Sorry, Your Philosophy is Not Science or Fact and Neither is Mine–One of Them May be True However

Before we get to the matter of our metaphysical frameworks/narratives not being “science” or “fact” let’s start here and herewhere we are told our brains are not computers and that the mind will remain a mystery to science.  And, I agree with both.  As in my previous post, so much is about “seeing” and perceiving (reading) and how we see and understand is always constrained to an extent by the metaphors we choose to be the prisms, through which we see.  These can either hinder or open up what it is possible for us to “see”.  The philosophical narrative frameworks we all inhabit consist of metaphors that shape the way we “see” and “perceive” reality—in fact, help us see what is “real”.  If we are aware of this, great.  If not, then we tend towards the fundamentalist sensibility, which assumes there is a one-to-one correlation between facts (information) and our conclusions regarding those facts as if any meaning was plain, literal, or obvious (which is how fundamentalists read their sacred writings).  The fundamentalist sensibility is to think there is no interpretive nature to their “reading” of reality, to the use of metaphor; they actually think there is a straight line between their “reading” (whether sacred writings or empirical scientific information) and their pronouncements regarding meaning, even the assertion there is none, or the assertion we cannot know if there is any.
In the first link, the writer notes the inherent problems associated with thinking or “seeing” our brains as computers.  And, of course, given the ubiquitous nature of computers and their deep relation to our lives, it is a ready-made and easily grasped metaphor.  It is very easy to think our brains are likecomputers.  But, they are not.  The writer tells us:
“But here is what we are not born with: information, data, rules, software, knowledge, lexicons, representations, algorithms, programs, models, memories, images, processors, subroutines, encoders, decoders, symbols, or buffers – design elements that allow digital computers to behave somewhat intelligently. Not only are we not born with such things, we also don’t develop them – ever.
We don’t store words or the rules that tell us how to manipulate them. We don’t create representationsof visual stimuli, store them in a short-term memory buffer, and then transferthe representation into a long-term memory device. We don’t retrieve information or images or words from memory registers. Computers do all of these things, but organisms do not…
Forgive me for this introduction to computing, but I need to be clear: computers really do operate on symbolic representations of the world. They really store and retrieve. They really process. They really have physical memories. They really are guided in everything they do, without exception, by algorithms.
Humans, on the other hand, do not – never did, never will.”
There is something about consciousness that doesn’t seem to change, that doesn’t develop like our physical bodies do.  Instead, it seems we simply become more aware as our physical bodies develop.  Our minds open up so to speak (or, unfortunately, sometimes not!) as we interact and experience other people and our world in general.  But it is not as if our consciousness is like something that starts empty and fills up with information.  It is more like our consciousness is already full (perhaps as large as the universe, or existence itself, perhaps even eternity) but our experiences and interactions are small.  How interesting though that what our minds can conceive and produce (computers/software) we then imagine is what we ourselves are doing too when we think and use our brains, the key word here being “imagine”.
I would like to believe that any reflective soul of even a slight rationality, of some experience of life, of some education, knows they are nothing at all like a computer.  We get anxious, we fear, we love, we cry, we get angry, we desire, we often are confused, we don’t make sense, we do make sense, we are contrary, we hope, we experience joy, sadness, and grief.  We are nostalgic and melancholy.  We are capable of great acts of sacrifice and kindness toward others and also of great cruelty.  We build orphanages, but also death camps.  We communicate silently with each other in a glance, nod, or tip of the head.  We speak (which is itself a mystery) and sing songs; we write great pieces of literature, poems, and music.  We laugh, we make jokes, and we use satire.  We are capable of recognizing beauty.  We are intuitive.  We can reason.  We can feel ashamed and embarrassed.  We philosophize and theologize.  We grow and change (we hope!).  Our opinions change and not always simply because of new information, but because of experience and our rubbing up against life.  We even become different sorts of people than we were at one time.  We have “conversions”.  We are great mysteries, indeed (See Shakespeare).  There is an infinite difference between us and computers.  The idea our brains/minds are like computers or operate like them, in any way at all is nothing more than magical thinking, a grand superstition, to be generous.

The greater point here is that the metaphor “computer” doesn’t mean we have derived this term from “science” or that science demands we use that metaphor.  It derives from a philosophical view—one that reduces mind to matter, or that sees the mind as the brain and the brain as machine like.    
And that our brains/minds are not like computers leads us to the second link.  Because they are not like any machine, or like anything we can reduce to the purely physical, they will remain a mystery as far as science is concerned.  Our conscious selves remain outside the bounds of science as far as science being able to explain such in purely physical terms, although there will be much science can do (and has done) as far as doing what it does best: Give us information regarding the physical aspects of the brain.      
What is rather amazing about physicist Edward Witten is that while he remains optimistic we will one day know why there is something rather than nothing, and that string theory will turn out to be correct, he doesn’t feel the same about consciousness.  And thinking we will one day know the answers to those other questions, purely through science, is a tall order indeed.  The fact he doesn’t feel the same about consciousness, tells us something about the unique enormity of the problem specific to that question:
“Witten is optimistic about science’s power to solve mysteries, such as why there is something rather than nothing. In a 2014 Q&A with me he said: ‘The modern scientific endeavor has been going on for hundreds of years by now, and we’ve gotten way farther than our predecessors probably imagined.’ He also reaffirmed his belief that string theory will turn out to be ‘right.’
But in a fascinating video interview with journalist Wim Kayzer, Witten is pessimistic about the prospects for a scientific explanation of consciousness. The chemist Ash Jogalekar, who blogs as ‘The Curious Wavefunction,’ wrote about Witten’s speech and transcribed the relevant section. (Thanks, Ash.) Here is an excerpt:
I think consciousness will remain a mystery. Yes, that’s what I tend to believe. I tend to think that the workings of the conscious brain will be elucidated to a large extent. Biologists and perhaps physicists will understand much better how the brain works. But why something that we call consciousness goes with those workings, I think that will remain mysterious. I have a much easier time imagining how we understand the Big Bang than I have imagining how we can understand consciousness…”(italics added)
Hopefully this becomes a trend that will continue where very intelligent people realize the limits of science (what rational person would even deny this, really?).  Science is wonderful.  Science is extremely helpful.  Science is a necessary tool—a tool we cannot do without.  I am a fan of science and firm supporter.  And I also understand science to be in harmony with faith.  The only ones who do not are those who hold to some sort of scientism/secular fundamentalism—they see faith as a rival to science—as two opposing narratives.  Such is a huge misunderstanding of both science and faith.  Those who see these as rivals are confusing their philosophical naturalism/scientism with “science” (see prior post and comments).  I do not see science as a rival and the great majority of non-fundamentalist Christians (the vast majority of Christians) do not either.  However, regardless, I do think science has its limits and is only one way of “seeing” or “reading” and understanding the world/existence.  It is a very specific and narrow type of seeing/understanding and in that one sphere (materiality), it sees wonderfully.  If we are trying to land on the moon, we consult science not our Bibles.  But the moment we train that narrow focus on other areas of enquiry and thought, other areas of life (such as the topics discussed on this blog), we see its impotence and limitations.  To think that science can comment upon or eventually explain everything to us is to misunderstand the tool one is using, and what it is for—it would be like handing a sledge hammer to someone who was trying to sew a button on their sweater.  It is not that a sledge hammer isn’t a good and proper tool; it’s only that it is limited and in some circumstances not very (or at all) useful or helpful.
Finally, we should note that even though science is limited in its scope and what it can address, even though it holds no monopoly upon knowledge per se, every philosophical framework/narrative should be aware of and take into consideration the findings of science.  I have referenced this link many times in the past and it is a good example of this point in the area of ethics/morality.  Like most neutral academic sources, it asserts that most of the meta-ethical views (Note: philosophical views…not scientific views) are viable as far as the science goes—that there is no conflict or clash with “evolution” or science.  The essay ends with:    
“So all three metaethical views discussed here—expressivism, error theory and moral realism—remain on the table.”
However, only philosophical naturalists (and creationists) believe the science actually proves their philosophical view to be the true or correct one, and the only reason there is even a discussion is because philosophical naturalists believe there is a conflict or clash with science on the part of moral realists.  They are in the minority however.  The Stanford writer addresses a pertinent part of their objection (Italics added and I bold and underline the pertinent portions):
“Proponents of epistemic ‘evolutionary debunking arguments’ think it should, arguing either that evolutionary considerations support moral skepticism (Joyce 2006, 2013, Forthcoming) or that they at least undermine traditional moral realism by providing a defeater for our moral beliefs if correctness for moral beliefs is construed in a realist fashion as accurate representation of objective or independent moral truths (Street 2006, 2008). (For recent discussion of these arguments, see Copp 2008, Shafer-Landau 2012, Berker 2014, FitzPatrick 2014a,b, among many others.)
On the face of it, the mere fact that natural selection would not have ‘designed’ our moral faculties to track moral truths accurately (as it plausibly designed our perceptual faculties to track facts about medium sized objects in typical human environments) is not obviously problematic. There are, after all, lots of cases where we seem to be able to grasp genuine truths even though those truths play no role in the story of how our basic mental capacities evolved. We are able to grasp truths of quantum field theory or higher dimensional topology or, for that matter, philosophy (or so we are assuming in even engaging in this debate) even though those truths had nothing to do with why the basic mental capacities underlying these abilities evolved in Pleistocene hominins. Those capacities evolved in response to selection pressures in ancestral hunter-gatherer environments, and we have simply learned how to develop, train and exercise them in cultural contexts to discover truths that go far beyond any that were relevant to the evolution of those underlying capacities. Philosophers who endorse some form of moral realism have typically believed that we’ve done the same thing in grasping moral truths (see sections 2.4–2.5).”
And what the writer means by “moral truths” are objective truths (as is clear from the reference to moral realism).  Evolution does not pose a problem here.  Nor does physics.  Why?  Because we are able to grasp moral truths including philosophical truths: “… (or so we are assuming in even engaging in this debate)…” thus it would be self-defeating to assert that physics somehow precluded such as it would mean the very argument one was making was precluded or a violation of physics!  Notice this is an argument from logic and philosophical reasoning, apart from the science or any empirical fact or finding.  And no one makes the argument (that I am aware of) that to grasp such truths, brains states are altered somehow or in some fashion.  Who makes that argument?  No one.  How silly.  If brain states are not altered in our ability to grasp philosophical truths, why would they be altered to grasp moral truths—when the very same process is in play?  The fact that anyone could “hear” or think that Christian philosophers or theologians were asserting moral truths were grasped by (divine?) changes in our brain states tells us all we need to know.  Someone is not listening.  Someone is not hearing the other.  They are like Gopnik in the last post.  Moral realists do not make this argument, nor do Christian philosophers or theologians (that I am aware of anyway—if someone can show me who does—I will certainly also object).  And who would ask what the “mechanism” is that allows us to grasp philosophical truths?  How about being human (see Stanford link and quote again), if we want to call that a “mechanism”.  The mechanism is being alive in this world, this existence, and having a human mind.  Such is also what allows us to grasp moral truths.  To ask for something in addition to that, means one doesn’t understand what is being asserted in the Stanford quote or what Christian philosophers or theologians believe about such things in the first place.
Another example, which I’ve taken the time to unpack in the past, is when someone tells us that miracles are inconsistent with or “clash” with science.  What they are really telling us (whether they know it or not, as I think most do this from ignorance) is that miracles are inconsistent with their presupposition the universe is a causally-closed-system, which is a metaphysical view, not an empirical finding from science.  As David Bentley Hart has written:
“The very notion of nature as a closed system entirely sufficient to itself is plainly one that cannot be verified, deductively or empirically, from within the system of nature. It is a metaphysical (which is to say “extra-natural”) conclusion regarding the whole of reality, which neither reason nor experience legitimately warrants.”
The assertion that such a view (a causally closed universe) is philosophical and not scientific, is so commonly known we need look no further than a basic Wikipedia reference.  So they confuse such a belief with “science” and conflate the two.  Unless one already has the faith-based view that God doesn’t exist, he would simply believe that science and natural laws are the best descriptions of how the physical world words, except in those cases when God acts.  Say we set up an experiment for a ball to launch at a certain speed so we could then measure the distance it would travel before falling to earth.  We launch our ball, and a by stander sees the ball headed toward a small child and moves to knock the ball down.  We would not then throw up our arms in defeat and abandon science and a belief in its power to describe and predict the physical world.  How silly. Once we allow for God’s existence, the logic is the very same.  If we accept it for a human agent, we must accept the same logic for God.
As for a view that is not logical, here it is: I believe God may exist, but if such a being did exist and acted upon the physical world it would be a violation of the physical laws or it would clash with what we currently know about physics or some other branch of science.  Such is simply not a logical view; it also normally entails a straw-man view of God, and question-begging (so a triple failing).  If God exists, such cannot violate any physical law by definition.  For God to violate a physical law would mean the physical law was somehow inviolable in and of itself, a stand-alone force, uncreated, unmovable,  impervious to the very being acting upon it who created it, the being from which it exists and has its law-like power.  Again, it would be like suggesting that a person could not act in the ball experiment.  Well, no, if they exist, then yes, they could.  This belief comes from thinking of God as Bigfoot or some other object or force in the universe, rather than the ground of all being, the very thing making the universe possible to begin with including the laws by which it operates.  If one is taking the actual view of the God of Christianity, Aristotle, Moses Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, Mulla Sadra, and even Spinoza then it is logically impossible to assert such.  One cannot make this argument against, as Hart has put it, that which is the:
“…one infinite source of all that is: eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, uncreated, uncaused, perfectly transcendent of all things and for that very reason absolutely immanent to all things.”
So this argument only works against some straw-man conception of God.  It also begs the question when it asserts this God may exist, but this agent’s acting would violate physics or “clash” with what we currently know about physics/science, as this is the very thing disputed.  Whether or not the clash is with science or a different philosophical framework/narrative is what’s disputed to begin with.  Thus, not only is it not a logical view, it is question-begging and, in almost every case, based upon a straw-man view of God.  All the way around it fails as any sort of logical response.  At least the atheist is being logical knowing that only if we disallow God’s existence can we logically claim a causally closed universe with the ancillary logical implications.  No such implications exist for the agnostic.  Any agnostic out there worried about logic, should look first to this argument as it contains none.  And by the way, it matters little if one does not like or agree with Hart’s definition of God—it is the one that needs to be addressed and not some straw-man view.  And if one doesn’t understand the definition, then one needs to investigate and research it before commenting.
Another straw-man view of God trotted out in this argument is that, well, but if God can just, every now and then, capriciously intervene in the physical world, how can we trust the consistency of physical laws and the scientific method?  Well, because God is not capricious or random or out of control in any imaginable fashion.  God only acts for a reason and a reason always consistent with the nature and character of God as demonstrated in the life of Christ and the Christian narrative.  So this straw-man objection is easily addressed.  Like the agent acting in the ball example—he acted because he saw the ball was going to hit a child—God is not capricious or random.  God is not a mindless tornado or earthquake or some trickster god.
And if one’s only objection is, yes, but it would still mean a miracle would clash with what we presently know about physics and science, one is not listening.  The only thing it would mean is that there would be a clash with philosophical naturalism or the belief in a causally closed universe.  Or, read post again.  And if someone wants to show us how a causally closed universe is a recognized scientific fact, proven, widely accepted, and not a metaphysical belief—please do.  Good luck with that.  If one cannot however, then they need to give up this clear confusion of a metaphysical belief with “science” or “fact”.
Bottom line: the belief God may exist (agnosticism), but that this being acting within creation would violate some physical law or clash with our current view of science is illogical and inconsistent with the premise: “God may exist”.  IfGod does exist, then logically miracles cannot be a violation of a physical law.  Such would make the physical law greater than God and apart from God in some way that violates the very definition and understanding of “God” as given by Hart or classically understood.  We can only violate a law when we ourselves are under the law—meaning the law has power over us.  God, by definition, is under no such law.  Further, if God does exist, then the universe is not a causally closed system, thus, logically, our view would be that physical laws are not violated and our current view of science remains consistent because such laws operate and predict consistently, except in those cases where God might act.  This is not ad hoc, but a logical conclusion based upon the premise. 
Thus, one cannot have it both ways.  One cannot claim agnosticism, but then assert the world is such that we can know nothing of this being and characterizes this being’s (we can know nothing about!) acting in the world as a violation of some sort.  These philosophical pre-set boundaries, these philosophical presuppositions regarding what this being (if such exists) can and cannot do are metaphysical faith claims, not science.  To claim one is agnostic regarding God’s existence, but then basically assert, for all practical purposes, an atheistic universe is, in my view, not only illogical but disingenuous.  Is one afraid to simply assert he is an atheist?  Is it a pointless hedging of bets?  What exactly is the point of asserting agnosticism but then outlining a (philosophical) view where God may as well not exist, because we could never know if such a being did exist (which is only because of the presuppositions I’ve adopted by faith) and if this being ever acted it would be a problem for science (and not really “science”, but his own world-view/philosophical framework)?  I love it, an agnosticism that keeps all the doors closed (but claims they really shut themselves or that science proves they are closed) just in case there really is something out there!  This may be agnosticism as neurosis or simply fear.  It is certainly not logic.  Further, if one is truly an atheist, or comes to the exact same conclusions they do in these areas, reasons the same way, then stand-up and be counted man. Otherwise, I think one is being disingenuous.
The greater point is that what is discussed here are the philosophical views (not scientific) that articulate what they think the findings of science, whether biological evolution (or physics) mean as to questions of ethics specifically (in the Stanford link), but in other places it could be life after death, consciousness, or other such questions.  What we see here is that the science neither proves nor disproves any of the major philosophical views in these areas—that is not its job—such is outside its pay-grade.  In general however, what we see is that philosophical naturalists confuse their philosophy with “science” or conflate it with “science”.  It is however no more “science” than the creationist’s views are “science” or any other type of fundamentalism.
Does every legitimate and serious philosophical framework/narrative consider the best science in a holistic way as it reasons out and unpacks its conclusions?  Of course.  But there is a huge (understatement!) difference between taking into consideration the best science and mistaking one’s philosophical views for “science”.  Nor does it mean science provestheir philosophical conclusions.  When people tell us the “science” proves their philosophical views in matters of God’s existence or non-existence, morality, souls, life-after-death, and all such similar areas, they are just like the fundamentalists who tell us the Bible proves their positions/views too.  What they are really telling us is that their “reading”, their interpretation, is the only authoritative one.  This is the fundamentalist sensibility.  Whether “science” or the Bible, these people need to quit hitting us over the head with either.

Now, it will be interesting to see how this post is “read” and interpreted.  How will it be “heard”?  Remember, there is a huge difference between understanding a person’s view and disagreeing, or not understanding, and asserting things that only confirm the misunderstanding.  We may see in the comment section only the fact a conversation never took place.  If the comment is simply the repeating  of what is addressed in the post without any further point, I will simply respond: See post.  If we end up in an endless loop, so be it.  I would much rather write “see post” than re-write the entire post in the comment section.  In other words, do some work.

PS: I will only respond to comments that include, in quotes, that which they are referring to from the post.  And any general comments must still refer to a general idea or point noted somewhere in the post they can at least refer to.  We are going to discuss this post, not some other point or topic. Thank you.

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144 Responses to Sorry, Your Philosophy is Not Science or Fact and Neither is Mine–One of Them May be True However

  1. Darrell says:

    Burk,

    “Also, I notice that you allow for your agnostic above the evidence of experience, which you downplay or dismiss for believers. Regardless, I still assert the agnostic, if truly agnostic, should also be agnostic as to whether or not we can know this God, whether or not morality is objective or not, or whether or not miracles clash with science. Why? Because all those questions are intrinsically related to the question of whether or not God exists. If we are going to be agnostic as to that question, we should also be agnostic toward the other questions. That would be the truly logical position of a reasonable agnostic.”-Darrell

    “You are trying to conflate a very vague and personal *feeling*…”

    I’ve never articulated the idea of experience that way. You are the one bringing up experience, not me.

    “So the agnostic does indeed remain agnostic with regard to the *possibility* of such things existing and perhaps also being known.”

    That is simply illogical for the reasons already noted. If one is agnostic as to God existing, then he must be agnostic regarding these other questions. One cannot be agnostic regarding one (God existing) but then assert, as Bernard does, that even “if” God existed, we could not know anything about this being, whether morality is objective, and all the other ancillary questions (miracles) discussed here.

    Again it is an illogical formulation. Now, if he means “know” as in we can prove such empirically/scientifically, then is speaking to something (which should be clear from the post title, the post, and my entire blog) no one is asserting. Further, he or you also do not “know” in that sense that God doesn’t exist, or an objective morality, and so on, so—the point?

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  2. Darrell says:

    JP,

    “This is fine, as far as it goes. But it does not address at all the question of “how we know”. Knowledge must be justified or warranted in some way.”

    Again, what do you mean by “know”? Further, the argument he is addressing is not how we prove these types of truth (in any fashion—if that is what you are getting at), but that we can grasp, reason to these conclusions and such does not clash with evolution/science. If you have any idea in mind for how we can “know” in these other areas, all his examples, then your question is answered. If you think in some of these areas we know empirically, then you are just wrong. If we knew empirically in some of these areas, they would no longer be theoretical abstract concepts and formulations, but “fact”. So either your question is answered here, or you simply disagree with the writer. Again, that puts you outside the consensus here, not me.

    “Knowing a “truth” of quantum physics entails empirical verification. Knowing a “truth” of mathematics entails formal proof.”

    He is not talking about those types of truth, although, again, empirical evidence (or mathematical) is available to many of the theories in these areas. You are confusing two types of truth. I will note it again: It obvious from the context and his actual writing that he equates all those examples as one type: Philosophical. Such does apply to moral truths—that is his whole point.

    “And, I will ask again: What do you mean by “access” and “knowing”?”-Darrell

    “As for this, I leave it entirely open: if one claims to know truths of objective morality, it's up to him to explain how it's done. I'm not prejudging anything.”

    Since you are not asserting (?) we can only know something empirically/scientifically then what do you mean by “know” and “access”? I’ve told you what I mean. I mean what the writer means when he uses the word “grasp” in the context of all those other examples. There is no way one uses that word if he then thinks we have no “access” or can “know” anything about what we can grasp in any of those areas. If you mean “know” as in proven empirically, well, again, read the title to the post, the post, and most of my blog. I couldn’t be clearer in that regard. I don’t “know” in that sense any more than the anti-realist “knows” there is no objective morality. Whether you agree with me or not, what is not clear about that?

    You are the one asking questions regarding “access” and “knowing”. You need to tell us what you mean by those terms in the context of this conversation. How can I answer if I don’t know what you mean by those words? And I’ve told you what I mean. I think you mean prove empirically/scientifically, which isn't what I am saying (nor the Stanford writer) at all. But how can we know if you don't unpack those words for us in the context of this conversation?

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  3. Burk says:

    Hi, Darrell-

    Let me be simpler..

    “… if truly agnostic, should also be agnostic as to whether or not we can know this God, whether or not morality is objective or not, or whether or not miracles clash with science.”

    This is three points.

    1. Whether or not we can know this god.. that is truly undecided. One can leave that open as an agnostic, no problem. But that does not mean that you take the reports of others as gospel, as it were.

    2. Whether morality is subjective or not … this also is an open matter, though an agnostic may easily have other criteria than the possibility of god to inform her philosophy on the matter. That possibility may be so remote as to not count for much in something so immediate and important.

    3. Here is the problem. Miracles do clash with science- that is by definition and incontestable. Miracles might be true- all things are possible with god. But at the same time, the induced natural laws make miracles a violation of the observed regularities, thus a clash.

    The problem is whether one grants both traditions equal weight, thus keeping an “open mind” on the universality of scientific laws vs the possibility of special exceptions. This is a classic false equivalence, given the much different epistemological statuses of the two traditions. One can easily be an agnostic, and also weigh the scientific corpus more highly than the theological one, based on its philosophical track record. And still keep a formal possibility open that some aspects of theology might at some future date be reconciled with what we know far more securely via science, which is, certainly, not everything.

    It is all quite probalistic, in the end. What are the odds the scientific laws are universal, vs the odds that the reported miracles happened as we are told via the various tales. One can be agnostic and extend some slight chance to the latter while holding it unproven, and unlikely.

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  4. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “No, there's no clash with regard tp our key assumptions…”

    Is one of your key assumptions something called “science”? What could that even mean?

    Again, when you are ready to admit that the clash is between our differing philosophical frameworks/narratives and not “science” (that may be the ancillary assertion, but it is based upon one’s philosophical leanings/presuppositions, not “science” itself), I would be happy to direct you to the Stanford piece again that addresses your questions rather nicely and we can go from there—you have yet to engage the writer (or any of the links and the points related to them) other than tell us you disagree with him.

    Just like I do not let people tell me they speak for the Bible, I do not let people tell me they speak for “science” in that they think my views clash with “science” rather than their own philosophy. We are going to stick to the point of the post. You think this is about proving your point, when it is about something much more important. What you are doing is what's wrong with much of the discourse in the world today.

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  5. Darrell says:

    Burk,

    “… if truly agnostic, should also be agnostic as to whether or not we can know this God, whether or not morality is objective or not, or whether or not miracles clash with science.”-Darrell

    “1. Whether or not we can know this god.. that is truly undecided…

    2. Whether morality is subjective or not … this also is an open matter…”

    Well, then you just agreed with me that Bernard’s position is illogical. I will leave the miracle aspect for now (and I do disagree with you for the reasons noted in the post—no need to repeat here), as the above alone proves my point.

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  6. Hi Darrell

    “What you are doing is what's wrong with much of the discourse in the world today.”

    This is a big claim. What I'm trying to do is see if there's any way of making your belief that we can gain knowledge of moral truths (non-constructed) line up with some key scientific propositions (evolution, fundamental physics, neuroscience). I can't see how you're doing it, and in the absence of a method, I'm concluding you can't do it. Hence your beliefs that it can be done appear to clash with the science that precludes, as best I can see, a successful method for gaining such knowledge.

    “I would be happy to direct you to the Stanford piece again that addresses your questions rather nicely .”

    My question is, how could we line up our assumptions in this business of moral reasoning, such that they reasoned outcomes would then line up with moral reality? That seems a tricky business, and nowhere does your source address this. Rather they offer that moral reasoning is like physics, where the lining up happens empirically, or philosophy, where we can happily reach opposing views and accept the clash is a result of differing assumptions, and so no sort of convergence of views is guaranteed.

    So, how might you solve this assumption problem? Consider the difference between Darwin and Bentham, the father's of evolutionary science and Utilitarianism respectively. Darwin took three key assumptions (that traits are passed from parent to child, that not all children survive, and some inherited traits affect chances of survival) and then reasoned his way to natural selection. But that's not all that happened. Both the assumptions, and the implications of the resulting theory, have been tested empirically, again and again, and it is the success of these tests that sees evolution established as the only game in town (and some of these tests have led to further modifications of our understanding – convergence and progress).

    Contrast that with a moral philosopher. Bentham took as his starting point that our moral purpose was to maximise total enjoyment, and assumed also that the individual is the sole judge of this enjoyment (as I remember it) and from here reasoned his way to a complex moral theory. Some people accept this as a good explanation of morality, and some reject it entirely, while others like some bits but not others. And they're all intellectually free to do this, for it is widely accepted that one's embrace of utilitarianism is a function of one's taste for the starting assumptions. Moral reasoning can only take us to a description of reality if we can first line our assumptions up correctly. So, how does this happen? Stanford is silent on this, and so are you. Again, I can only presume this is because you have no answer.

    Or do you have one, and you're keeping it to yourself? Specifically, to use the example, how do we know whether or not Utilitarianism's starting assumptions line up with moral reality? Any idea how we can do this without calling upon some process that contravenes what science tells us about our physical world? Stanford has nothing to say on this. Do you?

    Bernard

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  7. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    See my last two responses. I know you want to keep talking about your point. But you are missing the greater point—the point of the post.

    Rather than telling people their views, in matters like these, clash with “science” or the “Bible” (whatever authority you wish), we need to be honest and more humble. We need to admit that the other person’s views clash with my own philosophical presuppositions (narrative/frameworks) regarding how I view (interpret) the science or Bible. See, rather than trying to put ourselves on some pedestal, looking down on everyone else, rather than wrapping ourselves in “Science” or the “Bible” like patriots do flags, this other and more honest way puts us all on the same level, where we now have to defend our philosophical presuppositions and narratives from the same playing field, without resort to claiming the other guy’s problem is with “Science” or the “Bible”. No, my only problem is with your philosophy.

    You mistakenly think this discussion is about moral realism, or miracles, or proving something about those areas. It is not. When you can see that, I would be happy to continue the conversation. You let me know.

    Like

  8. Darrell says:

    JP,

    You tell me if I have this right.

    You are either miss-reading the Stanford writer or you understand him but disagree with him. If you think he is stating something else, please take his writing and tell us what you think he is “really” telling us. So, please clarify.

    He is not telling us in his quote that some of those examples are proven or established empirically/scientifically and some are not. He is not even talking about proof or proving anything as “true” in that sense at all. Look at his argument in context. The de-bunking argument is this: “As discussed in section 2, evolutionary accounts of the origins of our capacity to be guided by moral judgments do not require any appeal to the comprehension of moral truths by our hominin ancestors, or even to the existence of such truths.”

    Unless your questions about “knowing” “access” and “mechanism” doesn’t go to “comprehension” or “existence” then it is addressed by the writer as to “how” we can grasp moral truths—we do it the same way we “grasp” philosophical truths in general. So, please clarify what you mean.

    He is not saying that comprehending or grasping proves any of those truths or abstract theories as being true. If they did, then one side would indeed have been proven true. We wouldn’t even be having this conversation. But the de-bunking argument from evolution tells us we couldn’t even comprehend moral truths, even if they existed.

    He is asking should evolution: “…undermine our confidence in the existence of moral truth or in the possibility of moral knowledge (at least if moral truths are understood to be objective, i.e., independent of our evaluative attitudes)?”

    As far as I can tell, you (and Bernard) would answer this question in the affirmative—that “yes” it should (thus the supposed clash with science). He goes on though as to why it needn’t:

    “On the face of it, the mere fact that natural selection would not have 'designed' our moral faculties to track moral truths accurately (as it plausibly designed our perceptual faculties to track facts about medium sized objects in typical human environments) is not obviously problematic.”

    Now, as far as I can tell, by “track” he means “know” “comprehend” “discover” “reason to”. But he is not telling us this would “prove” they existed. I’m not saying such (that is the point of the title and the point of the post). He is simply noting that the idea evolution somehow proves we could not comprehend, track, or grasp moral truths is not a problem (meaning doesn’t clash with science, which here is biology). Why isn’t this a problem? (Continued)

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  9. Darrell says:

    Because:

    “There are, after all, lots of cases where we seem to be able to grasp genuine truths even though those truths play no role in the story of how our basic mental capacities evolved. We are able to grasp truths of quantum field theory or higher dimensional topology or, for that matter, philosophy (or so we are assuming in even engaging in this debate) even though those truths had nothing to do with why the basic mental capacities underlying these abilities evolved in Pleistocene hominins. Those capacities evolved in response to selection pressures in ancestral hunter-gatherer environments, and we have simply learned how to develop, train and exercise them in cultural contexts to discover truths that go far beyond any that were relevant to the evolution of those underlying capacities. Philosophers who endorse some form of moral realism have typically believed that we've done the same thing in grasping moral truths.”

    The above has nothing to do, whatsoever, with proving any of the theories in those areas are true, the actual state of affairs. The point is that we can grasp moral truths in the very same way we grasp these other truths, because they are of the same type. It is not about “proof”. Neither side (see post!) can prove their point empirically. The anti-realist has never proved morality is subjective empirically or scientifically.

    So here is what I think is really going on: By use of the words “know” “access” and “mechanism” you are equating such with “prove empirically”. If so, you are not reading the Stanford writer or me correctly. I mean by “know” and “access” nothing more than “grasp” or comprehend. Which means, like the writer, I disagree with the de-bunking arguments. This puts me in the consensus view. Now, if you are asserting some other de-bunking argument different that what is being discussed here, what is it? But before you get to that, please address and provide the clarifications as to what you mean.

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  10. Darrell says:

    I can also make this real simple. For every question as to “how” we “know” or have “access” or what the “mechanism” is as to moral realism (of any type) I will simply respond:

    “There are, after all, lots of cases where we seem to be able to grasp genuine truths even though those truths play no role in the story of how our basic mental capacities evolved. We are able to grasp truths of quantum field theory or higher dimensional topology or, for that matter, philosophy (or so we are assuming in even engaging in this debate) even though those truths had nothing to do with why the basic mental capacities underlying these abilities evolved in Pleistocene hominins. Those capacities evolved in response to selection pressures in ancestral hunter-gatherer environments, and we have simply learned how to develop, train and exercise them in cultural contexts to discover truths that go far beyond any that were relevant to the evolution of those underlying capacities. Philosophers who endorse some form of moral realism have typically believed that we've done the same thing in grasping moral truths.”

    And if you disagree with the writer, fine. But please don't turn around and ask the very same question again. You will get the same response. We do this in the same way we do it in these other areas. We've “done the same thing”.

    Like

  11. Hi Darrell

    It is a mistake to assert that all disagreements are based upon foundational disagreements. In this case, I am offering an alternative, that our disagreement is based upon you not quite understanding the mechanism you propose. So there are types of misunderstanding. by insisting that ours is a difference of philosophical foundations, you are assuming in advance you could not possibly be making a logical error.

    So, we can't move to the 'this is really a philosophical/foundational difference, as you would like, until we establish whether or not this other type of error is in play. I think it is. Specifically, I think your claim we can reason our way reliably to moral truths is faulty, because it lacks a mechanism by which our starting assumptions are made accurate.

    By refusing to address this, you are attempting to use the possibility of foundational differences between us (or indeed between you and anybody) as a shield such that you can avoid engaging with any criticism of your point of view.

    Do you think you have an answer to this problem of assumptions?

    Bernard

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  12. Darrell

    Your response to JP above is now becoming comical. He, and I, have shown specifically why the case of philosophical or moral reasoning is not like the case of reasoning in quantum physics. Specifically, in the case of the physics, the assumptions, and extrapolations, can be tested against evidence. They bump up against the real world, so to speak.

    In the case of morality, without this contact with the real world, we can neither test nor confirm our theories, and the best we can say of them is they are consistent with out our assumptions. We can not however say these assumptions are consistent with reality.
    So, the writer is wrong for exactly this reason 9if you are interpreting him correctly). And if you agree with the writer, you are wrong for the same reason.

    When we point out the problem, you just keep re-copying the offending paragraph, as if this somehow amounts to a refutation. Are you refusing to engage because you know you are wrong on this, or is something else going on?

    Bernard

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  13. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “It is a mistake to assert that all disagreements are based upon foundational disagreements.”

    I didn’t say they were. Here is what I wrote again:

    We need to admit that the other person’s views clash with my own philosophical presuppositions (narrative/frameworks) regarding how I view (interpret) the science or Bible. See, rather than trying to put ourselves on some pedestal, looking down on everyone else, rather than wrapping ourselves in “Science” or the “Bible” like patriots do flags, this other and more honest way puts us all on the same level, where we now have to defend our philosophical presuppositions and narratives from the same playing field, without resort to claiming the other guy’s problem is with “Science” or the “Bible”. No, my only problem is with your philosophy.

    You are claiming my view clashes with “science”. Instead, you should be asserting that my view clashes with the way your philosophical leanings interpret what the findings of science should mean in these areas. Such has nothing to do with the two of us disagreeing about our differing philosophical presuppositions. Whether we agree or disagree over those has nothing to do with my point above.

    Further Bernard, if you do indeed disagree with the Stanford writer you only prove my point that it is your view that is outside the consensus here (I’m not speaking for that consensus—I’m noting a fact). That is what I’ve noted all along. If such is the case, then what is the problem? We can simply note that you personally and privately believe my view clashes with science—such is your opinion based upon your philosophical view. At the same time, we can note that your opinion is not widely shared in the neutral academic community.

    If we can agree to this understanding, and for neither one of us to claim we speak for the scientific consensus, I would be happy to continue the conversation.

    PS As to your other comment, the only thing that is comical is the fact you did not understand those comments in the least. You are not listening.

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  14. Hi Darrell

    “You are claiming my view clashes with “science”. Instead, you should be asserting that my view clashes with the way your philosophical leanings interpret what the findings of science should mean in these areas.”

    Both these things can be true. To be vey clear, I am claiming that the way you match the science and your view regarding morality contains a logical error. Specifically, your claim that we can reason our way to transcendent moral truths ignores the requirement for the starting assumptions of that inquiry to line up with that reality.

    So yes, this is a philosophical disagreement, in the sense that we disagree about whether or not your views can be made compatible with science. Furthermore, it is an agreement that could be resolved, were you prepared you engage with the criticism. Specifically, how can we set up our assumptions, such that reasoning of them reliably track a non-constructed truth? Any ideas at all on this?

    Your position is that we can reason our way to moral truths. My objection is, well, that can only work if we have our starting assumptions lined up (and I've given clear examples from moral philosophy where different assumptions will lead to opposing conclusions despite the reasoning being bang on).

    Do you have any answer to this? If not, we can conclude that your way of making science and theology compatible is unreasonable, in that you have no reasoned response to a central objection. Or, put another way, your view clashes with science. Such is my opinion, based on a very simple observation.

    “If we can agree to this understanding, and for neither one of us to claim we speak for the scientific consensus, I would be happy to continue the conversation.”

    Of course, there is a scientific consensus on some basics of evolution, neuroscience, and physics that is pertinent here. We both accept that. What we disagree on is whether there is any way of matching your belief regarding moral knowledge with our shared understanding of the scientific findings.

    So, can you make the match work? If you offer your method, we can at least attempt to rationally analyse it.

    Bernard

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  15. JP says:

    Hi Darrell,

    We must distinguish:

    1. The existence of objective moral truths (moral realism).
    2. The possibility of moral knowledge (knowing these truths(

    I have said nothing about (1). The question is: given (1), what about (2) ?

    I agree that there is no a priori reason to deny (2) on evolutionary ground. It is true that we have knowledge of subjects that have no connection with “how our basic mental capacities evolved”.

    Now, in the context of moral realism, can we acquire moral knowledge? Is there a way to get at these objective moral truths?

    It is for those who say this to explain how. As I said, I am not presuming anything. I understand that this cannot be done through empirically means. And I am not asking for “proof” of anything. The “clash” claim is that, whatever method is proposed, the evolutionary debunking argument will apply. It's up to those who answer “yes” to (2) to propose a method for which this argument does not work.

    Your only answer to this is to say that it's done the same way we do it in physics, math and philosophy. This is incorrect, for reasons already given. Simply repeating it's the same is no answer at all.

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  16. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “You are claiming my view clashes with “science”. Instead, you should be asserting that my view clashes with the way your philosophical leanings interpret what the findings of science should mean in these areas.”-Darrell

    “Both these things can be true.”

    No they cannot. The only way you could rightly claim my view clashed with science, as to these types of questions, is if those within the philosophy of science and philosophy disciplines as a consensus supported you, and they do not. Another reason they cannot be true at the same time is because of logical fallacies. One of my assertions is that “science” or empirical means cannot prove, either way, the truth (if we mean empirical of scientific) of any of these questions. You beg the question. You first would have to address the matter of whether or not science can even address these questions as in “proving” empirically one or the other view as true. Unless you can do that, it is impossible for there to be a clash to begin with. In that sense, the very claim my view clashes with science is question-begging. If you want to talk about logic, look no further than the problems you have, which I noted in the post.

    “To be vey clear, I am claiming that the way you match the science and your view regarding morality contains a logical error.”

    Well, this is even more confusing then. An argument can contain logical errors and not clash with the findings of science. So, which is it?

    Either way Bernard, you have no business beginning whatever the problem you think I have with “Your view clashes with science.”

    “If we can agree to this understanding, and for neither one of us to claim we speak for the scientific consensus, I would be happy to continue the conversation.”-Darrell

    “Of course, there is a scientific consensus on some basics of evolution, neuroscience, and physics that is pertinent here. We both accept that. What we disagree on is whether there is any way of matching your belief regarding moral knowledge with our shared understanding of the scientific findings.”

    All you are noting here is that, like those who make the “de-bunking arguments” noted in the Stanford link, that I disagree with those people. Yes, I do. So does the Stanford writer. So does the consensus of the academic community. That is the consensus you don’t seem to care about. But because I disagree with their philosophical views doesn’t mean my view clashes with science—all it does is prove my point that these are philosophical disagreements regarding the science. Whether or not anyone’s views actually clash with science is not a settled issue and is why moral realism remains “on the table”.

    Again, when you are ready to acknowledge that this is a clash between different philosophical frameworks/narratives regarding what the science means or should mean, but that neither or us speak for science as to these questions, I will be happy to continue.

    Look, if you can’t agree to the above, then just say so. That will make you look completely unreasonable, but do what you need to do. I’m not going to keep repeating myself here however. Thanks.

    Like

  17. Darrell says:

    JP,

    “1. The existence of objective moral truths (moral realism).
    2. The possibility of moral knowledge (knowing these truths(

    I have said nothing about (1). The question is: given (1), what about (2) ?”

    This is the very question the Stanford writer is addressing. We “know” in the “same way” we know those other truths. But what do you mean by “know”? Your talk of knowing in some of those areas empirically misses his point. He is not talking about proving the conclusions of any of those examples empirically—he is talking about the matter of grasping and discovering the possibilities of knowledge in those areas. So, again, it is answered in the Stanford piece. If you disagree with the writer or my reading of him, just say so, but please do not just state the very same question again. He would not include all those examples and write:

    “…to discover truths that go far beyond any that were relevant to the evolution of those underlying capacities. Philosophers who endorse some form of moral realism have typically believed that we've done the same thing in grasping moral truths…”

    –if he thought there was a difference as to empirical means. That is just absurd. If we “discover” and “grasp” in the same way, if we’ve “done the same thing” then he is not making the distinction you are. Further, he doesn’t even care about the fact that empirical and mathematical work underlies the theories in quantum physics of those other areas, as that isn’t even the point. The point is that we can “discover” and “grasp” those types of concepts and abstract reasoning. You miss the point all the way around here.

    “Now, in the context of moral realism, can we acquire moral knowledge? Is there a way to get at these objective moral truths?”

    Yes. See the Stanford link. In the same way we do those other areas. Now, if you mean by “acquire” and “get at” that we can prove they are true empirically or scientifically, then no, of course not. But since you won’t tell us what you mean by those terms, I can’t help you. And if like Bernard, you simply disagree with the writer, then you prove my point. It is your views that are outside the consensus here, not mine.

    I mean what the writer means by “discover” and “grasp”, so I have told you what I mean. I have also told you that to do either doesn’t mean we can prove empirically or scientifically what we have discovered or grasped, but this is true for the anti-realist, the de-bunker as well. The de-bunker, the anti-realist as also discovered or grasp the concepts, including the conclusions they have come to. But that doesn’t mean they are true in any empirical sense. I have told you what I mean and it is clear from the context what the Stanford writer means. You have yet to tell me what you mean by those terms. And I think I know why: I think you do mean “empirically” “scientifically”.

    We could find out whether or not that is what you mean by asking a simple question: Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?

    As the Stanford writer notes at the outset:

    “These issues remain challenging and controversial. But the controversies are as much ongoing philosophical ones as scientific ones, and it is therefore unlikely that scientific results will settle them. Science will plainly not settle, for example, whether or not there are moral truths; and if there are, they will likely play an explanatory role with regard to at least some of our moral beliefs—something we will miss if we approach these issues from an exclusively scientific point of view.”

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  18. Hi Darrell

    This may well just be about terminology, which is tedious but there you are.

    I am arguing that one can not make the current science match logically the view that we have reliable knowledge of moral truths. If you don't want to call this a clash with science, fine. Call it what you like.

    “All you are noting here is that, like those who make the “de-bunking arguments” noted in the Stanford link, that I disagree with those people. Yes, I do. So does the Stanford writer. So does the consensus of the academic community.”

    Well, no. There's no consensus here. But the important point is, you disagree my claim. Can you justify your belief, or is it unreasoned? In the absence of your reasons, I'm assuming the latter. You are welcome to put up your reasons.

    “Again, when you are ready to acknowledge that this is a clash between different philosophical frameworks/narratives regarding what the science means or should mean, but that neither or us speak for science as to these questions, I will be happy to continue.”

    It appears to be clash not between frameworks, so much as processes of reasoning. I'm offering a reason why your argument doesn't work (the assumption problem) and you're saying I'm wrong, but offering no reason why. That's where we're at. So I don't agree the clash is about frameworks. Rather, it's a clash about the employment of reasoning.

    What's happening, when JP or I ask how we might reason our way to moral knowledge, is you are offering a single quote that does not address the identified problem. Specifically, it does not show how we manage to line up our moral assumptions, such that reliable reasoning can occur. As such, you are avoiding confronting the critique being offered. And this is all our clash is currently about, your inability to offer a reason for your belief.

    As such, you are unable to provide a reasoned link from the science we both accept, to this thing you want to believe is true about the world. These two things then, your belief, and the science we both accept, clash in this specific respect.

    So, for the how ever manyth time…

    How do we line up our moral assumptions, such that we can reason from them to a reliable representation of an external moral truth? Do you have any idea on this, at all? (By the way, we've had this entire conversation before. That time you eventually yielded, and offered miracles as your answer).

    Bernard

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  19. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “I am arguing that one can not make the current science match logically the view that we have reliable knowledge of moral truths. If you don't want to call this a clash with science, fine. Call it what you like.”

    I know what you are arguing. Here is what you need to understand: You are arguing from a philosophical viewpoint. I’ve noted what we should call it—let’s be honest and call it what it is: A disagreement between different philosophical perspectives regarding what the science means.

    “Well, no. There's no consensus here.”

    As to moral realism not being a problem as to evolution, yes, that is the consensus. The consensus is that moral realism isn’t “de-bunked” or proven false by anything we know from science. That is indeed the consensus.

    And again, are you claiming a clash with science or an error of logic. The reasons I have are the exact same ones in the Stanford link along with its train of thought, so I assume then you are telling us the Stanford writer is also making some error of logic? Either way, believing something that is contrary to what the consensus is as to the philosophy of science discipline and, an error of logic in reasoning, are two different things. So, which is it?

    And, again, since I claim that science or empirical methods neither prove nor disprove moral realism, you beg the question to keep claiming my view clashes with science. Here is another good example of the disconnect. All reasoning is done within philosophical frameworks/narratives, so I don't know why you think a “process” of reasoning here is the problem. We both can reason. Ironically, why you are being so unreasonable here is beyond me. There isn't a person on the planet, other than some rabid atheist, would not admit he is arguing from a philosophical perspective and doesn't speak for science. Therefore, the clash is between two different philosophical perspectives.

    You are just off-base here all the way around. I know you want to talk about something else, but what I am talking about is the whole point of my post. We can either agree to the above or respectfully move on (how many time am I going to have to note this?)

    Like

  20. Darrell says:

    Yes, we did have this conversation before and I didn't then, nor ever have, offered “miracles” as addressing anything regarding moral realism. Another great example of the disconnect, of not listening.

    Like

  21. Darrell says:

    JP,

    Some more pertinent points from the Stanford writer:

    “Autonomy Assumption: people have, to greater or lesser degrees, a capacity for reasoning that follows autonomous standards appropriate to the subjects in question, rather than in slavish service to evolutionarily given instincts merely filtered through cultural forms or applied in novel environments. Such reflection, reasoning, judgment and resulting behavior seem to be autonomous in the sense that they involve exercises of thought that are not themselves significantly shaped by specific evolutionarily given tendencies, but instead follow independent norms appropriate to the pursuits in question (Nagel 1979)…This assumption seems hard to deny in the face of such abstract pursuits as algebraic topology, quantum field theory, population biology, modal metaphysics, or twelve-tone musical composition, all of which seem transparently to involve precisely such autonomous applications of human intelligence…”

    Notice he is not talking about the fact that any area here may have underlying empirical support for their theories, nor is he talking about the fact they any of the theories in these areas or the work in these areas may turn out to be proven or “true” in that sense. That is to completely miss the point. They may or may not. He is simply noting that how we can “know” or “access” or “get to” these areas is the very same in each case: autonomous reflection. That is the “mechanism”—that is the “how”. Whether or not a “truth” lines up with an external reality depends upon what we are talking about. If we are talking about physical forces or objects, then yes, they must line up. If we are not (and morality would fall here), then such is a category error to expect it to and is irrelevant.

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  22. Darrell says:

    And here is more JP:

    “Finally, Street [JP] challenges the realist to specify what faculty or capacity [‘mechanism’] might ground our capacity to arrive at independent moral truths, how the former evolved, and how the latter could plausibly have arisen as a byproduct of it. She claims that there is no plausible story to be told here, since the capacity to grasp independent moral truths would have to be “a highly specialized, sophisticated capacity” akin to the human eye, and no such entity could plausibly emerge “as the purely incidental byproduct of some unrelated capacity that was selected for on other grounds entirely” (Street 2006, 142–43). But the realist's story needn't take that form. The claim will be just that our capacity to grasp moral truths—like our capacity to grasp philosophical truths about metaphysical necessity, say—is simply a byproduct of our general capacities for critical reasoning, combined with the evolved capacity for forming and employing normative concepts in our thinking and decision-making.”

    Again, there is the answer: autonomous moral reflection; the capacity to grasp; the capacity for critical reasoning; etc.

    Now, one may disagree with the above, but to keep asking a question that has been answered over and over is getting old. To claim that I am not offering any reasons is laughable. I am the only one here taking the conversation outside our limited (clearly) knowledge in these areas, and backing up my reasons with people who know more about these areas that we do. Either address the answer or move on. And please do not trot out the absurd idea that in some of these areas we can prove our conclusions empirically, when that isn’t even the point nor is anybody arguing such. The capacity to reason in those areas is the same, and whether or not we can prove our conclusions empirically in some areas and not others is exactly what we would expect since they deal with different areas of “truth” or ontology. Two different things entirely.

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  23. JP says:

    Hi Darrell,

    You keep claiming that we are not listening but, from your answer to Bernard, it appears you still think we claim a clash between science and moral realism: As to moral realism not being a problem as to evolution, yes, that is the consensus. For the nth time, this is not so.

    The possible clash is between science and the capacity for moral knowledge (or the realist kind). This is not the same thing.

    This should be clarified first: is it your claim that the existence of objective moral facts (moral realism) implies that we can discover what they are?

    As to how we achieve moral knowledge, you offer this:

    Again, there is the answer: autonomous moral reflection; the capacity to grasp; the capacity for critical reasoning; etc.

    In other words: we figure out moral facts by thinking about them.

    Well, what can I say? You really believe this is a satisfactory answer?

    Sure, we need to think, to apply critical reasoning, and all that. This is necessary, no doubt. But not sufficient. All reasoning starts by assuming certain premises and then build up from there. The question then becomes: how do we know these premises are true?

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  24. Hi Darrell

    “And, again, since I claim that science or empirical methods neither prove nor disprove moral realism, you beg the question to keep claiming my view clashes with science. Here is another good example of the disconnect. All reasoning is done within philosophical frameworks/narratives, so I don't know why you think a “process” of reasoning here is the problem. We both can reason. “

    I have never claimed that science has anything to say about moral realism. Rather, the clear implication of modern science is that we would have no way of gaining knowledge of an independent moral reality, should it exist.

    Here, again, is my reasoning:

    If we attempt to reason our way to a moral truth, we will be constrained by the accuracy or otherwise of our starting assumptions (see for example the different assumptions Utilitarians or Kantians make). In the field of ethics, our assumptions stem from our moral intuitions, and these in turn are a function of our evolutionary past, along with the development of cultural and psychological traits. For all of these processes, there is no reason to think they can be shaped by any oral reality, should it exist. Rather they are shaped by pragmatic forces.

    So, we have no reason to think our assumptions, and hence the subsequent reasoning, will lead reliably to independent moral truths (although they can easily lead to objective truths, as per mathematics).

    Do you have any answer to this case? in the absence of your answer, I'm assuming you have nothing, and have been bluffing all along.

    Bernard

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  25. Darrell says:

    JP,

    “This should be clarified first: is it your claim that the existence of objective moral facts (moral realism) implies that we can discover what they are?”

    What do you mean by, what “they are”? And, what do you mean by “discover”? I’ve told you what I mean.

    “As to how we achieve moral knowledge, you offer this:”

    “Again, there is the answer: autonomous moral reflection; the capacity to grasp; the capacity for critical reasoning; etc.”-Darrell

    That is not only what I offer, it is what the Stanford writer does as well and is why the consensus view is that moral realism, or how we come to that belief, does not clash with science.

    “The question then becomes: how do we know these premises are true?”

    That is not the question (this post, this conversation, is not about proving which view is true, if we mean empirically). I will just keep saying it over and over I guess. The point is that there is nothing in science that tells us we can’t grasp or discover such truths—and we do it in the same way we grasp these other truths. And what do you mean by “how” and “true”? How do we know the arguments put forth by the “de-bunkers” are true? We do what the Stanford writer does, he offers reasons and counter arguments as to why he thinks their case fails. Did that prove, empirically, or scientifically that the anti-realist is wrong? Of course not, but that isn’t the point. You cannot prove either view empirically.

    And, I will ask again:

    We could find out whether or not that is what you mean by asking a simple question: Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?

    Like

  26. Darrell says:

    JP,

    Additionally, a perennial mantra on this blog is that no one can know their philosophical presuppositions are “true” if we mean empirically true. That is why I constantly assert we all live by faith. I am arguing nothing different here. This is not a new conversation–it is the same one we have been having since day one. So how do we know the anti-realist's premises are true? The atheist's? Yours? We all have reasons and arguments, but none have empirical proof for those. We may have empirical evidence that we think bolsters our case, but we can't prove our case that way in these matters.

    That is why it is important you address my questions. I think they will reveal your own presuppositions.

    Like

  27. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    When you are ready to agree this is disagreement about two differing philosophical narratives regarding what the science means as to these questions, you let me know.

    Like

  28. Darrell says:

    And, if you are not ready to agree to such, then you need to move on. Thanks and cheers.

    Like

  29. JP says:

    Hi Darrell,

    Look, I am trying to understand how a moral realist goes about determining what are these moral facts. And, frankly, this is still extremely vague.

    Take this moral claim: “it is morally right to stone to death adulterous women”. (A)

    I understand that, for the moral realist, this claim has a definite truth value. Is is either true or false, in an objective sense, independent of what anybody thinks or feels, independent of time and place and culture.

    Now, from where I stand, outside of the moral realist framework, I am wondering: how can we know? This seems a very natural thing to ask. If (A) has a truth value, can we know it and, if so, how?

    I am not asking for a proof, or for anything empirical. I just want to know how the moral realist does it. Because it seems to me an (almost?) impossible thing to do. This is why the answer “by autonomous moral reflection (thinking about it)” is so unsatisfactory. This answer says nothing at all, unless of course the thinking process itself is spelled out in detail.

    Why do I find this impossible? The key point is the requirement or assumption that these objective moral facts are independent of anything we think or feel, and all the rest. If so, then our intuitions, cultures, world views and all the rest are no guide at all – by definition. It seems we have nothing at all we can use to think about (A).

    Like

  30. Darrell says:

    JP,

    I’ve given you several sources that address the questions you have raised. You ask:

    “Now, from where I stand, outside of the moral realist framework, I am wondering: how can we know?”

    I will ask again: What do you mean by “know”? I’ve already addressed the “how” by reference to the link and those quotes. You claim you are not asking for empirical proof so what would suffice then for you? We “know” in the same way the anti-realist thinks he “knows” the opposite. I’m sure you are familiar with the arguments and reasons that each brings to these questions, right? I’ve given you several links and examples where the reasoning is laid out. So, what is the problem here? You are not really thinking we are going to survey and summarize the arguments of the entire community of moral realists here in the comment section are you? If you take the time to read the entire essay, the Stanford link, you will see what people are talking about as to “knowing” something.

    I think moral realists and anti-realists believe they have come to the right conclusion. Obviously, one of them is wrong. They both believe however that they “know” (through reasoning, reflection, the holistic process I’ve spoken of before) that either morality is objective or that it isn’t. I think you are reading too much into the term “know”. They believe it to be true, the actual state of affairs. How do they know this? By reasoned argument. Does that prove one of them is right? Well, some arguments are more persuasive than others for all types of reasons. Some arguments have become the consensus view, even if there are still some who disagree. So what do you want here? I have no idea what you want, since you won’t tell us what you mean by those terms. It would help if you would answer my question:

    Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?

    More importantly, the fact remains that the writer shows that the de-bunking arguments are addressed and many think they are persuasively, which is why he ends his essay by noting that moral realism remains on the table. That is the consensus view and why it is inaccurate and false to claim otherwise.

    Like

  31. Hi Darrell

    “When you are ready to agree this is disagreement about two differing philosophical narratives regarding what the science means as to these questions, you let me know.”

    In one sense this is obviously true, and I am happy to agree to it. It is obvious we are not disagreeing about the science, but rather what the science implies, and I am happy to cast this as a philosophical disagreement. Now, you hold up your end of the deal and explain the following:

    1. Moral reasoning can only take us to conclusions consistent with our opening premises.
    2. Moral reasoning will therefore only reliably deliver up knowledge of moral truth if the premises are consistent with this truth.
    3. Science offers us the most plausible explanation as to how we arrive at our premises (evolutionary pressures, cultural evolution, individual psychological development).
    4. None of these processes, according to science, would be sensitive to moral truth should it exist.
    5. Hence we should conclude, if the science is right, that we can not reliably reason our way to moral truth.

    Which aspect of this argument do you object to, and why?

    Bernard

    Like

  32. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “In one sense this is obviously true, and I am happy to agree to it. It is obvious we are not disagreeing about the science, but rather what the science implies, and I am happy to cast this as a philosophical disagreement.”

    Thank you.

    “1. Moral reasoning can only take us to conclusions consistent with our opening premises.”

    First of all, there is no “moral” reasoning. There is only reasoning. And what you note is true of any type of reasoning, including that which leads one to the anti-realist position.

    “2. Moral reasoning will therefore only reliably deliver up knowledge of moral truth if the premises are consistent with this truth.”

    Reasoning leads us to conclusions consistent with our premises. Is that what you mean? And whether or not our conclusions are true, see my questions to JP. What do you mean by “true” and “know” and “deliver up”? You might also answer the question I asked JP:

    Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?

    “3. Science offers us the most plausible explanation as to how we arrive at our premises (evolutionary pressures, cultural evolution, individual psychological development).”

    Those are not philosophical premises. Those are the findings of science. You have this backwards. We bring our philosophical premises to those findings.

    I think you have some work here to do. Let’s do this: See my responses to JP and the several Stanford quotes I noted in the comments and bring those into the discussion—that might help.

    Like

  33. Hi Darrell

    Thanks for engaging. That's most helpful, and hopefully from here we can move towards a better understanding of each's position.

    We appear to agree on 1. A solid start.

    With regard to 2. you ask: “What do you mean by “true” and “know” and “deliver up”?
    This is a hypothetical argument, that starts with 'what if transcendent moral truths exist? If they do, then moral statements are true or false relative to this underlying truth (this being one of the defining characteristics of realism).

    So we might say for 2. – If a moral truth exists, then reasoning will reliably lead us to true moral statements iff our starting premises are consistent with this moral truth.

    Do you agree with this? (It seems to follow directly from 1. but I will give you a chance to disagree if you wish).

    Your response to 3. I'm unclear on. If we can reason our way to moral truths, as you claim, then we must be able to utilise some starting premises. For a Utilitarian, for example, these premises will revolve about maximisation of some definition of total happiness. Our choice of one set of premises over another (i.e why not have as our premise the goal of a moral system is to maximise pain?) must come from somewhere. 3. suggests the only place these inclinations could come from are the genetic, developmental and cultural backdrops (if we are to remain consistent with science). Do you agree? If not, on what might the choice of premises be based? (Note we can not say it is based upon reason,a s premises are by definition not reasoned to).

    Bernard

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  34. JP says:

    Hi Darrell,

    I will ask again: What do you mean by “know”? […] We “know” in the same way the anti-realist thinks he “knows” the opposite.

    I am not asking how we know moral realism is true, which is what you seem to answer here by referring to the anti-realist. For the sake of this conversation, I assume that there exists objective moral facts, independent of anything we can do or feel or think.

    Consider again:

    (A) It is morally right to stone to death adulterous women.

    This is a moral claim and, if moral realism holds (which I assume for the moment), it is either true or false.

    Now, suppose a person P1 tells me (A) is true and another P2 tells me (A) is false.

    I then ask P1: “How do you know?” This is a natural question. P1 claims knowledge of a moral fact, it's entirely legitimate to ask how how knows this. I am not presuming anything about the kind of answer he can give. I simply want to know P1's answer.

    If P1 answers “through autonomous moral reasoning”, this tells me nothing at all. P2 could answer the same thing.

    Suppose P1 answers: “I accept (A) by faith alone”. Then what? P2 could say the same thing: “I know (A) is false by faith”.

    From where I stand, this is a stalemate. There is nothing I can see that distinguish the two positions. Therefore, neither P1 nor P2 is justified in saying he knows anything about the truth value of (A).

    For me, this is the problem. I am not calling a clash, this is Bernard's argument (although I think he is right). I'm only asking this very simple question: “How do you know (A) is true? (or false)”

    Like

  35. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “So we might say for 2. – If a moral truth exists, then reasoning will reliably lead us to true moral statements iff our starting premises are consistent with this moral truth.”

    Reasoning can bring us to either view, whether moral realism or anti-realism. And, again, I think you have this backward. The question would be: Are our conclusions consistent with our premises. Whether or not moral truths actually exist, or not, is another question. One can have conclusions consistent with their premises and still reach false conclusions.

    “Your response to 3. I'm unclear on. If we can reason our way to moral truths, as you claim, then we must be able to utilise some starting premises.”

    Well, first, it is not my claim but the Stanford writer’s claim and the claim of the consensus view. We can also reason our way to the view that moral truths do not exist. Second, everyone uses starting premises (philosophical frameworks/narratives) including you, and other anti-realists.

    I think something that would really help is to get your answer to the same question I asked JP:

    Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?

    I you don't believe we can, like all philosophical naturalists/empiricists/atheists, then this is one of your philosophical premises. This alone would tell us why you think my view clashes with science. But, or course, the above is not a scientific statement, it is not an empirical statement, it is a philosophical premise.

    After you respond, I think we should probably take this conversation to my next post, which will be a Part Two to this one where we can further clarify these questions and see if your philosophical belief my view clashes with science is still a reasonable view to hold.

    Like

  36. Darrell says:

    JP,

    How do you think the anti-realist “knows” moral truths do not exist? In answering, you will give their reasons, the arguments, and so on, right?

    Now do the same for the moral realist. What is the problem then? They both “know” in the same way. Is one of them wrong? Yes. But we cannot determine that in any empirical or scientific fashion (thus, whence the clash?). As the Stanford writer notes, science will not give us that answer. Again, the issue is not who has come to the “true” answer, as you noted, the clash is not whether moral truths exist or not, but how could we even “get there”. That has been addressed. Are you now shifting to, “Okay, but who is right?” That was never the issue by your own admission.

    I notice no one wants to answer my question. Anyway, as I noted to Bernard, go ahead and respond to this and then we will move this conversation to my next post.

    Like

  37. JP says:

    Hi Darrell,

    How do you think the anti-realist “knows” moral truths do not exist? In answering, you will give their reasons, the arguments, and so on, right?

    Now do the same for the moral realist. What is the problem then?

    Do you actually read what I write? In this conversation, I have not raised the question of the existence of objective moral truths. Not once. In fact, I just wrote in my last comment that, for the sake of argument, I assume they exist.

    But you always come back to this issue. An interesting one, no doubt, but not one I have mentioned.

    As to shifting? Not at all. My only point in all this conversation is: how do we know what these truths are?

    To be very specific, suppose a moral realist says: “stoning adulterous women to death is wrong”. My only interest here is the answer to the question: “How do you know that?”

    Frankly, I have no clue. For reasons given many times, autonomous moral reflection does not work.

    ps -I will be off the internet until Monday evening.

    Like

  38. Darrell says:

    JP,

    “To be very specific, suppose a moral realist says: “stoning adulterous women to death is wrong”. My only interest here is the answer to the question: “How do you know that?”

    Give any example you wish—it doesn’t matter. I answered. How does the anti-realist know it isn’t wrong? He will give reasons, arguments. So will the moral realist. Are you suggesting that one side uses reasons and arguments and the other has empirical proof? If not, then again, what is the problem? And if you are not concerned about who is actually right, then I have addressed your question about “knowing”. So has the Stanford writer.

    Since you haven’t answered my question and since you won’t tell us what you mean by “know” I can’t help you any further until you clarify what you mean. I have said over and over that I mean “know” in the same way the anti-realist would mean “know” when they tell us moral truths do not exist. If you can tell us how the anti-realist “knows” what they purport to know, you will tell us the same as to the moral realist.

    We will now move on to the next post.

    Like

  39. Hi Darrell

    “Reasoning can bring us to either view, whether moral realism or anti-realism.”

    We're not discussing whether realism or non-realism holds. Rather, can we gain reliable knowledge of moral truth if realism holds. You've avoided answering whether or not you think 2. is valid. It appears valid to me, and consistent with 1., which you agree with.

    “Second, everyone uses starting premises (philosophical frameworks/narratives) including you, and other anti-realists.”

    Yes, indeed. But you're avoiding answering the question. Does 3. hold. How might a person reasoning their way to a moral truth (as you claim can be done) choose their starting premise?

    “Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically? If you don't believe we can, like all philosophical naturalists/empiricists/atheists, then this is one of your philosophical premises.”

    We can certainly use non-empirical methods to arrive at conclusions that may be true (guesswork will have this 'may be true' quality). I don't however think we can reliably reach knowledge this way. This is not a premise, but rather a conclusion. The premise in this case is that science provides the best explanation of the physical world. From here, I am reasoning my way towards the conclusion that our other ways of knowing can not be reliable.

    But note, you've avoided the questions. Do you think 2. holds, logically? And if you disagree with 3. how else might we choose our premises? Stick with this line of reasoning, and we'll get there.

    Bernard

    Like

  40. Darrell says:

    Bernard,

    “Reasoning can bring us to either view, whether moral realism or anti-realism.”-Darrell

    “…Rather, can we gain reliable knowledge of moral truth if realism holds.”

    What do you mean by “reliable knowledge”? And, I wasn’t talking either about whether either view is true. Go back and read my response. My point was that we all have premises that we think logically lead to our conclusions—both sides reason that way. Even then, I think you have the statement you make above backwards. “If” moral realism holds (which I assume you mean is “true”) then of course we could come to that conclusion. However, we could also reason to that conclusion and be wrong. We could also reason to the anti-realist conclusion and be wrong.

    “You've avoided answering whether or not you think 2. is valid.”

    No avoidance at all. Read my answer again:

    Reasoning can bring us to either view, whether moral realism or anti-realism. And, again, I think you have this backward. The question would be: Are our conclusions consistent with our premises. Whether or not moral truths actually exist, or not, is another question. One can have conclusions consistent with their premises and still reach false conclusions.

    “Second, everyone uses starting premises (philosophical frameworks/narratives) including you, and other anti-realists.”-Darrell

    “Yes, indeed. But you're avoiding answering the question. Does 3. hold. How might a person reasoning their way to a moral truth (as you claim can be done) choose their starting premise?”

    Again, I’m avoiding nothing. Answer: In the same way the anti-realist does. See the Stanford link and quotes. How would a person reasoning their way to the belief there are no moral truths choose their starting premises? The answer is the same for both (although we don’t choose our starting premises just to reach the conclusion we want—you have it backwards again—we have premises that we then tease out from there reasoning holistically to our conclusions). Unless of course you just want to come out and throw your hat into the naturalist camp and tell us that the anti-realist view is proven by empirical evidence and science and the other side simply makes reasoned arguments? If you are claiming a “winner” as to the moral realist view and the anti-realist view, just say so.

    “Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically? If you don't believe we can, like all philosophical naturalists/empiricists/atheists, then this is one of your philosophical premises.”-Darrell

    “…I don't however think we can reliably reach knowledge this way. This is not a premise, but rather a conclusion. The premise in this case is that science provides the best explanation of the physical world. From here, I am reasoning my way towards the conclusion that our other ways of knowing can not be reliable.”

    (Continued)

    Like

  41. Darrell says:

    (Continued)

    At last we get to it. We are not talking about the physical world. Morality is not a physical thing. Neither is God. If you are asserting we can only “know” something to be true if we can prove it scientifically/empirically, that is called scientism—if you think it applies to these types of questions as well as the physical world.

    And, this: …We can only “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) if they can be proven empirically or scientifically…

    -is a philosophical premise. It is the philosophical premise held by philosophical naturalists/empiricists/atheists and is why they think the views of moral realists clash with science. This is another clear example of why our views clash. But whether or not philosophical naturalists, who believe these de-bunking arguments, are correct is highly debatable. Further, it is clearly not the consensus view.

    So at least we know why you think my view clashes with science, your philosophical premises (which are held by faith) lead you to that conclusion. You have come to that belief, what you think you “know” here to be true, in the very same way I have come to the opposite conclusion, which is outlined in the Stanford link. You have sort of answered your own questions here. We have both reasoned from philosophical premises to conclusions. Nowhere in that process is there a clash with science, for either.

    I reject your philosophical premise here (which is why it was never about the science). Again, if we a-prior define “know” and “acquire” and “access” to mean empirically/scientifically, then neither the anti-realist or moral realist can do such. As to these areas of inquiry (non-physical concepts/ideas/theories) neither side has that sort of knowledge. Thus, the claim of a clash with science is a non-starter for either–my point all along–re-read the title of this post.

    Okay, we are done here. We can continue this with my next post. Thank you (the “thank you” means do not respond here—be polite and wait until the next post.

    Cheers.

    Like

  42. Burk says:

    Hi, Darrell-

    ” You claim you are not asking for empirical proof so what would suffice then for you? We “know” in the same way the anti-realist thinks he “knows” the opposite.”

    No, I'm afraid not. Here you are at an intrinsic disadvantage, because the antirealist (or subjectivist, really) claims a subjective moral criterion, which is clear in its origin, and needs no further proof or demonstration. It is the objective / realist case which intrinsically needs an objective foundation. That could be empirical in a traditional sense, or some other epistemology that gets you to the starting line here, “knowing” things that are supposedly objective, eternal, transcendent, etc.

    To fob this off onto the Stanford writer, who is writing a lengthy polemic that fails to prove anything, because it really fails to deal with its own underlying assumptions, is both unavailing and cowardly. It should be simple for you to just say that … (I am guessing here) … you think we automatically, and by some magical means know what is right and wrong, by virtue of being made by god. And that is exactly what the evolutionary argument addresses and conflicts with, per science.

    “Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?”

    No.

    Pure logical concepts, like math, are not mind-independent, because they rest on assumptions that are not themselves “true”. Instead they are axioms on which the rest of the logic rests. Math only applies to reality by way of empirical intermediation, not in any automatic or direct way.

    Do you believe differently? This would be another opportunity to explain how you get to this starting gate that is the premise for objective morality.

    Like

  43. Darrell says:

    Burk,

    “You claim you are not asking for empirical proof so what would suffice then for you? We “know” in the same way the anti-realist thinks he “knows” the opposite.”-Darrell

    “No, I'm afraid not. Here you are at an intrinsic disadvantage, because the antirealist (or subjectivist, really) claims a subjective moral criterion, which is clear in its origin, and needs no further proof or demonstration.”

    It is not clear in its origin. There are reasons and arguments given for its origin, but they are widely disputed. In fact, that is exactly what the Stanford writer is doing. No disadvantage at all.

    “It is the objective / realist case which intrinsically needs an objective foundation.”

    Peruse their arguments, they do. Like Plantinga, I think the objective source is God. You may disagree, but there it is. It is the traditional objective source cited, or there is Plato.

    “To fob this off onto the Stanford writer, who is writing a lengthy polemic that fails to prove anything…”

    He is not trying to prove anything. Like Bernard and JP, you miss the point. Like most neutral academic sources, he lays out the various arguments and counter arguments. His summation is that moral realism doesn’t clash with evolutionary findings. You may disagree, but he reflects the consensus view, which clearly you guys are outside of (which makes the assertion my view clashes with science so ironic). And they you need to resort to ad hominem is so Trumpish. It’s what happens when one doesn’t have any good arguments—all they can do is call the person they disagree with a coward. You are better than that.

    “Do you believe we can “know” “acquire” “or have access” to concepts/ideas that may be true (objectively true, mind independently true) but that cannot be proven empirically or scientifically?”-Darrell

    “No.”

    Well we knew that and we know that Bernard agrees. If either of you think this applies to every area of life, that is what’s called scientism, which is a minority view. And not only are you welcome to it, it is actually (more irony) a (philosophical) view held by many to be “unscientific”. See: https://www.aaas.org/page/what-scientism

    (Continued)

    Like

  44. Darrell says:

    (Continued)

    “It is one thing to celebrate science for its achievements and remarkable ability to explain a wide variety of phenomena in the natural world. But to claim there is nothing knowable outside the scope of science would be similar to a successful fisherman saying that whatever he can’t catch in his nets does not exist (15). Once you accept that science is the only source of human knowledge, you have adopted a philosophical position (scientism) that cannot be verified, or falsified, by science itself. It is, in a word, unscientific.”

    And what this philosophical view promotes was the point of this post:

    “The health of science is in fact jeopardized by scientism, not promoted by it. At the very least, scientism provokes a defensive, immunological, aggressive response from other intellectual communities, in return for its own arrogance and intellectual bullyism. It taints science itself by association.” -Physicist Ian Hutchinson

    In other words, if scientism was a person running for office, it would be Donald Trump.

    “Do you believe differently? This would be another opportunity to explain how you get to this starting gate that is the premise for objective morality.”

    What do you not get about Hart’s response to Gopnik—whether you agree with Hart of not? One cannot prove God, or that objective morality exists or doesn’t exist through empirical/mathematical means. Isn’t that obvious? If one then responds, “Well, then it can’t exist”, he begs the very question of if such (empirical means) is the only way to know if something is true or exists.

    “God is not a natural phenomenon. Is it really so difficult to grasp that the classical concept of God has always occupied a logical space that cannot be approached from the necessarily limited perspective of natural science?”

    Whether you agree with that conception or not, why would you raise the very same questions showing your objections do not apply? Mind boggling.

    You saw my responses to Bernard and JP—we are closing this comment section out. Please do not respond here, but wait until my next post. Thank you.

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