Therefore, all toasters are time-travel devices.
The argument above has a conclusion that is “relative” to its premise, or presupposition, so it is a valid argument. However, it’s conclusion is false. All valid arguments are “relative” in this way, but that doesn’t mean their conclusions are relative in the sense of confirming a conclusion that morality is relative (or objective for that matter). One of those conclusions is false, while both conclusions are relative to their premises.
“Yes indeed. You are a relativist. You think you come to beliefs that are relative to your starting assumptions, and we have no way of adjudicating between opposing moral beliefs…”
False. I am a moral realist. And let’s just be honest, when Bernard claims here that I am a relativist, he wasn’t just pointing out the trivially true, the obvious fact we all reason to conclusions that “follow” (are relative to) our presuppositions. If that had been his point, I would have thanked him for the compliment—it would be like exclaiming: “Yes, indeed, you are logical—you make valid arguments!” He clearly meant this in a “gotcha” sense however- that I was “really” a relativist, which means he indeed was completely confusing the two senses of “relative”.
I think when he realized this he tried to sweep it away by claiming it was only a word game or semantics. It is in no way just a word game or semantics—it is critical we understand the difference in the two senses of “relative” in a conversation like this one.
JP made the same mistake:
“Moral knowledge refers to what we know of these truths. Under your approach, this knowledge is relative to world views.”
Wrong for the same reasons. “Relative” to world-view simply means one makes a valid argument, one that follows—it is everyone’s approach we hope! It has nothing to do with whether morality is “relative” or objective. Everyone’s knowledge, what they think they know “of these truths”, even the knowledge we can’t know anything about them is “relative” to their world-view. One is only pointing out the obvious here (as Ron noted—it is trivially true) while mistakenly thinking they are commenting upon the question of knowing if our conclusions are “really” true or not. Two different things entirely.
And I do (we all do) have a way of adjudicating between opposing ethical assertions or the narratives from which they arise. When a Christian or moral realist claims that morality is universal and objective, how do they “know” this? And there is no need to break it down any further, for instance to ask: “How do you know torture is wrong?” The question as to any specific ethical stance is still based upon the same type of knowing and the greater question still goes to whether morality is objective and universal or relative and subjective, as any specific claim is still understood from one of those perspectives. This would be true even if it were two moral realists who disagree regarding a specific moral assertion. Since the disagreement cannot be adjudicated empirically/scientifically, it can only be adjudicated by reasoned argument, by contrasting and discussing the differing reasons, and in what believing such has actually produced historically (this is not an argument from pragmatism-but a normal part of the reasoning process-one of the factors any rational person considers). As we all know, this certainly hasn’t settled these issues or disagreements to everyone’s satisfaction, but cultures and entire civilizations do tend, by consensus, to affirm certain ethical stances over others and believed them to be “true” and not just in relation to them. Unfortunately, many times the adjudication happens violently as world wars and the need for police forces attest. For the most part however, the adjudication is peaceful and through reasoned debate and the passing of laws.
Are these types of disputes settled or adjudicated like a dispute over an empirical matter would be? Of course not, how silly. What would that even mean? Would they weigh, measure, run tests on, the two different answers? But that doesn’t mean there can’t be a consensus that develops, wherein a person or culture can assert that the other person or culture is “wrong” and in fact this is what we have done since recorded time and do now. As noted above, the assertion of their being “wrong” would not be simply relative to us or relative to our presuppositions, but an assertion of the violation of an objective and universal ethical assertion (taking an innocent life is wrong/evil), which may indeed be a true conclusion (or a false one).
This always leads to the next question (which has been covered in past posts): If two people disagree as to whether something is morally right or wrong, or even if morality is relative as opposed to being objective, doesn’t this fact alone mean morality is relative? No, it doesn’t. It just means there is disagreement. It just means someone is wrong. This always leads to the follow-up question: How do we know who is wrong then—how do we adjudicate this? Well, since we all agree (except Burk) that by “know” we do not mean empirically/scientifically then how else would we proceed, how else could we “know” who is wrong? Any ideas?
If one accepts the presupposition that not all knowledge is founded empirically/scientifically, then he must be open to other justifications for “knowing” or claiming the other person is “wrong” or holds a false belief. Let’s pause right there. If throughout the last comment section, unless one was being disingenuous, when we were told by “know” and “true” one did not mean in the sense of empirically/scientifically, he was, at the same time, accepting the presupposition that there are other ways to “know” what is “true”. At the end of this post, I will ask for clarification however.
If he was truly accepting that presupposition, he will then also accept the fact that one is never going to prove the other person wrong in an empirical fashion, unless the other person is making some sort of empirical/scientific claim to begin with. If a person tells us he believes torture is wrong based upon some empirical and scientific finding, he is then open to being disproved by those same methods. However, if a person claims torture is wrong based upon metaphysical and philosophical grounds, he is not then open to being disproved upon empirical/scientific grounds. He is open however to being shown his argument contains logical fallacies, or that the philosophical narrative he inhabits, that leads to his assertions, isn’t compelling or doesn’t align with the good, the true, and beautiful. Anticipating the next question (How do we know what is good, true, and beautiful?), see the many previous posts wherein this was discussed (and in which Bernard, JP, and Burk participated).
Now, they could take the path Burk takes which is one of scientism/empiricism. They could assert by “know” that they do mean empirically/scientifically because such is the only way we can “know” if something is “true” or exists. I think this would be the most logical argument to make to end up where they seem to want to, which is to make it so that if one does claim morality is objective, there is a “problem” with science. It still wouldn’t be a clash with science, but a clash with scientism/empiricism, but it would logically follow (I at least will give that to Burk).
So, given what we now know, let’s consider again Bernard’s peculiar way of being “agnostic”. Here, as far as I can tell, was Bernard’s initial claim:
1. Let’s stipulate God may exist, and therefore morality may exist derivative to God existing.
2. However, we can’t claim any knowledge of either; or, if we do, any such claim would be problematic from a scientific understanding.
3. Therefore, we should remain agnostic regarding God and morality existing objectively/universally.
Well, since we know Bernard agreed he didn’t mean “knowledge” in the sense of empirical/scientific knowledge and since we know no one is claiming they know by divine changes in their brains, but mean “know” in the sense of reasoning to, coming to conclude such, coming to that belief, then we can all see now the problems with the above. Bernard’s assertion in number 2 was based upon an erroneous belief that knowledge was obtained by divine intervention in people’s brains.
We would now have to put it this way:
1. Let’s stipulate God may exist, and therefore morality may exist derivative to God existing.
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Sailing to Byzantium
"...O sages standing in God’s holy fire As in the gold mosaic of a wall, Come from the holy fire, perne in a gyre, And be the singing-masters of my soul. Consume my heart away; sick with desire And fastened to a dying animal It knows not what it is; and gather me Into the artifice of eternity..." -W.B. Yeats
Hi Darrell
I'm asking only if you think your method for gaining knowledge of the moral state of the universe is any better than guesswork. if it is, your method is reliable. If not, you and I have no disagreement. I am sure people can indeed make guesses as to the moral nature of the universe.
So, again, do you think your method is more likely than guesswork to produce moral statements that reflect the true state of the universe? If you do, then why is this not true for people who use your method to reach opposite conclusions? (Better than guesswork requires this condition). As you describe it, your method appears to have precisely the same chance as random guesswork. And yes, I agree, when it comes to the metaphysical realities, this is all we have. This observation is a central plank of agnosticism.
Bernard
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Bernard,
Please address my last 3 comments, questions (pesky things, I know) and all. Thanks.
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Hi Darrell
You ask a lot of questions, most of which misinterpret my position. I actually don't think we're even disagreeing here. You think one can gain knowledge of the nature of moral truths, but accept the method by which we could do this is equally likely to lead us to error, or at least you are unable to explain why the process is any more likely to lead to true rather than false statements.
If you wish to call this type of uncertainty knowledge, then we disagree only on terminology.
Bernard
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Bernard,
If you answer my questions, then you get to clarify and state your position correctly. I need to know what you mean by “reliable” and how it doesn’t apply to you as well. As noted, it would mean your objection is just a guess too—it would be guesses all the way down. I need you to at least comment regarding why I think the word “reliable” doesn’t even apply to these topics for the reasons noted—I don’t think you can meet your own test. I need to know what you mean by “constructed” in the context of my further points where I ask you to clarify what you mean (see below). I need a response to the fact that if disagreement means none of us can claim either our method or conclusion is “reliable” then it applies to you as well, because clearly most do not agree with you here so it is a self-defeating argument.
Finally, I need to know why the better and more logical position for the agnostic to take (and in fact is what most do) is noting that as to whether moral truth is ontologically relative or objective the agnostic claims not to know, but also understands that, logically, it is either one or the other.
“My argument applies to the discovery of non-constructed objective truths.”
The assertion that morality is relative, or the assertion that morality is objective, is a constructed truth, if you mean the conclusions follow from the presuppositions. So how does your argument apply if that is all you mean? If you mean something else by “constructed”, I’ve missed it—so please explain.
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Hi Darrell
“I need to know what you mean by “reliable” and how it doesn’t apply to you as well. As noted, it would mean your objection is just a guess too—it would be guesses all the way down.”
Sure, although I've said this before. Reliable means a method that will lead to correct statements more regularly than pure guesswork.
Why doesn't it apply to me? Because the reliability problem arises when we make statements about an objective and non-constructed reality. So, for example, one can reliably know that there are infinite prime numbers, as prime numbers are themselves a construction, and we are simp;ly making deductions from premises, where these premises simply provide the definitions/conditions with which we work.
My argument is, i think, deductively correct, and my argument with respect to reliability accepts the ability to construct deductively valid arguments. As I say, you can reject my premise and so dismiss my argument, by dismissing the validity of deductive logic.
“The assertion that morality is relative, or the assertion that morality is objective, is a constructed truth, if you mean the conclusions follow from the presuppositions. “
I don't mean this. The assertion that morality is objective is not simply an assertion of what follows from a premise, it is an assertion about an underlying, or non-constructed, reality. So, constructed refers to a set of rules, constructed by humans, which are not thought to refer to anything beyond the very act of construction. In this sense, the true nature of morality is non-constructed.
“I need you to at least comment regarding why I think the word “reliable” doesn’t even apply to these topics for the reasons noted—I don’t think you can meet your own test.”
All I mean by reliable, is that the statement generated by your process regarding the nature of morality (e.g torture is bad) is more likely to be true than one generated by pure guesswork. Now, either you think the process you use will more often lead to true moral statements than simply making blind guesses. This is the relevance of reliability.
If you do not think it more likely to produce true statements, then we are in agreement. if you think it is more likely to do this than guesswork, then can you explain how this reliability arises? You accept you process can produce contradictory results, one of which must be wrong. What then guides it to more often lead ot the correct ones? You've never attempted to explain this crucial element.
” I need to know why the better and more logical position for the agnostic to take (and in fact is what most do) is noting that as to whether moral truth is ontologically relative or objective the agnostic claims not to know, but also understands that, logically, it is either one or the other.”
This is of course correct. I don't disagree. Your turn to address a question then.
Bernard
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Bernard,
“The assertion that morality is relative, or the assertion that morality is objective, is a constructed truth, if you mean the conclusions follow from the presuppositions. “-Darrell
“I don't mean this. The assertion that morality is objective is not simply an assertion of what follows from a premise, it is an assertion about an underlying, or non-constructed, reality.”
Yes, as is the claim that morality is relative, it is an ontological claim. So what? What error is being made if we make claims about the ontological status of moral claims? We could be wrong, but so what? And no one even claims the type of “reliability” you assert is needed to make such claims, and they don’t because it would make absolutely no sense to do so. You claim something is needed that doesn’t even make sense.
“All I mean by reliable, is that the statement generated by your process regarding the nature of morality (e.g torture is bad) is more likely to be true than one generated by pure guesswork. Now, either you think the process you use will more often lead to true moral statements than simply making blind guesses. This is the relevance of reliability.”
Again, the use of “reliable” in such a context with this subjective matter (the ontological nature of morality) is simply misplaced and makes no sense whatsoever. Again, morality is either ontologically objective or relative. There is no third option (unless you know of one?). If we believe it is ontologically objective, whether individual beliefs and statements match the objectivity noted (many place it in God’s existence, as I do, many place it in nature, as some atheists do, and some place it in some transcendental aspect) is another question; what is being asserted here is simply that morality is ontologically objective. If it exists ontologically in an objective fashion, how would “reliable” even pertain? Again, it either does or it doesn't.
(Continued)
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(Continued)
You have presupposed an arbitrary bar called “reliable” that neither the moral skeptic/anti-realist or moral realist can reach, but the only reason they cannot is because it doesn’t even apply here. It is completely imagined and neither reason nor logic requires it when speaking of the ontological nature of moral claims; it is an entirely misplaced term in this context and makes no sense whatsoever.
This should be easy to see on a basis of context and subject matter alone. Some physical things and forces can exist in different states of reliability or some statements can be true in the sense of being more or less “reliable” meaning, for instance, “If you follow my directions to get to town, it is more likely you will get there than not.” However, we would never use such a term to describe or qualify the assertion that moral truth is ontologically objective (or relative) because that simply doesn’t even make sense.
The claim that moral truth is relative/subjective is a claim that such is what morality “is” ontologically, which means this is TRUE in an objective sense—true for all people in all times and places—universally. What everybody seems to forget here is that both the relativist and the objectivist make objective and universal claims.
These claims bother you. And because these claims bother you, you want to be able to say that neither can know their view is true in that way (objectively/universally) because those types of claims do not meet a bar you (but no one else) have set called “reliable”.
So, after all the claims of clashes with science, errors of logic, it gets down to this: (1) what does “reliable” mean in this context—not just Bernard’s chosen definition; (2) is it even a term that makes sense in this context; and (3) how, unless he was guessing, does Bernard know that whatever has brought him to understand what “reliable” should mean in this context, both presupposition and method of reasoning, is, itself, “reliable”?
And, by the way, no serious person, you, the moral skeptic, the moral realist, the atheist, the agnostic, or the Christian thinks they are guessing as to what they believe about morality—even if what they believe is we cannot know with any “reliability” what morality “is”. And while most reasonable persons would admit they could be wrong, that is quite different than an admission one is just guessing. Two entirely different things. I could be wrong, but I’m not guessing.
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Hi Darrell
“And no one even claims the type of “reliability” you assert is needed to make such claims, and they don’t because it would make absolutely no sense to do so. You claim something is needed that doesn’t even make sense.”
So, to be perfectly clear, you do not claim, should one use your method, that they are any more likely to arrive at a true, rather than false moral statement? If you don't, we a re in perfect agreement, and I was simply misled by your use of the word knowledge.
“The claim that moral truth is relative/subjective is a claim that such is what morality “is” ontologically, which means this is TRUE in an objective sense—true for all people in all times and places—universally. What everybody seems to forget here is that both the relativist and the objectivist make objective and universal claims.”
What you may be forgetting is that my case has nothing at all to do with the question of whether morality is relative or not. It is a claim about our ability to make true moral statements if morality is objective (in a non-constructed sense).
Bernard
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Bernard,
“What you may be forgetting is that my case has nothing at all to do with the question of whether morality is relative or not. It is a claim about our ability to make true moral statements if morality is objective (in a non-constructed sense).”
But your claim does have to do with whether or not morality is ontologically relative. The moral skeptic/anti-realist, most atheists/materialists assert that morality “is” (ontologically) relative, whether we agree that it is or isn’t; in other words, they are stating an objective fact about morality that is true for everyone (universally). You get that, right?
It is exactly this claim, you assert we should not make because it is not “reliable”, correct?
And I still don’t understand what you think the difference is between a constructed case and a non-constructed case and how it pertains to your point.
As to the rest, I cannot vouch for or defend any and every specific moral assertion made by someone citing an objective source (I may not believe in that source), nor does anything I’m asserting require me to. Again, if you mean “reliable” must mean that most agree, then it is a self-defeating bar, as not everyone agrees with you regarding this very objection or what you think counts as “reliable”. You have yet to address that problem.
My assertion is that morality is ontologically objective. What do I mean by that? I mean God exists objectively (but not as a physical objective or force). What would it mean to ask, “Is that belief reliable?” I wouldn’t even know how to answer that. If I were asked, “Do you really believe that to be true?”—that I would understand and I would respond “yes”.
So, when I claim the taking of innocent life is evil and wrong, I think I am making a moral claim that is true objectively and universally—because I think it aligns with what I know about this God I believe in. I could be wrong. This God may not exist. Or, I could have completely misunderstood this God, the narrative, the Bible, the history, the oral traditions, even my own experiences. And so could you, or Burk, as to the narratives you inhabit and believe to be true. But to ask, again, if I thought my belief about murder being evil was a “reliable” belief, I wouldn’t even know what that meant.
If I am being asked if the way I came to believe in God was “reliable” I would state it was reliable in the same sense it is for anyone coming to a philosophical/theological belief of any type, even atheism or agnosticism. Then why do we disagree? Because of the nature of the subject. It is not an empirical or scientific subject. What that means is that reasonable people, can use reasonable methods (holistic reasoning) and come to reasonable conclusions, one of which is atheism, one of which is agnosticism, and one of which is belief in God. See, I do not need to accuse anyone here of being unreasonable, or committing logical errors (although we’ve all done this), or having views that clash with science, because I know if I adopted the presuppositions of the those with whom I disagree, I would easily come to their view or one very similar.
However, they cannot all be right. So, each admits, not that they are just guessing (an insult to all frankly), but that they could be wrong. And since most of them know they cannot prove their position or belief in an empirical/scientific fashion, they know the only way they can help others see why they have chosen to inhabit the narrative they do is through conversation, reason, and the way that they live.
So, the greater question here is why doesn’t this suffice for you? Instead of asserting we should not claim as ontologically true, either that morality is objective or relative, since that would require believing they are making some sort of error you are not (privileging one’s own views), why not assert that reasonable people can disagree, that one indeed could be right, and let’s continue the conversation?
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Also Bernard,
Here is the claim of the moral skeptic, or the type of moral skeptic I believe is wrong:
“Skepticism about moral reality is the claim that no moral facts or properties exist.”-Stanford
This is a claim about the ontology of a moral reality (what I would call God existing or some platonic or transcendental aspect to existence) and it is a claim about the way things really are, for everyone, regardless if they believe the opposite. It is a claim about an objective and universal fact: A moral reality does not exist. The skeptic would tell us this is a fact, whether we agree or not—this is his conclusion.
So, is the conclusion a constructed case or a non-constructed case? Is this a “reliable” conclusion per how you are using the term? If it is not, then it would seem you are using the term “non-constructed” to mean if our conclusion is such that we believe it to be true in an objective sense, true for everyone universally, rather than just true for us and simply a valid argument (constructed?).
If so, that still doesn’t tell us what the term “constructed” means in relation to your point or why it’s important. You certainly can't mean we error if we claim our conclusions are really true, in an objective sense, because of some logical sequence formulation. You might say you simply disagree with the conclusion, but you are telling us it's not that you disagree, because you don't know–you are agnostic as to whether a moral reality exists, but what then is the objection and how does this idea of “construction” come into play?
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Hi Darrell
“It is exactly this claim, you assert we should not make because it is not “reliable”, correct?”
Not at all. We are a long way form even understanding one another on this.
“And I still don’t understand what you think the difference is between a constructed case and a non-constructed case and how it pertains to your point.”
I can see that.
“But to ask, again, if I thought my belief about murder being evil was a “reliable” belief, I wouldn’t even know what that meant.”
You offered a method, holistic reasoning. I am asking, if a thousand people use dit to ascertain whether torture was truly wrong, do you think this method would tend to lead more people to the correct answer than if they simply guessed. If you think it's no better than guesswork, we are using knowledge in a different sense, and beyond that have no disagreement. if you think it would deliver more people to the correct answer than guesswork, how does it do this?
Bernard
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Bernard,
“But to ask, again, if I thought my belief about murder being evil was a “reliable” belief, I wouldn’t even know what that meant.”-Darrell
“You offered a method, holistic reasoning. I am asking, if a thousand people use dit to ascertain whether torture was truly wrong, do you think this method would tend to lead more people to the correct answer than if they simply guessed.”
There is no other method available to us. Would we all agree? No. So, what would that mean to you? That the method was faulty or unreliable? That would be self-defeating because it would mean the same for you as to your presupposing an artificial bar as to what is “reliable” or that we shouldn’t make the types of statements that seem to bother you here (although I’m not even sure now what the objection truly is at this point).
However, if you mean if a thousand people chose to inhabit the narrative I do and then reasoned their way from within that narrative (just like you are doing from your own narrative, as we converse here), would they tend to agree with me that torture was truly wrong? Yes, they would. Look around, the world we live in provides clear evidence for that. Could they be wrong? Of course. But they certainly wouldn’t be guessing. Could you be wrong? Of course, but you are not guessing as to why you think you should be agnostic as to the ontological status of morality.
I will state it again:
If I am being asked if the way I came to believe in God was “reliable” I would state it was reliable in the same sense it is for anyone coming to a philosophical/theological belief of any type, even atheism or agnosticism. Then why do we disagree? Because of the nature of the subject. It is not an empirical or scientific subject. What that means is that reasonable people, can use reasonable methods (holistic reasoning) and come to reasonable conclusions, one of which is atheism, one of which is agnosticism, and one of which is belief in God. See, I do not need to accuse anyone here of being unreasonable, or committing logical errors (although we’ve all done this), or having views that clash with science, because I know if I adopted the presuppositions of the those with whom I disagree, I would easily come to their view or one very similar.
However, they cannot all be right. So, each admits, not that they are just guessing (an insult to all frankly), but that they could be wrong. And since most of them know they cannot prove their position or belief in an empirical/scientific fashion, they know the only way they can help others see why they have chosen to inhabit the narrative they do is through conversation, reason, and the way that they live.
So, the greater question here is why doesn’t this suffice for you? Instead of asserting we should not claim as ontologically true, either that morality is objective or relative, since that would require believing they are making some sort of error you are not (privileging one’s own views), why not assert that reasonable people can disagree, that one indeed could be right, and let’s continue the conversation?
PS: And if you ever want to explain what you mean by constructed and non-constructed statements and why you don’t object to the objective, universal claims of the moral skeptic, only the objective, universal claims of the moral realist, please do.
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Hi Darrell
You misunderstand my question. If a thousand people used your method of holistic reasoning, would rtheir hit rate in terms of making true statements be any better than guesswork?
Yes or no?
“And if you ever want to explain what you mean by constructed and non-constructed statements and why you don’t object to the objective, universal claims of the moral skeptic, only the objective, universal claims of the moral realist, please do.”
I don't make this claim. Not at all.
“That would be self-defeating because it would mean the same for you as to your presupposing an artificial bar as to what is “reliable” or that we shouldn’t make the types of statements that seem to bother you here.”
No. I'm making no such claim regarding non-constructed truths.
“Could they be wrong? Of course. But they certainly wouldn’t be guessing.”
I'm not saying they're guessing. I'm saying, if the method has no means of ensuring greater accuracy than guessing (and yours shows none) then it is an unusual use of language to call this knowledge.
I'm sorry I've not bene able to make my case even a little clear to you. Your responses are consistently targeting in on a case I am not making. We're unlikely to progress this way. Answering the yes no question will help, if you are genuinely interested in reaching an understanding. Over to you.
Bernard
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Bernard,
“You misunderstand my question. If a thousand people used your method of holistic reasoning, would rtheir hit rate in terms of making true statements be any better than guesswork?
Yes or no?”
That makes no sense, whatsoever, as noted already. What would a “hit-rate” even mean in this context?
People, including you, inhabit the narratives they do by faith and believe they are true, that they reflect what is true about us and existence, objectively and universally. When they come to think about what morality is ontologically, they have to decide what the narrative they inhabit leads them to logically believe about such questions. The people that inhabit the Judeo-Christian narrative, tend to believe that morality is objective and universal for obvious reasons. Those who inhabit the narrative of materialism/physicalism tend to believe it is relative. Even though they disagree, none of them is guessing. So, based upon their belief the narrative they inhabit is true, they believe that anytime they make a statement of an ethical nature, they are making a true statement. At the same time, they know they could be wrong too. How would a term like “hit-rate” even apply just as I noted regarding the term “reliable”. The problem you are creating for yourself here, and no one else, is by simply using terms that make absolutely no sense in this context. I can’t help you there. But it certainly doesn’t raise any objection to anything I am saying here that I would consider substantive or a problem.
“That would be self-defeating because it would mean the same for you as to your presupposing an artificial bar as to what is “reliable” or that we shouldn’t make the types of statements that seem to bother you here.”-Darrell
“No. I'm making no such claim regarding non-constructed truths.”
I have no idea what you mean by constructed or non-constructed truths.
“I'm not saying they're guessing. I'm saying, if the method has no means of ensuring greater accuracy than guessing (and yours shows none) then it is an unusual use of language to call this knowledge.”
Only if you think knowledge means what we can know empirically/scientifically. Otherwise, it shouldn’t be a problem. People disagree. That has nothing to do with “accuracy” it has to do with the narratives we inhabit and how we reason from there. You method shows no greater accuracy than guessing if it leads us to believe (whatever your objection is–what whatever it is you believe about the ontological nature of morality)…because clearly people disagree with you, right?
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I meant: “(whatever your objection is–or whatever it is you believe about the ontological nature of morality)”
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Hi Darrell
“That makes no sense, whatsoever, as noted already. What would a “hit-rate” even mean in this context?”
This is very simple. You offered a method by which one could come to make correct moral statements e.g reach the conclusion that torture is morally wrong in a universe where this is actually the case. You called this holistic reasoning. We wondered if this method could indeed lead you to making such statements. You accept it might very well lead you to make incorrect, rather than correct statements. So, the question is, is it any more likely to lead to correct, rather than incorrect, moral conclusions? If it is not, then we can hardly call this knowledge – I have a holistic method for 'knowing' future lottery numbers, which I call gut feeling. Trouble is, it is no better than guessing when it comes to making correct statements. I think it's probably best not to refer to this as knowledge.
How can we distinguish between a method that leads us to make statements with no better than guesswork than probability that they are actually correct, and one which is indeed a genuine knowledge generator? One conceptual method is to think in terms of average outcomes. A thousand people, chosen at random, with diverse life experiences, values etc, assiduously apply your holistic reasoning method to draw moral conclusions on the nature of torture. Another thousand are simply asked to draw moral conclusions at random out of a hat. If your method is in any sense responsible for your moral knowledge, then you must be claiming the first group will result in more people making true moral statements.
If that's what you mean, then you need to explain how this happens, as you concede the likelihood of a true moral conclusion is a function of having true moral assumptions, and yet there is nothing in your method that explains why these initial moral assumptions should align with moral truth. (The reason you don't offer this method is you know at this point you will have to fall back on a miracle, which you earlier claimed your method doesn't require).
And so you I conclude the method you offer is unable to deliver up moral knowledge, although you may of course end up making correct moral statements, as anybody guessing might.
Bernard
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Bernard,
“That makes no sense, whatsoever, as noted already. What would a “hit-rate” even mean in this context?”-Darrell
“You offered a method by which one could come to make correct moral statements e.g reach the conclusion that torture is morally wrong in a universe where this is actually the case.”
The “more likely” or “less likely” criteria simply doesn’t apply or make sense in this context, as neither does “hit-rate” or “reliable”. And I’ve offered the same method you have used to come to your agnosticism.
It would make no sense to ask a moral realist if the statement “Murder is evil” was made on a Friday, would still be true on Saturday, right? The “hit-rate” for believing that statement to be true universally/objectively is going to be 100%, right?
Now, if 1000 people inhabited a narrative that led them to be moral realists, the same would apply, right? All this would apply to the moral skeptic too, right? The moral skeptic is going to believe it reliable and 100% accurate to note that the statement above (murder is evil) is relative all the time, any day of the week, right?
In other words, your questions about specific moral assertions cannot be abstracted out of or understood without linking them to the narrative the person inhabits and what that has led them to believe about the ontological nature of morality. What they believe in that regard and how it applies to their moral assertions, is that they believe those statements to be true, objectively and universally, whether they happen to be moral skeptics or moral realists. In that sense, in that context, they believe their statements, the methods, to be reliable and true. Again, in that context, a 100% hit-rate.
However, there is disagreement here. They both cannot be right and should admit they could be wrong. If that is all you have been getting at, I couldn’t agree more. I’ve noted that over and over. Both need to admit they could be wrong, and every reasonable Christian, atheist, or agnostic I know admits that very thing. So, believing, whether the atheist or Christian that they are making claims that are true, reliable, and 100% correct takes nothing away from the fact they also know they could be wrong and most readily admit as much.
If you are still staying something more than this, I have no idea what it is or what kind of objection (are we running afoul of a formal logical fallacy, outside the bounds of reason, sensibility, what?) it might be—and why it would only apply to me and no one else that believes things to be true, objectively and universally (like the moral skeptic).
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Hi Darrell
“If you are still staying something more than this, I have no idea what it is or what kind of objection (are we running afoul of a formal logical fallacy, outside the bounds of reason, sensibility, what?) it might be—and why it would only apply to me and no one else that believes things to be true, objectively and universally (like the moral skeptic). “
Yes indeed. I am saying something more, and apparently I've been unable to get you close to even understanding it. I'm at a loss as to how else to approach this, sorry. I am not implying my conclusion applies only to you, but it is a critique of the specific method you have proposed.
The notion of reliability applies to your method, rather than to your conclusion. You implicitly argue your method is a reliable generator of true statements, by using the word knowledge. If by knowledge you mean having information generated by an unreliable method that is quite another matter.
Your responses continue to apply to an argument quite foreign to my own. I doubt I can take you any further at this point, but if you have a specific question you think would help do of course ask it.
Bernard
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Bernard,
“You offered a method by which one could come to make correct moral statements e.g reach the conclusion that torture is morally wrong in a universe where this is actually the case.”
Perhaps this will help. I have offered nothing but what any of us can offer, including you. Out of the narratives we inhabit, we reason, we reflect, we learn, and we make decisions regarding what we think morality is ontologically (even if we conclude we can’t know what it is ontologically). When we come to what we think is true, that is all we offer, what any of us can offer.
I am sorry that you have adopted a presupposition regarding “reliability” and being “correct”, or “hitting” the mark, that doesn’t even apply to these questions. It is enough that most reasonable people note that while they believe what they do in these areas to be true, they also know they could be wrong. Any talk of “hitting” the mark, or being “reliable”, being proven “correct” is simply without any merit and makes no sense whatsoever in this context.
It would make sense if someone was claiming they could prove these things empirically/scientifically or with mathematical probability, but no one is. Why? Because most people understand we are not speaking of physical objects, forces, or something even given to mathematical probabilities. I would love to see the equation that shows that 7 out of 10 times, when we don’t torture someone, we make the “correct” choice. And I would love to see the person who would claim agnosticism until someone could show such to him—that unless we could map out, mathematically, how we are right more often than not (51%), then the heck with it. In my opinion, that is not a reasonable response. It is also a response that implicitly is asking for, requiring, empirical proof/mathematical probability, the very thing one supposedly claimed wasn’t necessary for something to be true or exist ontologically.
You have imagined a interesting objection to something no one asserts (mathematical probability) and makes no sense at all given the context of the subject matter. You have created this problem in your own mind, but it need not be a problem and isn’t for most.
If after all this, if this is the slight thread upon which you hang your agnosticism, you may want to re-visit your reasons. And no shame there—we all need to do so from time to time.
I think we are done here. I think we made some progress–actually. As always, thanks for the conversation. Cheers.
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Hi Darrell
So are you saying you have a method by which to reach a belief, but have no sense at all as to whether or not this particular method is a reliable method by which to discover truth? Are you sure you want to own the idea that a person guessing is just as likely to reach a true statement as one using your method? That strikes me as a very honest claim, but one that rather undermines the claim to have knowledge.
Bernard
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Bernard,
“So are you saying you have a method…”
No, I’m saying we all use this same method. Since you’ve never proposed another and have told us we can have knowledge and know something to be true (exist ontologically) in ways other than empirically/scientifically, it is all we have (holistic reasoning). So, it is your method too.
“…by which to reach a belief, but have no sense at all as to whether or not this particular method is a reliable method by which to discover truth?”
See prior response(s). “Reliable” is utterly without meaning in this context, unless of course one is showing his implicit empiricism and need for empirical or mathematical probability…
“…Are you sure you want to own the idea that a person guessing…”
No one is guessing, including you, so there is nothing to own. Nice try though.
Cheers.
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Hi Darrell
If I did indeed blindly guess as to what constitutes a moral act, and you were to apply your method, are you saying you would be no more likely to reach a correct moral conclusion than me (yet maintain the right to believe your conclusion is true nonetheless)? Why not simply answer the question?
Bernard
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Bernard,
I have answered it—several times now. You clearly just don’t like the answer. See my previous responses. What we each believe about morality and its ontological status, we believe to be true, even if that belief is that one doesn’t know its ontological status. So, if you told me you were guessing, I would reply: Well, you are an ignorant and troubled fellow then. Yes, we can maintain that we believe we are correct, and also, at the same time, admit we could be wrong (whether to the ontological nature question or as to any specific example). Why that is a problem for you and why you require a mathematical probability for questions of this nature to guarantee their being correct, something no one claims to do (for obvious reasons), something that doesn’t even pertain to the subject matter (I think 51% of the time, when I don't kill innocent people, I'm on the right track!), I have no idea. Perhaps you could explain that to us on your own blog. You agreed there were ways we could know something to be true and exist ontologically other than empirical/scientific/mathematical, and yet, that is only criteria we see now you will accept.
You introduce (presuppose) an imagined bar that no one (other than empiricists/naturalists) would agree even applies in this context. Not much I can do about that—it is sort of your problem, not mine.
We are done here however. Please don’t respond—you’ve had plenty of time to make your case and you are welcome to make it further on your own blog.
Cheers.
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