern conversation? Hello? Does Salon have editors? I believe number 5.
6. Atheists don’t have a moral code.
Here is where both sides do not ‘hear’ the other. I know number 6 is what many atheists ‘hear’ in discussions regarding morality with Christians, but I don’t think this is what most Christians mean. I certainly don’t agree with number 6. What I argue is that anyone who believes the material is all there is doesn’t have a rational basis for asserting or living by a moral code that doesn’t reduce to subjective power or survival alone. Now, that is certainly a moral code of sorts, but it is one of power only. Might makes right—and I decide what is right. But this has nothing to do with how most atheists actually live their lives, which is the same way that most of us live ours, which is ‘do unto others…’ I just think most atheists live with the cognitive dissonance this requires. Further, since most atheists live in countries with deep Judeo-Christian historical influences, they live following most of the same cultural moral codes we all do. Regardless, as a Christian, I think all people are made in the image of God and reflect the fact we are autonomous moral beings. An atheist is still, in my view (contrary to his own opinion), an autonomous moral being capable of living a free moral life consisting of true free moral choices. The dispute here is the basis and grounding of a moral code, not whether an atheist has one or not—of course they do.
7. Atheist lives are bleak and lack meaning.
Again, I think this comes from not ‘hearing’ each other. I don’t know about ‘bleak’ but what I mean by ‘meaning’ is meaning besides what one makes up for himself. Hitler’s life had ‘meaning’ to him and so did Mother Teresa’s. The question is what was that meaning and what was it based upon? If the universe and existence is without meaning, then so is the life within it. Obviously we could make up meaning, but that is sort of like whistling pass the grave yard. So I would say that the question here, like with morality, is what is the basis and grounding to one’s meaning? We all attribute some meaning to our lives; and all lives, I believe, are meaningful, but I say such from a Christian perspective. I’m not sure one can from a naturalist perspective, beyond saying something like, ‘well, we imagine or create meaning’ but to me that is doing the same thing they accuse believers of doing, which is imagining or creating god. Why is one good and not the other if both are imaginary? Simply because the atheist knows it’s imaginary? How does that help? It means you need to let go of your meaning then too. It is nothing finally. See the problem? And are you willing to work, build, defend perhaps, and strive for this meaning you know is imaginary and no more real than the fellow doing the very same thing, working, building, and perhaps defending his imaginary meaning—and one that is perhaps very different from your ‘meaning’? I just don’t believe people operate that way. They live and strive for what they really believe is true, not for what they know is imaginary. No culture, no civilization, no state, indeed nothing has ever been built out of a meaning people knew to be imaginary and of no more real traction in this life than the next person’s. Further, if there is no meaning inherent in existence, why do we need to create or imagine such to begin with? So the question is not does the life of the atheist lack meaning. Clearly it does not lack meaning. The question is this: Is that meaning real or imagined/created? If it is imagined or created—then the admonition to ‘grow up’, often given to theists, comes back now to haunt.
8. Atheists are hedonists who don’t understand the true meaning of love.
Again, I think these sorts of statements are based upon what we think ‘love’ really means and its basis or grounding in something beyond our emotional or physical indicators. Atheists go home each night and kiss their significant others, hug their kids, pet their dogs and cats, and love just like the rest of us. If they were to then tell us that this ‘love’ they display is ‘just’ (reduction) an emotional physical indicator for mate selection, sexual reproduction, and clan or herd survival, we would disagree, but the atheist would still then go home, kiss their significant other, hug their children, sacrifice for them, work hard, and so on. And they would continue to be kind and loving to complete strangers in unselfish ways. They love and understand love, I believe, in spite of their materialism/naturalism.
9. Atheists have no way to cope after losing loved ones without the belief in an afterlife.
I have no idea regarding number 9. I would certainly never say this to an atheist who had just lost a loved one—or in general for that matter. In a purely academic/philosophical sense, there is a place for discussions regarding souls and an afterlife, but I have no idea what the emotional or coping aspect to this might be if one is an atheist. Christians mourn and grieve the loss of loved ones and it hurts like it hurts anyone, but Christians take great comfort in believing they will see each other again one day and that this life is not the end. If one does not have that comfort or belief, I don’t know what they do, but I suppose there are other ways to cope.
10. Atheists are out to destroy Christmas.
Fox News aside, nonsense.
Byzantine Dream 
Hi Darrell
Interesting stuff here. It'll not surprise you to hear that number six is here you and I would disagree.
It's a subtle point, and there's no need to rehash it here, but it seems at least worth signaling that when we talk of all reducing to power, we may well be employing little more than an rhetorical device.
The problem, as I see it, is that this piece of rhetoric is equally applicable to both sides of the coin here, and so should be applied fairly. Yes, ultimately, if one wishes to impose one's moral viewpoint on others (and sometimes this will be inevitable) and can not get through there through negotiation and conversation, then all that will be left to us is force. The very fact that a society has an enforced justice system reminds us of this. This is equally true of atheists and believers alike.
The distinction you would make, I think, is that in the believer's case, they are motivated by a conviction that what they are defending is truly right. Equally, I suppose, the atheist might be motivated by the belief that what they are defending is truly desirable (at least for themselves, but if empathy drives them, oftentimes because they consider it truly desirable for others). Either way, power is equally in play, and as such I wonder if the distinction isn't overplayed.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
I really don’t see the use of the word ‘power’ as rhetoric.
I've noted many times that force or violence is often the last resort in a dispute, whether one invokes an objective or subjective morality. Such certainly doesn't defeat any arguments for an objective morality.
It does raise problems however for someone who believes all morality to be subjective and not universal and the examples are in your response:
“Equally, I suppose, the atheist might be motivated by the belief that what they are defending is truly desirable (at least for themselves, but if empathy drives them, oftentimes because they consider it truly desirable for others)…”
What do you mean by ‘truly’ desirable? Do you mean everyone should desire the same? If you mean just ‘truly’ for you, why is your desire more preferable than the desire of the one you may now commit violence against? And if ‘empathy’ drives them, so what? Is ‘empathy’ a universal, objective, good drive? According to the relativist, ‘empathy’ is a subjective emotion and relative to that person, but not necessarily the other. See the problem? If empathy and desires are relative, then what is really going on here is just the imposition of will upon whomever it turns out is the weaker party, which means it finally reduces to power. I just don’t see any way around this unless one can point to something beyond their own desire or even empathy. In other words what can one appeal to if even their desire is to kill the murderer they just happened to come upon after he has killed, and who they now have no empathy for?
If I take matters into my own hands and kill the murderer on the spot, yes, power and violence are in play. If however, I am motivated by a universal, objective, appeal to justice, to something other than mob or vigilante power and violence, I hold the person until the police come. They arrest him. He is tried and perhaps given the death penalty, meaning violence and power are in play. So yes, power and violence are equally in play, but I think there is a huge difference here you are overlooking. How could one ‘overplay’ such a difference when the difference is normally what we use as the very bar for what is civilized and what is barbaric?
And it doesn't matter if we try and parse the word justice and say that at the end of the day, it is still just the subjective idea of a group of people codified into law. That begs the question. Whether or not it finds its basis in something more transcendent, it is recognized as something outside my personal subjective desires and empathies. Whether or not I personally, subjectively, agree with this idea of justice no one cares, because most see that as its very purpose—to act as something objective over and against my personal desires in the service of the weak, the potential victim, not the strong or powerful.
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Hi Darrell
Thanks for taking the time to respond.
I'd argue that referring to power is misleading simply because power is not the distinguishing feature.
Rather, both approaches to morality (subjective and objective) collapse to power under identical circumstances: when other means of achieving agreement fail.
The difference, then, has nothing to do with power. The difference, as best I can see, comes down to what motivates the player, should they seek to change the behaviour of another. One acts upon the motivation of doing what they perceive as universally right, the other on what they perceive as most desirable for them.
In both cases, cultural context, biological design and personal narrative play a role in shaping that motivation, such that there is no reason why both players shouldn't make identical moral decisions.
There is certainly a difference, but it has nothing to do with power. As such, phrases like 'reduces to power' do have an element of empty rhetoric to them, I think.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“The difference, then, has nothing to do with power. The difference, as best I can see, comes down to what motivates the player, should they seek to change the behaviour of another. One acts upon the motivation of doing what they perceive as universally right, the other on what they perceive as most desirable for them.”
And, as already noted, I think therein lies the problem. If we are seeking to do what is universally right, we are not simply imposing our will upon another because it is our ‘desire’ to do so—regardless of right or wrong. If our motivation is ‘desire’ only, then like with the example I gave you, we are really just talking about power—the ‘desire’ of the more powerful will prevail. If our motivation is the recognition of something universal and objective, we are following something that has nothing to do with ‘desire’ (although we may desire it as well) or power, but with the common good. In other words, the less powerful, regardless of the ‘desire’ of the more powerful, could prevail in such a system where there is an objective universal aspect–that moves past individual subjective 'desires' or emotions.
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Hi Darrell
I'm not sure we should relate desire so closely to power: that feels more like a debating trick than a substantive point.
Yes, if it all comes down to how I personally desire the world to be, and in order to achieve that desire, I must assert my wishes over those of another, then power will come into play. But is this the same thing as saying that really it all comes down to power (I would rather say it all comes down to personal preference, with power one mechanism by which preference is expressed).
The problem is, your argument works against belief in objective truth too. One can easily write:
If it all comes down to how I personally believe the world is morally ordered, and in order to defend that belief, I must assert my beliefs over those of others, then power will come into play.
If, in the first case, we can reasonably infer that it all comes down to power, then so too can we in the second case. The objectivist is no more protected from the charge than the subjectivist. Hence, the claim that it comes down to power for the subjectivist is perhaps simply rhetoric.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“I'm not sure we should relate desire so closely to power: that feels more like a debating trick than a substantive point.”
We are only noting the relation when it is relevant to disputes and eventual violence. I hardly think such is a debating trick or not substantive.
“The problem is, your argument works against belief in objective truth too. One can easily write:
If it all comes down to how I personally believe the world is morally ordered, and in order to defend that belief, I must assert my beliefs over those of others, then power will come into play.”
But such is not what the objectivist is saying. The objectivist is saying “this is what I must do, regardless of how I personally believe…” You are forgetting the relations involved here as well as far as the weaker being able to prevail against the stronger.
You seem to think because violence may be the eventual end of a dispute that such relativizes all prior motivations, but I don’t believe that to be true. Such is why I can see a difference between the violence meted out by a lynching party and that of a court of law. Do you see a difference between the two or do you think they are each ultimately based upon who has the greater power and therefore equal?
In what scenario could an appeal be made to something outside two people’s contrary desires, where the one with the least amount of power could prevail in a non-violent manner? And, if what was appealed to was ‘outside’ their desires and even contrary to those desires, how is that not an objective source?
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Hi Darrell
The best the objectivist can do is make an appeal to what they believe is the moral truth of the situation. Problem is, another objectivist may well appeal to a contradictory moral truth (hence the lynch mob may well be convinced they are righteous, just as you may be convinced they are not).
We're all in the same boat, here, it seems.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
Then do you believe there is no fundamental difference between a lynch mob and a court of law? If the eventual end of a dispute is violence, then does that relativize all prior motivations in your mind?
I’m not asking you whether or not after all efforts have been exhausted there may be violence, no one disagrees in that regard—neither objectivists nor subjectivists. Everyone agrees that we are in that same boat. But that is not the issue; it is neither the issue in my post nor the issue discussed by the atheist writer.
I’m asking whether or not you see any fundamental difference between a lynch mob and a court of law? Or, again:
In what scenario could you envision an appeal being made to something outside two people’s contrary desires, where the one with the least amount of power could prevail in a non-violent manner? And, if what was appealed to was ‘outside’ their desires and even contrary to those desires, how is that not an objective source?
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Hi Darrell
The least powerful will prevail only if the more powerful assents to this. This is true under either system.
So, it may be that the more powerful believes it is morally right to let the less powerful prevail. Equally, it may be that the more powerful believes it is personally desirable to let the less powerful prevail.
The relationship to power remains identical for both subjectivist and objectivist.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“So, it may be that the more powerful believes it is morally right to let the less powerful prevail. Equally, it may be that the more powerful believes it is personally desirable to let the less powerful prevail.”
You are not answering the question. The problem lies when the more powerful DOES NOT have the desire to let the less powerful prevail.
What do we do when it is contrary to the more powerful’s desire? When the more powerful lets the less powerful prevail, contrary to their desire, what is the reasoning normally involved? Isn't it an appeal to something objective, something outside their desire?
Here it is again:
In what scenario could you envision an appeal being made to something outside two people’s “contrary desires”, where the one with the least amount of power could prevail in a non-violent manner? And, if what was appealed to was ‘outside’ their desires and even contrary to those desires, how is that not an objective source?
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Hi Darrell
Well, under the objectivist scenario, the powerful still must have the desire to do what they believe is right. Without this desire, the powerless are out of luck, be we speaking of subjectivist or objectivist belief systems.
So, the powerless will only have their desires met if this accords with the wishes of the powerful. There is no difference between the two systems in this respect, and hence power is in play in precisely the same way.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“Well, under the objectivist scenario, the powerful still must have the desire to do what they believe is right.”
No, this is exactly wrong. Under the objectivist scenario the powerful must do what is “right” or “lawful” regardless their desire or the fact they are more powerful.
“So, the powerless will only have their desires met if this accords with the wishes of the powerful. There is no difference between the two systems in this respect, and hence power is in play in precisely the same way.”
So, then you are agreeing with my critique that everything boils down to power, because such must be the case if there is no objective morality? And are you also asserting that power is in play “precisely” in the same way whether it is a mob lynching or a democratic state or republic state under law?
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Hi Darrell
No, I'm arguing that both objective and subjective systems boil down to power to the same extent.
You say under the objectivist scenario the powerful just do what is right, no matter what their desire. Are you saying that the powerful can not desire to do what is wrong, if the world has objective moral values? If so, then the counter evidence is everywhere. people do both believe in objective moral truths, and act in ways that they feel to be wrong, and are ashamed of.
So, the will to do right by the powerless only affects powerless if the will as acted upon. Now the powerful will act upon it for different reasons if they do it because they personally desire to see the person helped, or because they simply believe they have an obligation. Motivations are certainly different in this respect. But the role power plays is identical – the powerful person acting upon their desire becomes the determinant of the powerless person's experience.
So, for example, you and I might both pass a beggar in the street, and might both chooser to give them money. In both cases, we have acted against our own interests, in the interests of the relatively powerless beggar. You might do it because you believe it to be right, and I because I see my actions as personally desirable. From the beggar's perspective, however, the same event has occurred, they have benefited form the choice of the powerful.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“You say under the objectivist scenario the powerful just do what is right, no matter what their desire. Are you saying that the powerful can not desire to do what is wrong, if the world has objective moral values?”
No, I am not saying that—not even sure how that would follow. I asserted what I did in response to your statement that, “Well, under the objectivist scenario, the powerful still must have the desire to do what they believe is right.” The whole point is that maybe they don't have that desire. And the only way we can desire a true “good” or do what is truly “wrong” is in a world of objective moral values. Otherwise, we are simply talking about choices and actions, neither good nor bad, they just “are”. My point is that if we believe in an objective morality, we would try and do the right thing regardless our desire—especially if the right thing went against our desire.
“Motivations are certainly different in this respect. But the role power plays is identical – the powerful person acting upon their desire becomes the determinant of the powerless person's experience.”
It is not identical, at all. Or, again, are you saying there is no difference between the motivations of the lynching party and the court of law? If the motivations are different then the role power plays is not identical.
Your example of the beggar fails, because we are talking about the use of violence when two parties have contrary desires. Further, if a person desires to do a good thing and does it, that isn't an argument that only desire is in play. Our desires are trained and molded into us by family, culture, religion, personality and a myriad of other factors. What if we desire the worst for the beggar? Just because the same event occurs isn't an argument for a subjective morality.
I’m just going to assume at this point, not seeing anything to the contrary, that you cannot address this question:
In what scenario could you envision an appeal being made to something outside two people’s “contrary desires”, where the one with the least amount of power could prevail in a non-violent manner? And, if what was appealed to was ‘outside’ their desires and even contrary to those desires, how is that not an objective source?
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“…the powerful person acting upon their desire becomes the determinant of the powerless person's experience.”
Give me an example of where a powerless person acting upon their desire becomes the determinant of the powerful person's experience. And, since they had more power, why did the more powerful let this happened as it would normally not be their desire.
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Hi Darrell
You say if motivations are different, then so too is the role power plays. This is where you lose me.
Both the person motivated to do good, and the person motivated to follow their desires, can be motivated to follow exactly the same course of action (be it to donate, lynch, try in court of whatever), and the extent to which they must use power to implement it is also identical.
The idea that subjectivity reduces to power in the way that objectivity does not doesn't hold. It's a rhetorical device used to claim a high ground that simply isn't available upon inspection.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“Both the person motivated to do good, and the person motivated to follow their desires, can be motivated to follow exactly the same course of action (be it to donate, lynch, try in court of whatever), and the extent to which they must use power to implement it is also identical.”
This is just wrong. You have to give an example of why a person with more power “should” desire to give the person with less power what they desire, when it conflicts with the desire of the person who is more powerful, especially when the end is going to be violent.
Would you tell a family whose son was dragged out of the police station and hung that whether or not the motivations of the mob and those of a court of law were different, both had to use power to implement their desires, thus, their use of power here is identical?
Further, how can you speak of the person who is “motivated to do good”? If I hear you correctly, you are saying there is no objective “good” for the person to follow, right? You are saying that even if he thinks such, he is really just following his desire. You are claiming that your two people above are “really” doing the same thing. That is contested and question-begging. Give us an example of a person who is not motivated to do good nor desires to do good, but does anyway. What is the appeal to in such a case? Isn't it something objective?
Or, here it is again:
In what scenario could you envision an appeal being made to something outside two people’s “contrary desires”, where the one with the least amount of power could prevail in a non-violent manner? And, if what was appealed to was ‘outside’ their desires and even contrary to those desires, how is that not an objective source?
If you cannot give an example, then aren't we talking about power at the end of the day? What else is in play?
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Hi Darrell
Here's an example that for me shows the distinction pretty well. See what you think.
Throughout history, cultural and biological forces have encouraged the formation of social structures which have subjugated women. Our very human desire to love, care for and help has very often been distorted by a social structure that tells us, as men, that we should abuse and demean.
Consider claims to moral objective imperatives to honour killings, as a hideous example. At the end of Othello, our fallen hero believes his wife has been unfaithful and, despite still feeling a great love for her, desiring her survival in other words, follows his moral belief and murders her.
So, objective moral belief brings power into play, leading to a murder whereas his desires would leave him otherwise to mercy.
As you know, honour killings remain are tragic feature of our contemporary world, grounded in a commitment to objective moral beliefs.
All our examples can be twisted in this way. Sometimes our desires favour the powerless (as with Desdemona) while objective morality encourages their abuse, other times it is reversed. To say that one reduces to power, and the other doesn't, doesn't seem to work.
In all cases, if the powerful do not desire to hep the powerless (at least to they extent that they desire to do what is 'right') then the powerless are not helped. The powerless are helped when the powerful have both the desire and capacity to help them. This constraint holds under both objective and subjective moral systems.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
I will be happy to address any examples you wish, but I would ask that you first address the one’s I have already presented you:
In response to your assertion that even if the motivations are different, the use of power is identical:
Would you tell a family whose son was dragged out of the police station and hung that whether or not the motivations of the mob and those of a court of law were different, both had to use power to implement their desires, thus, their use of power here is identical?
In what scenario could you envision an appeal being made to something outside two people’s “contrary desires”, where the one with the least amount of power could prevail in a non-violent manner? And, if what was appealed to was ‘outside’ their desires and even contrary to those desires, how is that not an objective source?
If you cannot give an example, then aren't we talking about power at the end of the day?
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Hi Darrell
The lynch mob and the court of law are different in both motivation and action. And both can be driven both by either objective or subjective belief systems.
You ask for a situation where a person appeals to something beyond their desires, in order to settle a clash in favour of the powerless. The answer could an appeal to many things, a tradition, a biological urge, a belief in the objective truth, whatever. In any of these cases, the powerless will only benefit if the powerful have both the desire and ability to help them.
To give you a concrete example, yesterday I met a stranger who needed money for petrol,s o I gave it to him. not because I had any desire to part with my money, at a basic, self-serving interest, but because I had a desire to see myself in a certain light, to live consistently within my personal and cultural narrative. This is identical to the person who believes in an objective moral truth and desires to live up to the ideal.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“The lynch mob and the court of law are different in both motivation and action. And both can be driven both by either objective or subjective belief systems.”
That is not the point. As already noted, no one disagrees that either belief system can end in violence. What you need to tell us now though is this: what is the difference then since you agree there is one? What about the motivations and actions make them different?
“You ask for a situation where a person appeals to something beyond their desires, in order to settle a clash in favour of the powerless. The answer could an appeal to many things, a tradition, a biological urge, a belief in the objective truth, whatever. In any of these cases, the powerless will only benefit if the powerful have both the desire and ability to help them.”
Yes, a tradition, or an abstract belief, but a biological urge is not an objective source in the context of ethics or morality. We do not have the “urge” to be merciful like we do the urge to eat or drink. Desires are cultivated and trained in reference to objective sources, whether for good or ill. But do you see the point? For the powerless to prevail, there must be an objective source appealed to such that the more powerful would put aside their desire (or urge) and allow the one with less power to “win” so to speak. Otherwise, we are simply talking power—the one with the greater power will have their “desires” met. This seems rather straight-forward and a matter of logic.
Your concrete example proves my point. You did something contrary to your basic desire, urge, by an appeal to a “certain” light and a “cultural” narrative. Those are objective sources, not simply personal ones. No one is arguing that unless one believes in an objective morality he cannot do good, thus your “identical” aspect fails. What we are arguing is that one cannot know what “good” means in action unless there is an objective referent (otherwise “good” could mean not helping the one with less power) and if there is none, then arbitrary power is all that is left to us.
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Hi Bernard,
To address now your previous response: You have no reason to believe that the desire to subjugate woman is wrong, if “desire” trumps all. You have no reason to believe that our desire to love, care, and help is any “better” than our desire to subjugate. “Better” requires an objective referent. You talk of “distortion” but how do you know? The only way we can know if something is distorted is if we know what “clear” means. You speak of something being “twisted” as if you knew what it means for something to be straight. You are talking about an “ought” when you are telling us at the same time there is only the “is”. And if you boil it all down to mean what is “better”, “clear”, not “twisted”, and “caring” for you personally, and only you, then any dispute is still going to reduce to power and your desires over the other person’s. And you can’t even tell us the other person’s desires were “bad” or “wrong”, you can only tell us they were not your desires. How is that not about power then?
If I hear you correctly, whether or not Othello believed in an objective morality or whether it was simply his desire to kill, violence and the use of power, in this case, was still the end and therefore identical. Is that your point, because, again, no one disagrees that violence may be the end of a dispute, regardless of whether one believes in an objective morality or a subjective one.
How do we know what the “right” desire should be, if we thought there was no true “right” but only our desires? You claim it is inherent to know, but it clearly is not. Biological drives are inherent, but whether we deem them “good” or “bad” is an entirely different matter. Without an objective source to guide between competing desires, how does all not reduce to power? How am I ever able to deny a desire, unless I can look outside myself to something objective? Certainly you must believe that not every desire should be followed, right? If so, how do you know that and how is that not an objective source?
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Also, this is just wrong:
“In any of these cases, the powerless will only benefit if the powerful have both the desire and ability to help them.”
An objective source is the very thing often driving the powerful to do the right thing, regardless their desire or if their desire is to do the wrong thing.
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Sorry, one more-think about it: If…
“…the powerless will only benefit if the powerful have both the desire and ability to help them…”
then power is all this reduces to. However, if the powerful “should” desire certain actions over others then all doesn't reduce to power. What your system robs us of is a “should”.
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For any society to work, you have to provide some sort of basis for the way members ought to behave. In other words, you have to be able to complete the sentence “You ought to do X because…” in a way that will be convincing to members. Now, you can always complete it: “…if you don't, I'll force you.” If you're like me and you lack the ability to deploy force effectively, you don't really like that option. So the question becomes: “What other (better?) ways can you complete the statement?” To be effective, you have to appeal to something objective (or suitably intersubjective). Now, religions posit objective bases for the oughts: “You ought not rape women because they are as much God's children as you” or “You ought not rape women because the suffering you inflict in this life will redound to you in your next incarnation” or whatever. So long as most members of a society believe in the objective bases, you can minimize violence. This is a good thing.
If the atheist, agnostic, or naturalist will not posit some objective basis for the “oughts”, how can the sentence be completed any way other than “…because if you don't, I'll force you”? Appealing to desire won't cut it. “You ought to do X because I desire that you do it” is either irrelevant or just a thinly veiled threat (“…and I will make you comply with my desire”). Appealing to innate impulses is naive. There's absolutely nothing innate about thinking one ought not rape… Indeed, in many societies (some quite successful) throughout human history rape has simply been an accepted part of life. Forced copulation is practically a norm in the animal kingdom. That modern non-religious people in some cultures find it abhorrent is simply an artifact of their cultural history (generally Christian), and there is nothing inherent in a predominately naturalist culture that would provide any ballast to keep it that way.
If you can tell a compelling story that people believe, you can provide an underlayment for moral values that does not rely on force to obtain compliance. On naturalism, not only do you lack such a story, but a core premise is that no such stories are true, and that “believing” stories is itself a “bad” thing to do anyways.
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Hi Darrell
You are quite right that our sophisticated desires (my desire to help a stranger for instance) are grounded in culture and narrative. And this is exactly what I appeal to, in the way you appeal to your conception of truth, I appeal to a narrative that fulfils me. Mine is not an objective source, the narrative into which I have tumbled I see as subjective, and yet our actions are identical.
Ron, I agree entirely. Any society must establish a set of behavioural mores and instincts, in order to have cohesion. Must we be able to justify these mores on objective grounds in order for them to stick? I doubt it. Much of the behaviour I witness in a school setting is habitual, ingrained through repetition and practise. there is good evidence, for example, that empathy can by honed not through a process of reasoning, but rather one of practice. As a general rule, those raised in secure, loving homes, in turn learn to love.
The strongest social driver, I would argue, is not 'because it is right' but rather 'because if I don't behave like this, I will be shunned by my peers.' We learn to mould our behaviour to fit the dominant narrative, precisely because we crave our place in the stable society this moulding allows.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
“You are quite right that our sophisticated desires (my desire to help a stranger for instance) are grounded in culture and narrative. And this is exactly what I appeal to, in the way you appeal to your conception of truth, I appeal to a narrative that fulfils me. Mine is not an objective source, the narrative into which I have tumbled I see as subjective, and yet our actions are identical.”
Here we disagree. Unless you personally and subjectively created and built this “culture” and “narrative” you are speaking of (which you did not), it is objective. The fact that you subjectively agree with it is beside the point. It is objective and outside of you. Thus, if it is objective, then our actions are identical. However, if you are just arbitrarily following your personal subjective desires, regardless this culture and narrative, then it reduces to power alone and our actions are not identical, even though violence (or loss of freedom) may be the eventual outcome (for instance life in prison or a lynch mob). And by the way, your appeal to a narrative is still an appeal to what you think true. No difference there between us.
“The strongest social driver, I would argue, is not 'because it is right' but rather 'because if I don't behave like this, I will be shunned by my peers.' We learn to mould our behaviour to fit the dominant narrative, precisely because we crave our place in the stable society this moulding allows.”
Just as an aside, I don’t think shame is a good social driver. Putting that aside, shame still requires an objective referent, otherwise how do we know what we should be ashamed of? If such comes from our culture and narrative, those are both objective referents, which we expect people to respond to regardless of whether they personally subjectively actually feel shame or not. You seem to keep missing this aspect.
Anyhow, it would appear my assertions regarding power, the initial point discussed, still stand. Even if we were to substitute “desire” for “power” we would run into the same problems.
That is my view anyway. As always, thanks for the input and conversation.
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Darrell
Ah yes
We have been using objectively very differently here. In the sense you use it, the atheist or agnostic does still have recourse to objectively moral beliefs, and this is quite consistent with their non-theistic stance.
Bernard
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Hi Bernard,
Right, otherwise all reduces to power. Now, one may believe that these narratives, laws, and cultural values/desires, even though objective, are ultimately reducible to the subjective desires of the majority or most powerful over time, with no link to an objective referent at some point in the past. That may be the case. I don't believe it is (obviously). I don't think most people believe murder or torture to be wrong simply because a majority or the most powerful have said so over time and codified it into law. In other words, in the context of the court of law or lynch mob, I don't think most people say to themselves, “I know this business about a fair trial and evidence is a complete charade on our part, something we made up or was passed down, but let's for the sake of appearances let this guy have a trial, even though we could take him out and hang him right now and it is really the same thing.” I don't think most people believe that murder or torture are simply wrong because a majority or the more powerful said so over time. Such still reduces to power. Of course, they could be wrong.
Whether or not morality is objective in this sense (ultimately, peeling back every layer) is intrinsically linked to whether or not God or something transcendent exists. If one is agnostic to that existence, then one must be agnostic to the question of whether morality is objective or not. But that is another conversation.
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Sorry, I see that I repeated myself in that last response…
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